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The ongoing pandemic, economic challenges, and political divisions exemplified by the tumultuous events of recent weeks will affect the prospects for significant tax legislation and other policy changes this year. At the same time, the outlook for action on President Joe Biden’s campaign proposals has improved since the results of the Congressional Georgia Senate runoff elections gave Democrats effective control of the Senate, with Democrats also holding a slim majority in the House.

President Biden has made it clear that his first priority is to address the pandemic and its economic fallout, even as the Senate considers an article of impeachment of former President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, the new Biden administration and Congress have begun active discussions of the president’s ‘Build Back Better’ recovery proposals that rely on increased taxes from corporations and high-income individuals to offset part of the cost of his plans. These issues are being considered this year on a dual-track basis, as shown in Figure 1.

With major US tax policy changes under consideration, global tax policy also remains in a state of flux as the pandemic increases revenue challenges for other nations. Negotiations are ongoing over the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposed changes to long-standing international tax rules, and globally engaged businesses are facing the risk of even greater cross-border tax controversy.

International trade relations and business supply chains also are being redefined. The United States and other countries are seeking to address disagreements with China over trade and a range of other issues. New trading patterns are being forged in North America under the United States’ revised free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico and in post-Brexit Europe, as well as in other parts of the world.

In this environment, business leaders need to assess the potential effects of changing policies in the United States and around the world and to engage actively with policymakers. Companies should consider speaking ‘early and often’ with Democratic and Republican members of Congress as well as the new Biden administration about how the policy issues discussed in this outlook—corporate and individual rate increases, potential increased taxation of foreign operations, and a host of other proposed changes to US, state, and foreign tax laws—may affect your business. Business outreach efforts also should include results of modeling the effect of potential tax changes on competitiveness, business investment, and job creation.

Figure 1: Potential 2021 timeline for tax policy actions

The heart of the matter
Overview

In his inaugural address, President Biden called on all Americans to work together to heal political divisions and to meet the challenge of overcoming the pandemic and its economic hardships. He pledged to seek action in 2021 on his campaign proposals to create better-paying jobs, tackle climate change, invest in American infrastructure, promote racial justice, and address income inequality. Additional Biden goals include immigration reform, targeted student loan forgiveness, and building on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by providing a Medicare public option and by making other modifications to 'Obamacare.'

President Biden has proposed a $1.9 trillion COVID relief package that would build on the $900 billion COVID relief package enacted last December, which he referred to as a ‘down payment.’ The 2020 year-end legislation also included a significant ‘tax extenders’ package renewing business and individual provisions that had been set to expire at the end of 2020.

Biden’s plan includes increased funding for national vaccine distribution efforts, an increase in individual recovery direct payments, additional funding for state and local governments, help for small businesses to retain workers and avoid closures, and expanded paid sick and family leave requirements, along with other measures.

President Biden has pointed to the ongoing economic hardship associated with the pandemic as warranting further immediate action by the federal government. According to the most recent jobs report, the US economy shed a net 9.37 million jobs in 2020, exceeding the 5.05 million jobs lost in 2009 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Biden has noted job losses continue to be felt most severely by low-income workers. Employment levels for workers earning less than $30,000 fell the most in early 2020 and still remain roughly 20% below pre-pandemic levels, while overall employment levels for workers earning more than $60,000 have fully recovered.

“In this moment of crisis, with interest rates at historic lows, we cannot afford inaction,” said Biden. He added that the return on his proposed investments “will prevent long-term economic damage and the benefits will far surpass the costs.”

Observation: The course of the pandemic and the possibility of future federal aid to states and localities will be key factors in the state tax policy decision-making process.
While many in Congress support additional federal spending to address the pandemic and its economic effects, some in the House and Senate have expressed concerns that federal budget deficits have grown significantly since the start of the pandemic, as shown on Figure 2. Notwithstanding the federal government’s ability to borrow at historically low interest rates, debate over the size of projected federal budget deficits will play a role in determining the scope of additional pandemic relief measures and whether such legislation is enacted with bipartisan support or with only Democratic votes, as discussed below.

Figure 2: Estimated budget deficit relative to pre-COVID baseline (not including 2020 year-end legislation)

Source: FY 2020 actual and CBO (September 2020 for 10-year projection); Does not reflect 2020 year-end legislation.

Biden tax proposals

During his campaign, Biden proposed a number of business and individual tax increases that are intended to offset in part the cost of his ‘Build Back Better’ recovery agenda. Key business tax proposals include:

- Increasing the US corporate tax rate to 28%,
- Imposing a 15% minimum tax on companies’ global book income, and
- Doubling the current minimum tax on profits earned by foreign subsidiaries of US firms, raising it from 10.5% to 21%.
Additional Biden business tax proposals include sector-specific proposals that would affect energy companies, real estate businesses, pharmaceutical companies, and large financial institutions. He has proposed several ‘Make it in America’ tax measures that seek to ‘end outsourcing’ and promote US domestic manufacturing and job creation.

President Biden has proposed significant changes to individual tax provisions both to offset the cost of his broader policy agenda and as part of his efforts to address income inequality. Key individual tax proposals include:

- Rolling back income and estate tax reductions from the 2017 tax reform act (the 2017 Act) for taxpayers with incomes above $400,000; and
- Taxing capital gains and dividends as ordinary income for individuals with income above $1 million, while making other changes that would limit the ability of individuals to use current ‘step-up in basis’ rules.

Democratic control of both the White House and Congress raises questions about how certain provisions from the 2017 Act that are subject to change under current law may be addressed. While 2017 Act individual provisions are not set to expire until the end of 2025, other changes are scheduled to take effect at earlier dates:

- New rules requiring capitalization of research expenditures, set to take effect in 2022;
- Further limiting of interest deductions, by denying an addback for depreciation and amortization (also set to take effect in 2022); and
- Full expensing rules for qualified property are set to phase out, beginning in 2023.

Budget reconciliation provides opportunities and limitations for the Biden agenda

The final results of the 2020 election cycle allow Democrats to use the ‘budget reconciliation’ process in seeking to advance in 2021 some of Biden’s tax proposals, such as increases in corporate and individual tax rates, with only Democratic votes. Budget reconciliation could also be used to address the statutory federal debt limit, which in 2019 was suspended through the end of July 2021.

If necessary, budget reconciliation procedures could be employed to enact Biden’s pandemic recovery proposals with only Democratic votes. Since there was no budget resolution completed for fiscal year (FY) 2021 (ending September 30, 2021), Congress could create two sets of reconciliation instructions this calendar year—first for FY 2021 and later for FY 2022. The first could provide an opportunity to enact Biden’s pandemic recovery proposals and to address issues like the federal debt limit, while the second could enable Democrats to enact his tax increase proposals.

Originally designed to facilitate the adoption of bipartisan deficit reduction legislation, the budget reconciliation process has been used more often when one party controlled the White House and Congress, but did not have a 60-vote ‘filibuster-proof’ majority in the Senate. Under this procedure, Republicans achieved enactment of tax reform legislation in 2017, and Democrats accomplished enactment of the final ACA legislation in 2010. Budget reconciliation procedures provide significant benefits for a party controlling both the White House and Congress, but also include significant limitations, as discussed below.
The final 2020 election results have provided House Democrats with only a slim majority, after suffering unexpected losses last November. Democrats began the 117th Congress with a 222 to 211 majority; one New York House race is still undecided, and a Louisiana House seat is vacant due to the recent death of Representative-elect Luke Letlow (R-LA). Democratic victories in the two Georgia races have resulted in a 50-50 Senate, with the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Kamala Harris giving Democrats a de facto 51-50 majority.

With the narrow majorities, the scope of any tax increase proposals considered under budget reconciliation will be limited by the need to gain the near-unanimous support of House Democrats and all 50 Democratic Senators. For example, Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) has stated that he would not support increasing the corporate tax rate above 25%. Other moderate House and Senate Democrats are expected to have concerns about various Biden tax increase proposals.

Given these political considerations, our PwC Tax Policy team expects to see strong efforts to enact:

- A corporate rate increase;
- Increased taxation of foreign operations;
- A return of the top individual rate to 39.6%.

