A new growth framework for the Kingdom
The next phase of growth in the Kingdom requires a shift from scale to quality. This edition of Saudi Economy Watch introduces a practical framework to help policymakers and investors identify sectors that can deliver resilient, high-productivity growth with reduced reliance on oil-funded demand.
Since the launch of Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has made rapid progress in expanding non-oil activity. As of 2024, the non-oil sector accounts for around 56% of a SAR 4.7 trillion (US$1.25trn) economy, and non-oil fiscal revenues have more than doubled since 2017. 1
These gains reflect sustained reforms to the business environment, large scale public investment and rising private sector participation, including the rollout of major gigaprojects, the expanding role of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) in anchoring new sectors, from tourism to advanced industrials and automotive manufacturing, and the use of Vision Realisation Programmes to coordinate policy, regulation and investment across government.
While headline indicators reflect continued progress in economic diversification, oil market conditions remain an important factor influencing non-oil activity. A material share of recent non-oil growth continues to be supported, directly or indirectly, by oil-related fiscal revenues, which links economic outcomes to movements in global oil prices. In 2025, softer oil prices reduced projected fiscal revenues by 13.3% year-on-year and contributed to a more constrained expenditure environment, highlighting the ongoing relationship between oil market dynamics and the scale, timing and composition of non-oil investment.
This linkage extends beyond short-term demand conditions. Productivity indicators suggest that recent non-oil growth has been driven primarily by capital investment, labour force expansion and public-sector support. Aggregate measures point to a moderation in total factor productivity since the mid-2010s, indicating scope for future diversification gains to be increasingly underpinned by efficiency improvements, innovation and private-sector-led productivity growth as the economic transition advances.
As fiscal conditions tighten, this growth pattern becomes harder to sustain. The next phase of diversification therefore places greater emphasis on how growth is generated, not simply how much is achieved. Progress will depend less on expanding non-oil output in aggregate and more on directing capital towards activities that raise productivity, generate scalable exports and attract private investment that can endure with lower reliance on the oil cycle.
This shift reflects a broader recalibration of economic strategy towards resilience. Policymakers are placing greater weight on whether growth can be maintained through external shocks and fiscal cycles, particularly in a more fragmented global environment and under pressure from lower hydrocarbon revenues.
Against this backdrop, this study examines how oil prices continue to shape non-oil economic performance in Saudi Arabia and sets out an export-oriented growth framework to guide investment towards more productive, competitive and resilient sources of non-oil growth in the Kingdom.
Oil revenues influence non-oil economic performance through the following channels:
First, oil prices shape fiscal space and the pace of public investment. Periods of high prices have enabled rapid capital deployment, infrastructure expansion and broad demand support across non-oil sectors. However, when prices soften, expenditure is reprioritised, borrowing pressures rise and investment pipelines slow. This underscores the need to use limited fiscal resources to build lasting productive capacity rather than activity with limited long-term economic returns.
Second, oil market conditions influence investment behaviour, particularly from foreign investors. Domestic business sentiment has become more resilient, with PMI readings remaining in expansionary territory even during periods of softer oil prices. External capital, however, remains sensitive to fiscal outlooks, public spending trajectories and the credibility of long-term growth, contributing to flatter FDI inflows during recent periods of oil price weakness.2
Third, oil prices affect the external position and the availability of foreign exchange needed to finance diversification. Foreign exchange reserves support imports of capital goods, technology and specialised services critical to non-oil growth. When oil revenues weaken, external buffers come under pressure, funding conditions tighten and non-oil projects may be delayed or scaled back. This reinforces the importance of building non-oil exports that generate stable foreign currency earnings and reduce reliance on oil-funded reserves.3
Our empirical analysis confirms that these channels remain economically meaningful. Our estimates indicate that a 10% change in oil prices is associated with around a 0.5% change in non-oil GDP.4
Figure 1: Changes in oil price and changes in non-oil GDP over time
We estimate the elasticity of non-oil GDP with respect to oil price to be 0.05
→ a 10% change in oil price leads to a 0.5% change in non-oil sector GDP
To put this in perspective, a 10% dip in oil price sustained over three years, would represent a cumulative loss of non-oil GDP of around SAR 430bn, against baseline non-oil GDP growth.5 If non-oil GDP were only half as sensitive to oil price movements, the cumulative loss of non-oil GDP over the three years would be limited to only SAR 215bn . This highlights the risk that oil price swings pose to the non-oil economy, as well as the importance of reducing the dependence of non-oil GDP growth on the oil economy.
Figure 2: The impact of oil price decline on non-oil GDP
These findings do not imply that diversification efforts to date have been ineffective. Rather, they underline that the economy remains in transition. The policy question is therefore how to reduce the influence of oil prices on non-oil performance over time by improving the quality, structure and sustainability of growth.
For a resource-rich economy like Saudi Arabia, growth driven mainly by domestic consumption does not provide sufficient insulation from commodity cycles. As long as oil revenues anchor household incomes and public spending, domestic demand will continue to be influenced by oil price swings.
Export-oriented activity matters as it supports sustainable diversification through several mechanisms:
International experience shows how export-oriented diversification has anchored structural transformation in resource-scarce and resource-rich economies alike:
Korea: targeted capability building through adjacent sectors
Korea’s development path illustrates how export-orientation can create cumulative capability gains. Early investment in shipbuilding shaped a foundation of engineering, fabrication and systems-integration capabilities. These capabilities supported expansion into adjacent industries such as chemicals, automotive, electronics and machinery. Export markets rewarded firms that scaled quickly, adopted advanced production techniques and met global quality standards. Over time, these capabilities enabled Korea to climb technology ladders and consolidate globally competitive firms across multiple sectors. Its strategy focused on an industry that could anchor wider capability development: shipbuilding created a platform of heavy-industry competencies that firms later applied in adjacent tradable sectors.
