- Move from highly centralised architectures to more distributed networks using decentralised generation, distributed energy resources and battery storage.
- Strategically locate assets to avoid too much capacity being concentrated in a single site, node or coastal cluster.
- Build more modular and segmented systems, so disruption in one part of the network does not automatically spread across critical dependencies such as power and water.
Disruption to power systems can quickly affect water supply and essential services, including healthcare, cooling, data centres, industry and households. Here is a resilience playbook to help utilities protect critical network nodes, operate under stress and recover quickly
Across the Middle East and beyond, the recent disruption has shown that power systems can no longer be planned only around supply adequacy, efficiency and demand growth. Generation assets, transmission networks, substations, transformers, control systems and other critical nodes all sit within a connected system where disruption at one point can quickly create wider consequences.
For the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this risk carries particular weight. Electricity underpins not only economic activity, but also water production, cooling, healthcare, data centres, industry, communications and daily life. The region’s power-water interdependence makes this especially critical: desalination depends on reliable electricity, while desalinated water sustains essential services and social stability.
This means disruption does not need to affect the entire grid to have wider significance. The loss or reduced availability of a generation asset, transmission corridor, substation or control centre can create pressure on supply, limit system visibility or affect the delivery of electricity to dependent services.
The priority now is to rethink how power systems are designed, operated and invested in so they can continue functioning during disruption, not only in stable conditions. That means reducing concentration risk, strengthening transmission resilience, protecting critical nodes, improving recovery capability and ensuring supply chains can support rapid repair and replacement.
Operations teams are already responding to this reality. Planning, investment and supply chain strategies are beginning to adjust. Policymakers and regulators now need to move at the same pace, embedding resilience and recoverability into the way power systems are planned, funded and governed.
Building system resilience
Energy security must now be defined by how well systems withstand disruption. It can be understood across four dimensions:
Physical resilience: The ability of infrastructure to withstand and limit damage from physical disruption, including through hardening, redundancy and asset configuration
Operational resilience: The ability to operate the system under compromised conditions, including through real-time reconfiguration, islanding and crisis response capabilities
System design resilience: The extent to which the architecture of the system reduces vulnerability, including through decentralisation, diversification and avoidance of concentrating the locations of key utilities
Institutional preparedness: The ability of organisations and stakeholders to anticipate, coordinate and respond effectively to disruption, including integration with government, defence and emergency response structures
Utilities regulators will, therefore, need to prioritise three additional capabilities alongside efficiency, cost and reliability:
Resilience: The ability of the system to absorb disruption without notable impact on society
Survivability: The ability to continue operating, even in a compromised state, under sustained disruption
Recoverability: The ability to restore functionality quickly and efficiently following disruption
Since electricity underpins desalination, communications, healthcare, cooling and industrial activity, strengthening power system resilience is the practical starting point for protecting the wider utility ecosystem.
A resilience playbook for power systems that support connected utilities
For utilities in the region, seven capability areas should guide action:
1. System design – reduce concentration risk and enable survivability
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2. Infrastructure protection – harden critical nodes and build redundancy
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- Physically harden high-impact assets such as substations, transformers and generation facilities.
- Protect key infrastructure such as control centres through measures such as undergrounding or physical separation.
- Prioritise investment on protecting the nodes that have the greatest system-wide impact.
3. Operational readiness – enable the system to operate through disruption
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- Transition from centralised control to active-active operational models.1
- Ensure effective blackstart capability and clear restoration sequencing.2
- Build capability for real-time system reconfiguration under compromised conditions.
- Prepare to operate with reduced visibility and constrained control.
4. Cyber resilience – protect the control layer of the system
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- Secure operational technology environments from intrusion.
- Implement segmentation between information technology and operational technology systems to limit propagation.
- Establish continuous monitoring, detection and rapid response capabilities.
- Recognise that cyberattacks amplify physical disruption by hindering control and coordination.
5. Emergency preparedness – move from plans to executable response
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- Establish and regularly rehearse crisis response protocols.
- Develop rapid decision-making structures and escalation pathways.
- Coordinate closely with government, defence and emergency services.
- Plan for sustained disruption, not just short-duration events.
6. Asset management strategy – prioritise based on system criticality
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- Shift from cost-optimised lifecycle management to risk-based prioritisation.
- Identify and prioritise assets that would have disproportionate system impact if disrupted.
- Accelerate reinforcement or replacement of critical infrastructure.
- Align maintenance strategies with resilience objectives, not just efficiency.
- Develop capability to salvage and reuse components from damaged or decommissioned assets.
7. Operating model and resourcing – enable sustained response under crisis conditions
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- Establish dedicated crisis teams with clear command structures.
- Enable cross-functional coordination across operations, cyber and asset teams.
- Integrate with national security and defence structures where required.
- Build workforce resilience, including training for high-stress and compromised operating environments.
- Develop rapid-response field repair teams capable of operating under disrupted or contested conditions.
- Pre-position mobile repair units and equipment, such as mobile substations and temporary transformers.
Strategic priorities for utilities in the GCC
For power systems, traditional planning frameworks built around adequacy, reliability and cost efficiency must now expand to include scenarios involving coordinated disruption, loss of control systems and prolonged system disruption.
The following five priorities stand out:
- Redefine planning criteria around resilience.
- Rebalance investment to value redundancy, decentralisation, flexibility and modular design.
- Elevate operational resilience and rapid recovery as core system functions.
- Accelerate grid digitalisation while managing cyber risk.
- Strengthen supply chain resilience through supplier diversification and regional repair capability.
These priorities move resilience from a technical consideration to a strategic test of whether power systems can protect essential services under pressure.
Contributors:
Dr. Ahmad Abdel-Majeed, Senior Manager, PwC Middle East
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