**Challenges ahead in bridging partisan differences**

Most legislation will not be considered under budget reconciliation procedures. For example, annual discretionary spending bills to fund the federal government are not considered under reconciliation. While government funding for FY 2021 is in place through the end of September, Congress will still need to act on new government funding legislation for FY 2022, which begins on October 1, 2021. Many other issues will be addressed under regular legislative procedures, which in the Senate generally require 60 votes. The Senate ‘filibuster’ is unlikely to be eliminated, since Senator Manchin has already gone on record opposing the idea and other Senate Democrats also are expected to oppose the move.

President Biden likely will seek to leverage his experience of serving in the Senate for 36 years and as vice president for eight years to build bipartisan support for legislation considered outside the reconciliation process. For example, there may be ad hoc bipartisan coalitions of moderate Senators who join together to advance specific policies, as was the case with the group of moderate Republican and Democratic Senators who played a key role in building support for action on the COVID relief package that was enacted in late December. At the same time, House and Senate progressive Democrats are expected to push President Biden to support their legislative proposals.
Observation: It will take considerable efforts by Democrats and Republicans—by all Americans—to reduce partisan divisions. President Biden may find it easier to establish an effective working relationship with Senate Republicans than House Republicans. In the end, then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and all but seven Senate Republicans opposed rejecting the results of the Electoral College. By contrast, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) and a majority of House Republicans voted to reject the Electoral College votes of Arizona and Pennsylvania.

Global tax and trade policy challenges

International tax issues and disputes remain ongoing challenges for US and non-US multinational enterprises (MNEs). Debates over the digitalization of the global economy and the traditional concepts of permanent establishment and arm’s-length principles have intensified since the 2015 release of the OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) Action 1 report on ‘tax challenges arising from digitalization.’ The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework is continuing efforts to reach a workable consensus on issues related to digital taxation. The OECD in 2021 is seeking to complete work on proposals for significant changes to the overall global tax framework as outlined in ‘Pillar One’ and ‘Pillar Two’ proposals.

Observation: The next six to 12 months will be crucial for the Inclusive Framework’s effort to remake the international tax system. ‘Success’ for that project would likely result in significant changes to national tax legislation in perhaps more than 100 countries, with effects on all globally engaged companies. If the project fails, the outcome almost certainly will be uncoordinated, unilateral actions by many of these countries (such as the new taxes on multinational corporations imposed by France and other countries), with effects not limited to ‘digital’ companies.

The European Union this year is expected to pursue an ambitious agenda on numerous tax initiatives apart from the OECD proposals. There were significant developments in 2020 affecting the level of transparency that taxpayers and governments are expected to provide to the public. Transparency is expected to be the focus of continued attention this year. With increasing pressures across the globe for greater disclosure of tax reporting, companies should proactively prepare for public scrutiny.

Finally, global trade will play a key factor in economic recovery efforts in the United States and around the world. Canada and Mexico together are still the largest trading partners of the United States, and business supply chains continue to be affected by implementation of the updated free trade agreement with those two countries. US-China trade policy is one area where there may be some continuity from the Trump to the Biden administration. President Biden has signaled that he intends to maintain current trade restrictions between the United States and China. The outlook for continued US-China trade tensions is likely to increase considerations by companies to relocate certain overseas operations in order to reduce policy-related trade risk. The Biden administration is expected to continue separate free trade agreement talks with the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as new trade agreements with other nations.
Balance of power

The 117th Congress is now underway with Democrats controlling Congress as well as the White House for the first time since late 2010, at the end of the former President Barack Obama’s first two years in office. Democrats hold a slim majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate is evenly divided, with Vice President Harris holding the potential Democratic tie-breaking vote.

House of Representatives

In the House, the new Congress began with 222 Democrats, 211 Republicans, and two vacancies. Republicans gained at least 11 seats in the 2020 election, narrowing the Democrats’ previous House majority, as shown on Figure 3. One New York race is still undecided at this writing, and one seat was left vacant by the death of Representative-elect Luke Letlow (R-LA). A special election will be held to fill the vacant seat in Louisiana.

Three House Democrats have been named to serve in the Biden administration: Cedric Richmond (D-LA), who served on the Ways and Means Committee, as a senior advisor to President Biden; Marcia Fudge (D-OH) as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; and Deb Haaland (D-NM) as Secretary of the Interior. The House seats of these members will be filled by state special elections, but the temporary vacancies will further tighten the Democratic majority for some months. A slim majority means House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) will have to unite Democrats behind key priorities, since nearly unanimous support among Democrats will be required to pass legislation that lacks bipartisan support.

Senate

In the Senate, there are 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats (including the two Independents who caucus with Democrats), with Vice President Harris holding the potential Democratic tie-breaking vote. Democrats gained three seats in the recent elections, as also shown on Figure 3. Senator Alex Padilla (D-CA) was appointed to fill the Senate seat vacated by Vice President Harris.

The last time the Senate was evenly divided followed the 2000 elections, and then Republicans controlled the chamber with the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Dick Cheney (R). A ‘power-sharing agreement’ between the parties was negotiated at that time to govern many aspects of committee and floor activities, with Republicans controlling the Senate floor schedule and serving as chairs of all committees. That agreement ended in May 2001, when then-Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont switched his party affiliation from Republican to Independent and began caucusing with the Democrats, giving them control of the Senate.
Note: Republicans were able to achieve significant tax cuts in 2001 under then-President George W. Bush with the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Cheney.

At this writing, the Senate is negotiating a power-sharing agreement on how it will operate in a divided environment. This agreement is expected to remain in effect until after the 2022 midterm elections and the start of the next Congress, unless another event, such as a Senator again deciding to leave their current party and begin caucusing with the other party, intervenes.

Note: This Outlook reflects the expectation that committee ratios will be evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, and Democrats will chair all committees, including the Finance Committee.

Senate procedures in effect generally require 60 votes to limit debate on legislation and bring about a vote on final passage. A Senate rule modification adopted in 2017 lowered the threshold for approving US Supreme Court nominations to a simple majority (usually 51 votes), which brought the requirement in line with a 2013 rule change that adopted a simple majority threshold for executive branch and non-Supreme Court judicial nominations.

Prospects for action on President Biden’s proposals increased significantly after Democrats gained a de facto 51-50 Senate majority, which would allow Democrats to use the budget reconciliation process in seeking to advance some of those proposals with only Democratic votes.

The President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, with a two-thirds majority of both the House and Senate required for a veto override.

Figure 3: House and Senate Election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US House</th>
<th>US Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2018</strong></td>
<td><strong>2018</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant/undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Net change</td>
<td>2020 Net change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Rs +11</td>
<td>Senate Ds +3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes two Independents: Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Angus King (I-ME)
House and Senate tax committees

Rep. Richard Neal (D-MA) continues as Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Rep. Kevin Brady (R-TX) remains the Ranking Republican Member. There currently are 25 Democrats and 18 Republicans on the committee. The Ways and Means Committee has four new members in the 117th Congress. Delegate Stacey Plaskett (D-VI) replaced Rep. Cedric Richmond (D-LA), who left Congress to join the Biden administration. Republican Reps. Kenny Marchant (TX) and George Holding (NC) did not seek re-election to the House; three new Republican members were appointed to the committee: Carol Miller (WV), Lloyd Smucker (PA), and Kevin Hern (OK).

The Senate Finance Committee is led by Chairman Ron Wyden (D-OR), succeeding former Chairman Charles Grassley (R-IA). Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID) serves as the Ranking Republican Member. In the last Congress, the Finance Committee had been composed of 15 Republicans and 13 Democrats; Senators Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Mike Enzi (R-WY) retired. With an evenly divided Senate, the Finance Committee under Chairman Wyden will have 14 Democrats and 14 Republicans.

Administration

The difficulty of passing legislation through a closely divided Congress could mean that regulatory and administrative actions take on additional importance for at least the first two years of the Biden administration.

President Biden nominated Janet Yellen to serve as the Treasury Secretary, and her nomination was recently approved by the Senate. He also will select nominees for key tax policy positions at Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), including the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy and IRS Chief Counsel. Current IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig was appointed to a fixed term that ends November 12, 2022.

President Biden also has named his economic team nominees, including Brian Deese as Director of the National Economic Council, Neera Tanden as Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Cecilia Rouse as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The president has nominated Gary Gensler to chair the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and will be able to fill other regulatory positions this year, including the Chairs of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). At the Federal Reserve, the term of the Vice Chair for Supervision expires in October 2021 and Chair Jerome Powell’s term expires in February 2022.

