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Consider a familiar scenario: A sponsor holds a high-performing enterprise software company acquired five years ago. Revenue has tripled, EBITDA margins have expanded, and the asset still has runway. But the exit market hasn’t cooperated. Strategic buyers are bidding well below where the sponsor sees value, and the IPO window remains uncertain. Meanwhile, LPs are pressing for distributions.
The sponsor is weighing their options to get liquidity to their investors. A continuation vehicle (CV), net asset value (NAV) facilities, dividend recapitalization, and preferred equity may all be viable, and can each address the liquidity need, but they produce materially different tax outcomes depending on structure, timing, and investor mix. Here’s how their analysis plays out.
Private equity’s exit backlog has grown to nearly 33,000 unsold companies globally, representing more than $3 trillion in value. In the U.S., the backlog stood at 13,325 portfolio companies as of March 31, according to PitchBook data cited by WSJ Pro Private Equity.
WSJ Pro Private Equity, “The PE Paradox: Volatility Fuels New Deals as Old Assets Sit Frozen in Portfolios,” May 13, 2026, citing PitchBook data as of March 31.With a CV, the sponsor moves the portfolio company into a new vehicle. Existing LPs can choose to cash out, roll over, or do a partial mix of both. For rolling LPs, the transaction offers continued exposure under new economics. For sellers, it creates a liquidity option at a valuation that a third-party sale may not currently support. The process resets the ownership timeline, which requires careful attention to valuation, governance, conflicts, term length, management fee, carry, and other economics.
The tax consequences hinge on the transaction’s form. If the legacy fund sells the asset to the new vehicle, gain is recognized and allocated among legacy partners, generally including rolling investors who reinvest their proceeds. A mixed redemption-and-contribution structure, by contrast, may produce different results on gain recognition, basis, and holding period.
Now suppose the sponsor isn’t ready to move the software company into a new vehicle but still needs to deliver liquidity. A NAV facility lets the fund borrow against portfolio value and distribute proceeds to LPs, buying time without forcing a sale. Depending on the facts, the facility may be used to fund distributions, support portfolio companies, refinance obligations, or bridge timing gaps. If this is the route the sponsor selects, they should communicate clearly and early about why any borrowing is being incurred, how it supports the fund’s strategy, and how it is expected to be repaid.
Additionally, the substance of the NAV-based credit facility must match the form. If the facility functions more like a disguised sale or lacks arm’s-length debt economics, the tax treatment could be challenged, with consequences for interest deductions, withholding, and investor reporting.
"[T] the longer hold times are giving firms the opportunity to build up their portcos’ fundamentals that will make their portcos more attractive to buyers upon exit. Based on our experience, we see five data-driven opportunities firms can use to reshape portco operations, improve their value creation potential, and unlock AI’s potential."
Alternatively, the sponsor could leave the fund structure untouched and instead have the software company itself take on new debt, distributing the proceeds upstream. This dividend recapitalization accelerates cash to LPs and potentially to the GP through carried interest, while the sponsor retains ownership.
At the portfolio company level, the central question is whether the interest on the new borrowing is deductible. As with NAV facilities, Section 163(j) applies, and the portfolio company’s ability to use the deduction will depend on its adjusted taxable income, the nature of its business activities, and whether any applicable elections are available. If the company operates through a pass-through structure, those limitations flow to the fund and its investors.
For LPs, the tax treatment of the distribution depends on the character of the payment at the portfolio company level, including whether the portfolio company is a C corporation or a pass-through entity, which determines whether the proceeds carry dividend income or are treated as a partnership distribution that reduces outside basis, with excess over basis generally treated as gain. Investors should also consider allocable interest expense and investor-level deduction limitations. Because a recap increases portfolio company leverage, the tax benefits depend on the company’s ongoing ability to service and deduct the interest.
Finally, the sponsor could bring in a preferred equity investor at the fund or asset level, raising capital without a full exit or traditional debt. Because preferred equity sits between debt and equity in the capital stack, its tax treatment turns on the instrument's terms. The threshold question is whether the IRS respects the instrument as equity or recharacterizes it as debt, and there is no bright-line test.
Beyond classification, sponsors and investors must evaluate how the preferred return is characterized for tax purposes, whether phantom income may be created, how the instrument interacts with the distribution waterfall and substantial economic effect rules, and what consequences arise on exit or conversion. State tax outcomes, UBTI, and ECI exposure should also be considered, particularly where the investor base includes tax-exempt or non-US investors. For a detailed treatment of these issues, see our prior post, Private market access is getting more complex, not just more available.
Each of these solutions has its own complexity, challenges, and upside. Each solves for liquidity in a different way and generates a different tax profile. The common consideration is that tax consequences are hardest to fix after commercial terms are set. Sponsors that model the tax early, pressure-test investor-level outcomes across entity types, and coordinate with advisors before elections are due can decrease the likelihood of the costliest surprises.
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