These experiences show that successful diversification relies on sequencing investments. Rather than dispersing investment across many unrelated activities, Saudi Arabia can concentrate on sectors where early scale creates transferable capabilities that support movement up technology ladders. Export exposure in these anchor sectors can reinforce learning, raise quality standards and accelerate the emergence of globally competitive firms, allowing adjacent industries to scale more quickly and with lower risk.
As fiscal conditions become more constrained, the composition of investment matters more than its volume. The focus shifts toward strengthening the foundations of sustainable diversification, including skills development, supply chain depth and competitive industrial capacity. As these foundations take hold and private investment expands, the sensitivity of non-oil growth to oil prices should ease over time.
Shifting the growth model in this direction has implications for investment priorities. When activity is driven mainly by domestic demand and public spending, capital often flows towards sectors that deliver rapid short-term gains but limited sustained capability. For example, construction can lift growth quickly, but its impact fades once projects end and skills do not easily transfer to higher-value tradable sectors. Similarly, activities reliant on episodic demand may lift growth temporarily but rarely sustain momentum unless they support firms to scale, move up value chains, and build local supply networks. For example, large-scale events can stimulate services and visibility, but their longer-term value depends on whether they build capabilities in areas such as logistics, creative industries, technology or international business services.
This means using public resources with greater selectivity. Public resources are most effective when they provide additionality: reducing early-stage risks, enabling shared infrastructure or setting the conditions that allow private investors to participate with confidence. As sectors mature, sustained progress depends increasingly on private firms expanding on commercial terms, investing in technology and competing in external markets.
Investment choices within supply chains matter. Upstream activities that provide essential inputs to many sectors can influence productivity and competitiveness across the economy. Materials, chemicals and digital platforms shape downstream costs and quality, while machinery and equipment manufacturing stimulates demand for components, specialised services and technical capabilities.7 Where these linkages are dense, learning and spillovers tend to be stronger.
International experience underscores the importance of such connected ecosystems. Korea’s industrial development shows how upstream capabilities in steel and chemicals supported shipbuilding and automotive manufacturing. Network-based research finds that improvements in upstream sectors propagate through production networks and influence economy-wide productivity, highlighting the role of capital goods producers in diffusing embodied technology.8 These dynamics suggest that linked ecosystems are an important condition for durable diversification in Saudi Arabia.
This points to an approach that prioritises export potential, capability formation, domestic value creation, skill intensity and disciplined public private risk sharing.
The growth framework in the next section sets out practical tests to apply these criteria consistently when assessing sectors and investment opportunities.
Our framework helps decision makers assess which sectors or investments can strengthen the non-oil economy and reduce exposure to oil cycles. It brings together the factors that matter most for long-term competitiveness: export potential, capability development, value creation, skills, private investment and resilience.
Many elements of this framework are already visible in Saudi Arabia’s diversification agenda. Initiatives launched under Vision 2030 increasingly reflect a shift from expanding activity in aggregate toward building export capability, industrial depth, and private sector scale. The framework therefore formalises and sharpens an approach that is already taking shape, providing a more consistent basis for prioritising future investment as fiscal conditions tighten.
Each pillar within the framework includes a set of key tests, which are practical questions that allow policymakers to evaluate investments in a consistent and evidence-based way. These tests are designed to be applied early in the decision-making process to judge whether an opportunity is likely to deliver sustained diversification, attract private capital, and build capabilities that support productivity and exports.
To illustrate the potential impact of productivity-oriented investment choices, we modelled a scenario aligned with the growth framework. The scenario assumes gradual increases in the knowledge stock through R&D and spillovers, improvements in human capital, and deeper integration into global value chains over a ten-year period.
Under assumptions drawn from the literature, this package could increase total factor productivity by around 10% by 2035, resulting in a boost to non-oil GDP of around 5.5% by 2035. These gains fall within observed international experience and would materially strengthen the resilience of non-oil growth.9
Figure 3: Potential gains from the growth framework10
Whilst not directly captured in our simulation, the redirection of investment towards activities with higher value addition, which rely on highly skilled labour, and which are inclined towards high knowledge spillovers, can support these policies and further enhance productivity gains.
Saudi Arabia has made decisive progress in expanding non-oil activity and reshaping the structure of the economy under Vision 2030. Non-oil GDP has grown strongly, new sectors have scaled rapidly, and private sector momentum has been sustained even through periods of softer oil prices. These outcomes demonstrate the effectiveness of reform and the catalytic role of public investment in accelerating diversification.
At the same time, non-oil performance remains influenced by oil market conditions, and productivity gains have been limited. As fiscal space tightens, this growth model becomes harder to sustain.
The next phase of diversification therefore requires a shift in emphasis from scale to quality. Capital should be allocated more selectively towards activities that build productive capabilities, generate scalable exports and attract private investment that can sustain growth independently of oil revenues.
The export-oriented growth framework set out in this study provides a concrete basis for this transition. It moves diversification from scale to quality. By anchoring investment decisions in export competitiveness, capability development, domestic value creation, skills upgrading and targeted public–private risk sharing, the framework strengthens productivity and underpins a more resilient and self-sustaining growth model for the Kingdom.
Richard Boxshall
Global Economics Leader and Middle East Chief Economist, PwC Middle East
Tel: +971 (0)4 304 3100