A listing of key policymakers is provided in Appendix A.
Looking ahead to the 2022 midterm elections

All 435 seats in the House are up for election every two years. Republicans would need to achieve a net gain of at least five seats in 2022 to regain control of the House.

The outlook for 2022 House races is complicated by the need to redraw House district maps to reflect the results of the 2020 census. According to recent Census Bureau estimates, 10 House seats are expected to move among states as a result of the reapportionment process. States that could lose at least one House seat include Alabama, California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. States that could gain one or more seats include Arizona, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Montana, Oregon, and Texas.

Roughly one-third of all Senate seats are subject to election every two years. In 2022, 34 Senate seats are up for re-election, of which 20 currently are held by Republicans and 14 currently are held by Democrats, as shown in Figure 4. Two of the Senate seats up for election in 2022—Mark Kelly (AZ) and Raphael Warnock (GA)—are held by Democrats who won special elections in 2020 for seats that had been held by Republicans. The Democratic Senate seats of Majority Leader Schumer and recently appointed Senator Padilla also will be up for election in 2022.

At this writing, three Senators—Finance Committee members Richard Burr (R-NC), Rob Portman (R-OH), and Pat Toomey (R-PA)—have announced plans not to run for re-election in 2022. Senate Finance Committee members currently expected to run for re-election are Republicans Mike Crapo (ID), Charles Grassley (IA), James Lankford (OK), Tim Scott (SC), John Thune (SD), and Todd Young (IN) and Democrats Michael Bennet (CO), Catherine Cortez Masto (NV), Maggie Hassan (NH), and Ron Wyden (OR). A listing of all Senators whose seats are subject to election in 2022 is included in Appendix B.

Figure 4: Senate

Source: University of Virginia Center for Politics

Democrat (12)  Republican (22)
**Figure 5: Congressional legislative schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117th Congress convened</td>
<td>January 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint session to count electoral college ballots</td>
<td>January 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Luther King Jr. Day</td>
<td>January 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inauguration Day</td>
<td>January 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s speech to a joint session of Congress</td>
<td>February TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents Day recess (House)</td>
<td>February 12–22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents Day recess (Senate)</td>
<td>February 15–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring recess (House)</td>
<td>March 26–April 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring recess (Senate)</td>
<td>March 29–April 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate recess</td>
<td>May 3–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Day recess</td>
<td>May 31–June 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence Day recess (Senate)</td>
<td>June 28–July 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence Day recess (House)</td>
<td>July 2–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August recess (House)</td>
<td>August 2–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August recess (Senate)</td>
<td>August 9–September 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Day recess (House)</td>
<td>September 3–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House recess</td>
<td>September 15–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate recess</td>
<td>September 16–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus Day</td>
<td>October 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate recess</td>
<td>October 11–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Day recess (House)</td>
<td>November 11–12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterans Day recess (Senate)</td>
<td>November 8–12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thanksgiving recess (House)</td>
<td>November 19–29</td>
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<td>Thanksgiving recess (Senate)</td>
<td>November 22–26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target adjournment date</td>
<td>December 10</td>
</tr>
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</table>
US tax policy

Economic outlook

The global pandemic holds a firm grip over the US economy as 2021 gets underway. While employers have added back more than half of the 22.2 million jobs lost during the shutdowns last year in March and April, the remaining loss in employment through December is greater in percentage terms than at any time during the 2008-2009 Great Recession, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Job losses through December remain greater than during the 2008-2009 recession

Source: Department of Labor, January 8, 2021
While a successful vaccine distribution effort is likely to promote higher US economic growth, the increasing spread of the coronavirus in late 2020 and early 2021 is expected to affect the operations of many businesses and to have an especially significant effect on consumer-facing businesses. Approximately two-thirds of the net job loss between February and December last year was in sectors limited by voluntary and mandatory social distancing measures, including travel, leisure and hospitality, education, and health care.

Extreme levels of job loss since the start of the pandemic also have been most persistent for individuals holding low-wage positions, as shown in Figure 7. Employment levels for middle-wage positions have recovered to a greater degree but remain significantly below pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, employment levels for high-wage positions have fully recovered to their pre-pandemic level.

**Figure 7: Job losses remains high among low- and middle-wage workers since the start of the pandemic**

Pandemic relief measures

The effect of job losses since the start of the pandemic on the rest of the economy was mitigated in 2020 by a substantial federal government fiscal response. The cumulative effect of relief measures enacted in early 2020 was to provide approximately $2.3 trillion in assistance over the six months between April and September.

The Response and Relief Act enacted in December 2020 extends much of the earlier relief measures. While the relief funding was set at lower levels, the $900 billion package is expected to provide a substantial economic boost to the economy in 2021.

Most of the recent funds allocated for assistance—including forgivable loans to small business, enhanced unemployment insurance benefits, and direct checks to households—are expected to be disbursed by the government in the first quarter of 2021. If just half of the $900 billion were spent by consumers, businesses, and government agencies in the first half of 2021, that assistance would add more than 4% to GDP over the period.

Additional pandemic relief measures recently proposed by President Biden could provide further support for US economic recovery.

Economic growth projections

In January, Blue Chip economists, as shown in Figure 8, estimated that quarterly real GDP will increase from 2.3% (annualized) in the first quarter to over 4% for the remaining quarters of the year. GDP by the third quarter of 2021 is projected to slightly exceed its level first reached at the end of 2019. Even with this strong recovery, GDP would be about 3% below the level CBO had forecast prior to the pandemic.

Figure 8: Blue Chip consensus forecast, 2020-2021

Federal budget outlook

CBO is anticipated to release updated budget projections in coming weeks incorporating the December COVID-relief package and updated economic projections. In projections made last September, CBO forecast a budget deficit of $1.8 trillion (8.6% of GDP) for fiscal year 2021. These projections were based on the laws then in effect, and thus do not include the deficit impact of the December legislation. Further relief legislation, as called for by President Biden, would add to the FY 2021 deficit.

The FY 2020 deficit was $3.1 trillion (14.9% of GDP), the largest federal budget deficit as a share of GDP since 1945. Debt held by the public exceeded 100% of GDP in FY 2020, up from 79% in 2019. Including debt held by government trust funds, gross federal debt set a record as a share of GDP at 128% of GDP.

CBO’s September budget projections estimated total deficits over fiscal years 2021-2030 of $13 trillion, averaging 5% of GDP annually. These projections assume current law—for example, they assume no extension of individual provisions of the 2017 Act that are scheduled to sunset after 2025.

Policymakers’ desire to provide more generous economic assistance and stimulus in 2021 may be tempered by concerns that further increases in the federal debt could place the economy at greater risk over the longer term. In the near term, however, advocates for additional relief argue that current low interest rates result in a very low cost to the government of carrying this debt.

Federal debt service costs have fallen

The Federal Reserve has committed to keeping the federal funds rate—its primary tool for influencing short-term interest rates in the economy—between 0 and 0.25% for an extended period. The median projection of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents in December was that this rate would be maintained at least through the end of 2023.

As a result, over the next several years, the average interest rate on outstanding federal government debt is projected to decline as the government rolls over higher yielding debt issued in earlier years. Notwithstanding the substantial increase in government debt arising from the pandemic, government interest costs as a share of GDP were smaller in 2020 than in 2019 and are estimated to continue to decline through 2024. CBO last year revised its projections of interest costs downward by $2.2 trillion to reflect significantly lower projections of interest rates.

Extended CBO forecasts

Beyond 2024, CBO forecasts that rising interest rates and increasing government debt will cause government interest costs as a share of GDP to begin to increase, as shown in Figure 9.

Under CBO’s extended baseline from 2030 to 2050, deficits grow steadily, with interest on the debt comprising the most rapidly growing expenditure as interest rates rise and the underlying deficits cause the amount of debt on which interest is owed to increase. Deficits are projected to rise from just over 5% in 2030 to 12.6% by 2050, as shown in Figure 10.
Several factors contribute to the projected rise in federal budget deficits:

- Higher per-capita costs of government health care programs and an aging population will lead to federal government health programs and Social Security expenditures rising relative to GDP.

- Discretionary spending—covering national defense and the cost of most other government operations apart from transfer payments—is projected to decline relative to GDP over the period.

- CBO assumes that federal revenues will remain below 20% as a share of GDP, even while overall outlays continue to rise above 30% as a share of GDP. CBO also assumes that 2017 Act tax increase provisions affecting business will take effect as scheduled and tax cuts for individuals and pass-through businesses will sunset after 2025.

Such large and increasing deficits, particularly after 2030, will cause government debt to represent an increasing share of national income, as shown in Figure 11. By 2050, CBO forecasts federal debt held by the public rising to 195% of GDP, substantially higher than CBO’s pre-pandemic forecast.

To reduce federal debt to near its current level of 100% of GDP by 2050, CBO projects that annual combined increases in revenues or cuts in noninterest spending of 2.9% of GDP would be needed. That would equate to a deficit reduction package of $8.8 trillion over the 10-year budget period 2025-2034.

Note: The CBO forecasts discussed above do not take into account the 2020 year-end legislation.

Figure 9: CBO’s extended budget projections to 2050

Outlays and revenues as a share of GDP

Source: CBO’s Extended Baseline from the Long Term Budget Outlook, September 2020, and actual FY 2020. The Extended Baseline generally assumes tax and spending as scheduled under current law.
Figure 10: Federal budget deficit: historical and projected under CBO extended baseline through 2050

CBO extended baseline assumes sunset of 2017 Act individual provisions after 2025 and implementation of scheduled business tax increases in various years.

Source: CBO’s Extended Baseline from the Long Term Budget Outlook, September 2020 and actual FY 2020. The Extended Baseline generally assumes tax and spending as scheduled under current law.

Figure 11: Federal debt held by the public as percent of GDP, 1940-2050

Impact of recession and legislation enacted in 2020

Source: CBO (September 2020) and FY 2020 actual.
Long-term fiscal concerns and near-term policy choices

The United States is not at risk of an immediate fiscal crisis resulting from a loss in confidence in the ability of the government to honor its debt obligations, as current debt service costs are manageable, interest rates are low, and there remains strong global demand for US Treasury debt. On a near-term basis, there is no immediate consequence from further legislation to provide deficit-financed support for the economy, or to continue current tax and spending policies.

CBO notes, however, that the fiscal path the United States is on is not sustainable, since an ever-rising debt relative to GDP implies the cost of servicing the debt takes on a continuously increasing share of the nation’s income.

CBO, and economists more generally, do not identify a tipping point at which a fiscal crisis might emerge. But as the cost of servicing the debt increases, the country becomes exposed to greater financial risks, including the effects of higher inflation, a spike in interest rates, or a decline in the value of the dollar. Increasing debt levels also may limit the ability or willingness of a future Congress to provide a forceful fiscal response to a future recession or other crisis.

Debate around these fiscal issues may increase as Congress faces policy choices related to maintaining current tax policy, federal entitlement programs, and other federal programs, such as infrastructure.

- The 2017 tax reform act, as noted above, features several tax increase provisions affecting businesses with varying effective dates, and key individual and pass-through business tax cut provisions are set to sunset after 2025.

- The Social Security Disability Insurance Trust Fund balance will be exhausted in FY 2026, and the Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund balance is projected to be exhausted in 2031, according to CBO projections. According to CBO estimates, Social Security retirement, survivor, and disability benefit payments would have to be reduced by about 25% in 2032 for the trust funds’ outlays to match projected revenues.

- Federal highway and mass transit program spending is projected by CBO to exceed receipts from federal fuel excise taxes and other resources by $189 billion from 2021 to 2030, assuming fuel excise taxes remain at their current rates and spending increases annually by the rate of inflation. With no increase in the federal fuel excise taxes since 1993, Congress in recent years has relied increasingly on transfers of general revenues and revenue-raising measures unrelated to transportation to cover highway trust fund shortfalls, which adds further to the challenge of reducing overall federal budget deficits.

While it is often difficult for Congress and the Administration to take on long-term challenges when the immediate benefits of doing so are not directly apparent, it is also the case that implementing policies that address those challenges earlier can avoid much larger, more disruptive changes later. In the absence of a fiscal crisis, however, it is unclear whether policymakers ultimately will take action to reduce spending, increase revenues, or adopt some combination of both approaches solely for the purpose of achieving a more sustainable federal budget. For example, Congress in the early 1980s did not enact Social Security reforms that included increased payroll taxes and changes in future Social Security benefits until confronted with the risk that full Social Security benefit payments could not be made to current retirees.
Biden administration priorities

Overview

President Biden has stated that his first priority is to address the coronavirus and the economic fallout of the pandemic. As part of this effort, Biden has directed his administration to focus on accelerating the distribution of vaccines and has proposed to Congress a $1.9 trillion package of economic relief and recovery measures.

Key provisions of the Biden plan include an expanded national vaccine distribution effort, increasing the individual recovery payments approved in December from $600 to $2,000, extending and expanding unemployment assistance, providing additional relief for small businesses, and increasing funding for schools and state and local governments. In addition, Biden has proposed to extend and expand emergency paid sick and family leave requirements that were enacted in 2020, with a refundable tax credit for employers with less than 500 employees. He also has proposed to increase the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour.

Looking beyond the need to address the pandemic and its economic effects, Biden has proposed a number of business and individual tax increases that are intended primarily to offset the cost of his spending and tax incentive proposals that seek to promote economic recovery and address concerns over economic inequality. Biden’s ‘Build Back Better’ recovery agenda for 2021 includes:

- Increased spending on infrastructure;
- Tax incentives for clean energy and domestic manufacturing;
- Expanded access to healthcare, with a Medicare public option;
- Targeted student loan forgiveness;
- Increased funding for education and job training; and
- Temporary increases in refundable tax credits for individuals and families.

Revenue effects

According to unofficial estimates by the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center (TPC), Biden has proposed tax increases totaling roughly $3.1 trillion over 10 years for corporations and high-income households, while reducing taxes through business tax incentives and tax cuts for low- and moderate-income households by approximately $1 trillion. See Appendix C for a listing of Biden’s campaign tax proposals and the TPC’s revenue estimates (official estimates of tax legislation are made by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) staff).
Note: The descriptions below of the Biden tax plan and the TPC estimates are based on his campaign tax plan summaries, which provided limited detail on key aspects of the proposals. TPC estimates assume a general effective date of January 1, 2022. The Treasury Department is expected to provide additional details on specific tax proposals that may be formally proposed to Congress as part of the Biden administration’s FY 2022 budget, including effective dates for Congress to consider.

Observation: Congress historically has approved tax increase proposals only on a prospective basis; for example, an income tax rate increase proposed in 2021 generally would be assumed to become effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2021. The only exception to this practice in recent decades was in 1993, when individual and corporate rate increases proposed by President Bill Clinton were made effective retroactive to January 1, 1993. At times, changes to investment income tax rates have been proposed to be effective on the date first proposed—for example, the date such a proposal is first offered by the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. In the end, however, capital gains rates increases since 1986 have become effective prospectively after the general effective date of the legislation.

Reconciliation process key to action on Biden tax proposals

With control of both the House and Senate, Democrats have indicated that they plan to use budget reconciliation procedures to advance President Biden’s policy agenda, as discussed above. The budget reconciliation process could allow for action on key Biden spending and tax proposals to be enacted with only Democratic votes.

Key aspects of budget reconciliation procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits of reconciliation</th>
<th>Limitations of reconciliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Budget reconciliation provides the opportunity to pass legislation by a simple majority vote at every step in the Senate, with expedited consideration (no filibuster allowed).</td>
<td>• Outyear deficits: Cannot increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond the ‘budget window’ covered by the reconciliation measure. Congress generally adopts budget resolutions for a 10-year period; e.g., the budget window for Biden’s tax proposals could be FY 2022 through FY 2031.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Under reconciliation instructions, separate reconciliation bills can be enacted for (1) mandatory spending (such as spending for mandatory student loan forgiveness), (2) taxes, and (3) the debt limit.</td>
<td>• Germaneness: Cannot produce a change in outlays or revenues that is merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Because there was no budget resolution completed for FY 2021 (ending September 30, 2021), Congress could create two sets of reconciliation instructions this calendar year—first for FY 2021 and later for FY 2022.</td>
<td>• Social Security: Cannot make changes to the OASI or DI programs. However, income taxes on wages in excess of the maximum earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax would be permissible if not used to fund either program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are no practical limitations to using budget reconciliation for enacting tax increases, provided they do not affect the Social Security Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) or Disability Insurance (DI) programs.</td>
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Biden pandemic recovery tax proposals

President Biden on January 14 released an outline of pandemic relief proposals that include:

- $1,400 per person direct payments (for a total of $2,000 when combined with the $600 payments approved in December);
- $400 per week in enhanced unemployment benefits through September 2021 (and automatically adjusted depending on health and economic conditions);
- Extending eviction and foreclosure moratoriums and rental assistance;
- Extending nutrition assistance programs;
- Raising the minimum wage to $15 per hour;
- Expanding childcare assistance; and
- Temporarily expanding child care tax credits, making the child tax credit fully refundable, and expanding the earned income tax credit.

Biden has proposed to extend and expand emergency paid sick and family leave requirements that were enacted in 2020. He would eliminate exemptions for employers with more than 500 employees and fewer than 50 employees. At the same time, he would extend a refundable tax credit to reimburse employers with fewer than 500 employees for the cost of paid leave.

The 2020 year-end pandemic relief legislation included $900 billion in funding for programs including additional Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) forgivable loans, the second round of direct payments to eligible individuals noted above, unemployment assistance, and additional tax relief measures. The legislation included a tax provision clarifying that businesses with forgiven PPP loans can deduct regular business expenses that are paid for with the loan proceeds. Additional pandemic relief tax measures included an expansion of the employee retention credit, enhanced charitable contribution deductions that were extended for 2021, and a temporary 100% deduction for business food and beverage expenses provided by a restaurant that are paid or incurred in 2021 or 2022.

Biden business tax proposals

During his presidential campaign, Biden proposed several business income tax changes to pay for part of the cost of his proposals. The most significant business tax change in terms of revenue involves raising the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%. In addition to increasing the statutory corporate income tax rate, Biden proposes doubling the tax rate on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) and a new 15% alternative minimum tax on global book income.

As discussed below, Biden also has proposed rolling back key individual tax provisions from the 2017 Act for those with incomes above $400,000, including the Section 199A 20% deduction for pass-through business income. This is estimated to affect more than 60% of pass-through business income.
Corporate rate increase

Biden has proposed increasing the federal corporate tax rate to 28%. The 2017 Act provided a 21% corporate rate, down from the 35% rate that had been in effect since 1993. In the intervening decades, other countries reduced their corporate tax rates significantly, so the US combined federal and state corporate rate had become the highest among OECD countries.

Observation: The 2017 tax reform legislation was the product of years of bipartisan efforts to make the US tax system more competitive globally, notwithstanding the fact that the 2017 Act was ultimately enacted with only Republican votes. As noted above, some House and Senate Democrats are expected to have concerns about increasing the current 21% corporate tax rate and other Biden tax increase proposals. For example, Senator Manchin has stated that he would not support increasing the corporate tax rate above 25%.

If a 28% federal corporate income tax rate were enacted, the US combined federal and state rate once again would be the highest among OECD countries, as shown in Figure 12. The OECD average corporate tax rate, excluding the United States, is 23.4%.

Figure 12: Global tax policy implications of a 28% corporate rate
**Doubling the GILTI tax rate**

Biden has proposed doubling to 21% the tax rate on global intangible low-taxed income that was enacted as part of the 2017 Act. This could be achieved by increasing the corporate tax rate to 28% and reducing the Section 250 deduction from 50% to 25%. In addition, he would change its application from an overall to a country-by-country calculation.

**GILTI tax rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current law</th>
<th>Biden proposal</th>
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<tr>
<td>A 10.5% GILTI tax rate applies currently, and this rate is scheduled to increase to 13.125% after 2025. GILTI is applied on an overall global basis.</td>
<td>Increasing the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% and reducing the Section 250 deduction to 25% would increase the current-law tax rate on GILTI from 10.5% to 21%. GILTI would be applied on a per-country basis.</td>
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*Note:* A 25% Section 250 deduction for GILTI together with a 28% corporate tax rate and an 80% limitation for foreign tax credits would result in a higher effective tax rate on all foreign income taxed at a rate less than 26.25%. By comparison, 25 out of 37 OECD countries have a corporate tax rate lower than 26.25%.

*Observation:* Any increase in the GILTI tax rate might be seen as necessitating a higher tax rate on foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) to counter claims by some foreign officials that FDII is an export subsidy under World Trade Organization rules. Under present law, taxpayers are permitted a deduction on their FDII of 37.5% (21.875% after 2025), thereby subjecting it to tax at a lower rate of 13.125% (16.406% after 2025).

**Minimum tax on book income**

Biden proposes an alternative minimum tax of 15% on companies’ book income, potentially applicable only to companies with at least $100 million in book income. Under an alternative minimum tax, a company would pay the greater of its regular tax or minimum tax liability. The proposal would provide a tax credit for income taxes paid to foreign countries and would allow companies to carry over book losses from unprofitable years. While many details of the proposal currently are unspecified, given the separate proposal for a 21% tax rate on GILTI, the greatest effect of the book minimum tax, if enacted, may be on companies with a greater share of domestic relative to foreign income.

Differences between book income and tax income may be temporary (timing) or permanent differences. Temporary differences may result in expenses being recognized sooner for tax purposes than for book purposes, such as with accelerated depreciation, or later for tax purposes than for book purposes, such as bad debt expenses.
Observation: Companies in industries such as manufacturing and information technology that take advantage of accelerated depreciation more than other industries may be more affected by a book minimum tax. The effect of the proposed tax might be less severe for companies with temporary book-tax differences if book minimum tax is creditable against future regular tax liability.

To the extent that a book minimum tax did not allow certain tax credits that are allowed to reduce regular tax liability (for example, the research credit or renewable electricity production tax credit), then these items also would create permanent differences. The Biden proposal currently does not specify any credit against the book minimum tax except for taxes paid to foreign countries.

Observation: Companies in the manufacturing sector and bank holding companies are the greatest users of business tax credits. Tax-exempt interest is prevalent among insurance and bank holding companies. Companies in these industries potentially have large permanent book-tax differences and could be most adversely affected by the proposed book minimum tax.
Sector specific proposals
In addition to general business tax proposals, Biden has proposed revenue-raising proposals that
directly affect certain business sectors. These include proposals to:

- Eliminate tax preferences for fossil fuels.
- Eliminate the deduction for prescription drug advertising.
- Eliminate certain tax preferences for the real estate industry.
- Tighten rules for independent contractors and increase penalties for misclassification.
- Institute a financial fee on certain liabilities of large financial institutions with over $50 billion in assets.

‘Make it in America’ proposals
Additional business tax proposals intended to ‘end outsourcing’ and promote US domestic
manufacturing and job creation include:

- Imposing a 10% surtax on profits of any production (or services) by a US company overseas
  for sales back to the United States; this 10% surtax would apply on top of the proposed 28%
corporate rate to provide a 30.8% rate for covered income.
- Providing a 10% advanceable tax credit for companies making investments that will create
  jobs for American workers (includes revitalizing/retooling existing facilities and reshoring/
  expanding job-creating production); this credit would apply to the increment of increased
  wages—above a company’s historic, pre-COVID baseline—for manufacturing jobs paying up
  to $100,000.
- Implementing strong ‘anti-inversion’ regulations and penalties.
- Denying deductions for moving jobs or production overseas.

President Biden has stated that one of his goals is to encourage pharmaceutical companies and
other businesses to make critical products in the United States. He also has announced his intention
to take a number of actions to promote domestic manufacturing through executive orders and
administrative actions. These include enforcing ‘Buy America’ rules; strengthening procurement
rules for public infrastructure programs; altering price adjustment rules to make American products
more competitive; combating falsely labeled ‘Made in America’ products; and creating an Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) office to manage procurement policy.
Implications of Biden business tax proposals for 2017 tax reform act provisions

As discussed above, President Biden has proposed to increase the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%—reversing half of the rate reduction achieved by the 2017 Act—and proposes other changes to the tax reforms that were adopted at that time. At the same time, Biden does not propose to reverse the corporate tax increases that were enacted as part of the 2017 Act to partially offset the cost of achieving the 21% tax rate and other tax reform provisions.

The top four domestic business revenue-raising provisions in the 2017 Act:

- Limit the deductibility of interest 30% of the adjusted taxable income (ATI) of the taxpayer (as discussed below, a tighter limitation on interest deductions is scheduled to go into effect in 2022);
- Modify the net operating loss (NOL) deduction;
- Require amortization of research and experimental (R&E) expenditures, beginning in 2022; and
- Repealed the deduction for income attributable to domestic production activities.

The 2017 Act also begins phasing out 100% qualified property expensing in 2023. In addition, the 2017 Act included international revenue-raising provisions, including tighter international tax rules that are set to go into effect in 2026.

Projected effects of business tax increase provisions effective in 2022

Research expenditure amortization

Under current law, for tax years beginning after December 31, 2021, domestic R&E expenditures are required to be capitalized and amortized ratably over a five-year period (15-year period in the case of expenditures attributable to research that is conducted outside of the United States). The provision reduces the return to research activities and may result in less investment in research and experimentation. The JCT staff have estimated the amortization of R&E expenditures under Section 174 would raise $119.7 billion from FY 2018 through FY 2027.

Observation: The tax code has codified immediate expensing of research costs since 1954. While intended to offset part of the cost of the 2017 Act, Congress also rationalized the 2017 Act change to amortization under the theory that research has a useful life beyond one year. However, research finds positive spillover benefits that provide an economic justification for the tax system encouraging taxpayers to undertake such activities.

The broad economic benefits of research activities have led some members of Congress to support keeping the current first-year research expenditure deduction. For example, legislation was introduced in 2019 by House Ways and Means Committee members John Larson (D-CT) and Ron Estes (R-KS) and in 2020 by Senate Finance Committee members Maggie Hassan (D-NH) and Todd Young (R-IN) to repeal the move to R&E amortization, and similar legislation is expected to be introduced this year.
**Interest expense deduction**

The 2017 Act limited the deduction for net business interest expense to 30% of the adjusted taxable income of the taxpayer. For tax years beginning before January 1, 2022, ATI is computed by adding back any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization, or depletion (EBITDA-based limitation). For tax years beginning after December 31, 2021, ATI is computed after any such deduction (EBIT-based limitation). Therefore, under current law, beginning in 2022 the base on which the amount of deductible interest is determined will be smaller and the interest limitation will be more restrictive. Companies unable to deduct interest expense due to the limitation face a higher cost of capital and may reduce capital investment.

The JCT staff consider the limitation on interest to provide less favorable treatment than normal income tax law and thus estimate a negative tax expenditure effect for this provision. The most recent JCT staff tax expenditure estimates for the interest limitation total $57.1 billion for FY 2020-2024, with more than 90% of the effect on corporations. The tax expenditure estimate for FY 2023 (the first full fiscal year for which the EBIT-based limitation is scheduled to be in effect) is approximately $12 billion more than the estimate for FY 2021 (the last full fiscal year for which the EBITDA-based limitation is scheduled to be in effect).

Companies may find their interest deductions limited when their income declines and they are least able to pay. In partial recognition of this fact, Congress increased the interest limitation to 50% of ATI for tax years 2019 and 2020 as part of pandemic relief legislation.

**Observation:** A switch to an EBIT-based limitation is likely to have a larger effect on companies with large amounts of depreciation, amortization, and depletion or that experience a sizable loss in revenue. Companies that increased their borrowing as a result of the current recession also may be more likely to be restricted in their interest deductions by the EBIT-based limitation.

While many countries have adopted interest limitations similar to the US EBITDA-based limitation, no other OECD country has an EBIT-based limitation.

**Observation:** The current fiscal climate, with large projected deficits, may pose a challenge to taxpayer efforts to repeal the research amortization and tighter interest limitation provisions of the 2017 Act. A temporary delay in the effective date of these provisions would have a smaller revenue cost. In the case of five-year amortization, a temporary delay may have a small revenue cost since R&E expenditures in 2022 and the next several years if amortized would still be fully claimed over the 10-year budget period.
Biden individual tax proposals

**Income taxes**

Under the 2017 Act, the highest individual income tax rate was reduced from 39.6% to 37%. As enacted under the budget reconciliation process, the individual income tax rates and brackets are scheduled to sunset after 2025, along with other key individual tax provisions discussed below.

Biden has proposed to return to pre-2017 Act tax rates for taxpayers earning more than $400,000; this would include restoring the highest rate to 39.6% for those taxpayers. He also would limit the Section 199A pass-through deduction for individuals with income above $400,000; as noted above, this would affect more than 60% of pass-through business income.

**Capital gains taxes**

Currently, an individual’s capital gains tax rate is based on their taxable income, with 20% being the maximum rate. The separate tax on net investment income increases the maximum rate to 23.8%.

Biden has proposed to make significant changes to the current way in which capital gains are taxed. These include taxing long-term capital gains and qualified dividends at ordinary tax rates for taxpayers whose adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeds $1 million. For qualifying taxpayers, this modification would tax long-term capital gains and qualified dividends in the same manner as short-term capital gains and ordinary dividends, respectively.

In addition, Biden is proposing that unrealized capital gains in excess of $100,000 are taxed at death or upon gift, as opposed to waiting until the sale or exchange of the asset. It appears the $100,000 exclusion would likely be on a per-individual basis. Exceptions to this treatment would include assets passing to the taxpayer’s spouse or charity.

Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden also recently noted his proposal to change the tax treatment of capital gains. Wyden has proposed taxing not only realized capital gains but also accrued unrealized capital gains, by including the change in the market value of assets (gain or loss) every year in the income of their owners for federal income tax purposes. This so-called mark-to-market approach seeks to eliminate the ability of taxpayers to defer paying taxes on unrealized gains by delaying the sale of an appreciated asset. In addition to raising revenue by collecting tax before the assets are sold, the proposal seeks to avoid the revenue loss from reduced capital gains realizations by eliminating the ability of taxpayers to defer taxes by holding on to assets. Senator Wyden’s proposal generally would apply to taxpayers with annual incomes above $1 million and/or ‘covered’ assets above $10 million.

*Note:* President Biden did not propose changing the capital gains tax treatment of the ‘carried interest’ of certain partnership investment income during his campaign. The 2017 Act extended the holding period for certain carried interest income to qualify for preferential capital gains treatment. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Neal and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden have stated that they plan to revisit the issue of carried interest. Numerous bills have been proposed over the years by Congressional Democrats to eliminate capital gains treatment for carried interest.

Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there have been nine capital gains tax rate changes: two rate increases and seven rate decreases. Both the 1986 rate increase and a subsequent rate increase enacted in 2010 were prospective.
The capital gains ‘lock-in’ effect

Under present law, capital gains generally are subject to tax only when they are realized upon the sale or exchange of the asset. If the assets are held until death, the gains are not subject to income tax, since the basis is ‘stepped up’ to a date-of-death valuation (although the estate tax may apply). As a result of both of these factors, capital gains taxes create a lock-in effect, discouraging investors from realizing gains on appreciated assets. JCT staff have estimated that increasing the tax rate above a certain level could result in a loss of revenue as the effects of the higher rate would be more than offset by a decrease in dispositions; i.e., the higher rate would apply to a smaller amount of realized gains. The revenue maximizing rate for capital gains under present law is estimated to be approximately 28%.

For taxpayers with AGI above $1 million, Biden has proposed to tax realized capital gains and qualifying dividends at the same rate as ordinary income. In combination with Biden’s proposal to increase the top ordinary income tax rate to 39.6%, the top tax rate on capital gains and qualifying dividends would increase from 23.8% to 43.4%. Without other changes to the taxation of capital gains, the proposal could collect less revenue than present law due to the lock-in effect.

Biden’s proposal to tax unrealized capital gains in excess of $100,000 at death or upon gift—as opposed to waiting until the sale or exchange of the asset—seeks to avoid the revenue loss from the step-up in basis incentive taxpayers might otherwise have to hold appreciated assets until death.

Itemized deductions

The 2017 Act made notable changes to itemized deductions. These changes, which are scheduled to sunset after 2025 along with the other individual tax provisions, include:

- Repealing the ‘Pease limitation,’ which increased marginal tax rates by limiting the deduction for home mortgage interest, state and local taxes, charitable contributions, and miscellaneous deductions;
- Limiting the home mortgage interest deduction on new mortgages to principal of $750,000 (instead of $1 million);
- Capping the state and local tax (SALT) deduction at $10,000;
- Suspending the miscellaneous deductions subject to the 2% floor; and
- Increasing the charitable contribution limitation to 60% of AGI (for 2020 and 2021 only, raised to 100% by COVID relief legislation enacted last year).

Biden has proposed to cap the value of itemized deductions at 28% for taxpayers earning more than $400,000. Biden also has supported repeal of the SALT deduction cap.
Estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes

Under the 2017 Act, the lifetime estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption was increased and indexed for inflation. For 2021, the exemption is $11.7 million for an individual, and the combined exemption for a married couple is $23.4 million. Like other 2017 Act individual provisions, the estate tax changes are set to sunset after 2025. Prior to the 2017 Act, the exemption was close to half the current amounts.

Biden has proposed reinstating the estate, gift, and GST tax rules that had applied in 2009, under the Obama administration. Under this proposal, the top tax rate would increase from 40% to 45% and the individual exclusion amount would be $3.5 million for estate and GST taxes, and $1 million for gift taxes.

Social Security taxes

Currently, the Social Security payroll tax is based on the 6.2% tax rate for both the employee and employer on the $142,800 wage base for 2021; the wage base is updated annually for an inflation cost-of-living adjustment. Self-employed individuals pay a combined 12.4% Social Security tax rate.

Biden has proposed to impose the 12.4% Social Security tax for income that exceeds $400,000. It is not clear if this additional tax would be borne solely by the employee or split between the employer and employee.

Observation: As noted above, budget reconciliation procedures cannot be used to make any changes to the Social Security program. However, Congress potentially could use the budget reconciliation process to structure an income tax surtax equivalent to Biden’s proposed 12.4% Social Security tax on incomes above $400,000, as long as the revenues from this tax were used for deficit reduction or to offset other proposals, and were not credited to the Social Security trust funds.

Other individual tax proposals

Additional Biden individual tax proposals include:

- Replacing the deduction for IRA and 401(k) defined contribution plan contributions with a 25% refundable credit;
- Providing automatic enrollment in IRAs for workers who do not have a pension or 401(k)-type plan;
- Temporarily expanding and making fully refundable the child tax credit;
- Providing a refundable first-time home buyer’s credit; and
- Providing a refundable low-income renter’s credit.
Climate change tax proposals

Environmental concerns are expected to be an important consideration for the Biden administration in the development of economic policy. Biden has issued an executive order to have the United States rejoin the multinational Paris agreement on climate and has proposed several tax incentives as part of his plans to address climate change and promote US infrastructure investments.

Key Biden climate change tax incentives include:

- Restoring and expanding the electric vehicle tax credit, with a focus on promoting consumer purchases of American-made vehicles;
- Reinstating the solar investment tax credit;
- Reinstating residential energy efficiency tax credits;
- Expanding tax deductions for energy technology upgrades, smart metering, and other emissions-reducing investments in commercial buildings; and
- Enhancing tax incentives for carbon capture, use, and storage.

Biden has not proposed a tax on greenhouse gas emissions (a carbon tax) or other carbon-pricing mechanisms, but several of his top economic advisors have, including Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and National Economic Council Director Brian Deese. Yellen was a founding member of the Climate Leadership Council, which in 2017 first proposed a plan to streamline carbon regulations with a gradually rising carbon tax that would be returned to all Americans in the form of a rebate. Deese was on a team that helped negotiate the multinational Paris agreement on climate and served as a senior advisor to former President Obama on climate change.

Under the Paris agreement, the United States committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 28% compared to 2005 levels by 2025. A carbon tax on the scale of the one proposed by the Climate Leadership Council is estimated to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 32% compared to 2005 levels by 2025 and by 50% compared to 2005 levels by 2035. Many plans for a carbon tax propose rebating at least a portion of the revenue raised from a carbon tax to consumers or spending the proceeds on other initiatives.

Observation: Economists who favor a carbon tax argue that it is a relatively efficient way to address climate-related negative externalities because a carbon tax does not favor any particular technology or any particular behavioral modification that individuals and businesses may adopt to reduce their carbon footprint. A carbon tax allows individuals and businesses to figure out the lowest cost means to reduce the most emissions for any given tax rate. It can therefore be more efficient than environmental regulation or tax incentives for particular technologies at achieving emission reductions and doing so at a lower cost.
Other tax legislative issues

Retirement savings

As noted above, President Biden proposed new retirement savings incentives during his campaign. Congress could act in 2021 on retirement issues as part of reconciliation legislation with other Biden proposals. Retirement savings proposals that have bipartisan support also could be considered as part of separate legislation.

Retirement plan provisions in the 2020 year-end COVID-19 relief package include provisions to allow certain construction and building trade workers age 55 or older who are receiving retirement benefits to continue to work and receive these benefits, and to provide a temporary rule to prevent partial plan termination of defined contribution retirement plans.

Ways and Means Chairman Neal and Ranking Member Brady in 2020 introduced a bipartisan bill (the Securing a Strong Retirement Act) to increase retirement savings and simplify and clarify retirement plan rules, including provisions to:

- Expand automatic enrollment in retirement plans;
- Increase the required minimum distribution age to 75;
- Offer individuals 60 and older more flexibility to set aside savings as they approach retirement;
- Create a new financial incentive for small businesses to offer retirement plans;
- Increase and modernize the existing federal tax credit for contributions to a retirement plan or IRA (the saver’s credit);
- Expand retirement savings options for nonprofit employees by allowing groups of nonprofits to join together to offer retirement plans to their employees;
- Allow individuals to pay down a student loan instead of contributing to a 401(k) plan and still receive an employer match in their retirement plan;
- Make it easier for military spouses who change jobs frequently to save for retirement;
- Allow individuals more flexibility to make gifts to charity from their IRAs;
- Allow taxpayers to avoid harsh penalties for inadvertent errors managing an IRA that can lead to a loss of retirement savings;
- Protect retirees who unknowingly receive retirement plan overpayments; and
- Make it easier for employees to find lost retirement accounts by creating a national online database of lost accounts.
Then-Finance Committee Ranking Member Wyden on December 15 introduced a retirement savings bill (the Encouraging Americans to Save Act) that would restructure and enhance the existing saver’s credit and restore the myRA program for workers without access to a workplace 401(k) plan.

Another bipartisan proposal that could be considered this year is the Retirement Security and Savings Act, which previously was introduced by Finance Committee members Rob Portman (R-OH) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). That bill includes provisions to modify the saver’s credit, inherited individual retirement accounts, and start-up retirement savings plans for small businesses.

The 2020 year-end package did not include proposals from last year addressing underfunded multiemployer pension plans. Then-Finance Committee Chairman Grassley and then-Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee Chairman Lamar Alexander (R-TN) on December 17 announced legislation to reform multiemployer pension plan rules and modify the multiemployer insurance fund, but the Senators said they ran out of time in bipartisan negotiations on multiemployer pension reform for proposals to be included in the year-end package.

**Healthcare**

The 2020 year-end COVID-19 relief package provided $69 billion for vaccines, testing and tracing, and community healthcare provider support. The legislation also includes a provision designed to eliminate ‘surprise’ medical billing that is substantially the same as one previously agreed to by key Congressional committee leaders. Under that provision, health insurers and providers must negotiate most billing disputes or bring their complaints to a mediator.

President Biden’s healthcare nominees include Xavier Becerra for Secretary of Health and Human Services, Dr. Vivek Murthy for Surgeon General, Dr. Rochelle Walensky for Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Marcella Nunez-Smith for COVID-19 Equity Task Force Chair, and Dr. Anthony Fauci for Chief Medical Advisor on COVID-19 to the President.

The first healthcare priority for the Biden administration will be combating COVID-19. The transition team has laid out plans that focus on access to testing, supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE), guidance for communities, vaccine distribution, and more.

Uncertainty over the legal status of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) may be resolved this year. The Supreme Court on November 10, 2020 heard arguments in California v. Texas, the latest case to challenge the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate. A decision in the case is expected by the end of June, when the Supreme Court term ends. During his presidential campaign, President Biden pledged to protect the ACA from continued attempts to repeal the law. He said he would build on the ACA by providing more consumer choice, reducing healthcare costs, and making the healthcare system less complex to navigate.

Congress this year could consider bills to address prescription drug prices. Last year, Senate legislation (the Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2020) was introduced by then-Finance Committee Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Wyden. President Trump in 2020 issued executive orders aimed at lowering prescription drug pricing and increasing domestic production of essential medical supplies.
Tax extenders

The enacted 2020 year-end legislation included a significant ‘tax extender’ package that renewed for at least 12 months all but two tax provisions that were set to expire on December 31, 2020, with some provisions made permanent and others extended for as many as five years. JCT staff estimate that the tax extender provisions and other tax provisions in the legislation will cost $103.8 billion over 10 years.

The following tax extender provisions were made permanent:

- Medical expense itemized deduction: adjusted gross income (AGI) floor 7.5%;
- Tax-favorable treatment of benefits provided to volunteer firefighters and emergency medical responders;
- Deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses repealed and replaced with increased income limitation for lifetime learning credit;
- Energy efficient commercial buildings deduction;
- Provisions modifying the rates of taxation of beer, wine and distilled spirits, and certain other rules; and,
- Railroad track maintenance credit (shortline railroad tax credit for expenditures on rail line maintenance reduced from 50% to 40%).

The look-through rule for payments between related controlled foreign corporations, the new markets tax credit, and the work opportunity tax credit are among the provisions extended through 2025. A number of renewable energy tax provisions also were extended or expanded.

Observation: The extension of certain provisions through 2025 will align them with the scheduled 2025 expiration of individual and pass through tax cuts that were enacted as part of the 2017 tax reform legislation.

For a listing of expiring tax provisions that includes certain 2017 tax reform provisions subject to sunset, see Appendix D.
Technical corrections

The new 117th Congress will have an opportunity to consider technical corrections to recently enacted legislation as well as a large number of long-pending proposed corrections to the 2017 tax reform legislation. Technical corrections are considered to have no revenue effect and traditionally are effective as if included in the original statute.

Tax policy leaders traditionally have addressed the need for technical corrections by reaching an agreement among the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate tax committees, the JCT staff, and officials at the Treasury Department and the IRS. However, during the last Congress, agreement was reached to address only a few technical corrections to the 2017 tax reform legislation as part of the 2020 CARES Act. These corrections included:

- Technical corrections to the 2017 Act clarifying (1) treatment of excess business losses that are carried forward and treated as part of the taxpayer’s net operating loss, (2) that excess business losses are determined without regard to any deduction under Sections 172 or 199A, and (3) that excess business losses are determined without regard to any deductions, gross income, or gains attributable to any trade or business of performing services as an employee (e.g., wages).

- A technical correction to the 2017 tax reform act to provide a 15-year recovery period for qualified improvement property (QIP). This technical correction made QIP eligible for bonus depreciation.

The previous Congress was unable to reach an agreement on a large number of additional technical corrections to the 2017 Act. While there has been some bipartisan support for addressing all technical corrections as a package rather than select provisions, such action has not been taken in part because key Democratic leaders have tied approval of technical corrections to action on their tax priorities—refundable credits and green energy tax incentives.

In a ‘Bluebook’ technical explanation of the 2017 tax reform legislation, the JCT staff identified more than 70 provisions that the staff noted may require technical correction. Then-Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-TX) proposed roughly 80 statutory technical corrections in early 2019, but they were not enacted into law. Additional proposed technical corrections to the 2017 Act include:

- A technical correction to the 2017 Act regarding Section 965 overpayment refunds; and

- A provision restoring the limitation on downward attribution of stock ownership in applying constructive ownership rules.
Outlook for administrative and regulatory actions

Regulatory guidance

The Biden administration has placed a temporary freeze on all tax regulations that were under development but that have not yet been published in the Federal Register before President Biden took office. This is a common practice for incoming administrations, especially of different political parties, and provides new Treasury officials a chance to evaluate the regulations in light of their priorities. Regulations under the 2017 tax reform legislation that remain unpublished include:

- Proposed foreign tax credit regulations; and
- Section 245A dividend exclusion guidance.

Given the closely divided Congress, President Biden may rely on his Treasury Department to use its regulatory authority to implement some of his tax policies. Rewriting regulations that had been finalized during the Trump administration would be time-consuming, meaning that many of those final regulations likely will remain intact.

The Biden administration may focus on a handful of significant provisions enacted in the 2017 Act that it may perceive should be re-examined. For example, President Biden’s Build Back Better plan calls for evaluating the Opportunity Zone program to ensure that it is delivering its intended economic, social, and environmental benefits. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden previously has said that he wants the Treasury Department to review the high-tax exception in the GILTI regulations.

OIRA review of regulations

The Trump administration implemented a policy requiring the White House OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to review tax regulations before they were issued by the Treasury. It is unclear whether the Biden administration will keep OIRA’s current tax regulatory review in place.

Congressional Review Act

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) empowers a majority in Congress to undo recent rules issued by federal agencies. Any rule enacted in the last 60 legislative days of the previous 116th Congress— in this case since August 21, 2020— can be reviewed by the new 117th Congress. President Trump and the Republican-controlled 115th Congress successfully used the CRA to invalidate several regulations issued during the final weeks of the Obama administration. In addition to nullifying a regulation, the CRA prohibits the issuance of substantially similar guidance. This factor may affect considerations by the Biden administration on whether to use the CRA to address regulations issued by the Trump administration.
IRS updates

Potential personnel changes

Charles Rettig has served as IRS Commissioner since October 1, 2018. Since the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, IRS Commissioners have been appointed to a five-year term. Nominated by former President Trump, Rettig was confirmed by the Senate in September 2018 as Commissioner until November 12, 2022. The position of IRS Chief Counsel currently is vacant, following the recent resignation of Michael Desmond.

IRS response to COVID-19

The IRS on November 17, 2020 released ‘A Closer Look,’ detailing how IRS operations addressed COVID-19 and the 2020 filing season. The agency on March 20 had directed all employees to evacuate work sites and closed more than 90% of its buildings, including call centers and Taxpayer Assistance Centers, due to the pandemic. According to the report, the IRS transitioned many employees to remote working, enabling 72% of its employees to work outside the office.

By April 10, 2020, the IRS met its obligation under the CARES Act to issue Economic Impact Payments to more than 81 million eligible individuals. By November 6, 2020, the IRS had processed more than 167.2 million individual income tax returns and had issued more than 124.8 million refunds totaling more than $314.5 billion. At the same time, the IRS continues to be challenged with its increased volume of work and reduced resources, which is affecting IRS operations in a number of areas, including with respect to the processing of net operating loss carrybacks and refund claims.

Operational improvements

The Government Accountability Office on November 18, 2020 released a report on the agency’s organizational structure, with recommendations that the IRS identify specific actions to address management challenges as it finalizes a reform plan. The House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee held a November 20 hearing with IRS Commissioner Rettig. In his written testimony, Rettig provided an update on IRS operations, including the agency’s COVID-19 response and implementation of the Taxpayer First Act and the IRS Integrated Business Modernization plan.

The IRS on January 11, 2021 delivered a comprehensive operations reform plan to Congress in response to legislation calling for the agency to improve a number of its processes and structures. The IRS plan recommends the creation of a new Compliance Division to coordinate and manage all of its compliance efforts, including criminal investigations, examinations, and leads from whistleblowers. These functions, which currently are housed across the agency’s Line of Business structure (Large Business & International, Small Business/Self-Employed, Tax Exempt, Wage & Investment), would be consolidated under the new Compliance Division and the existing Line of Business structure would be eliminated. The IRS has said that this organization redesign is intended to enhance the taxpayer experience while improving administrative efficiency.
IRS budget

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 27, 2020 provides for $12.1 billion in IRS funding for FY 2021. This appropriation amount includes $2.6 billion for taxpayer services (up from $2.51 billion in FY 2020), $5.2 billion for enforcement (up from $5.01 billion in FY 2020), $3.9 billion for operations support (up from $3.81 billion in FY 2020), and $222.7 million for business systems modernization (up from $180 million in FY 2020). Although appropriations for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2021 and later years are unknown at this time, it would not be surprising to see increased IRS funding, part of which likely would be devoted to increased examination and enforcement activity.

New Large Business and International (LB&I) Division campaigns

The IRS on September 14, 2020 announced four new compliance campaigns to address taxpayer noncompliance. Of the four new campaigns, two involve properly computing transition adjustments for life insurance reserves. The other two campaigns concern rules for capitalizing facilitative transaction fees and complying with Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) reporting requirements for nonresident aliens. The goal of LB&I’s compliance campaign program—which was launched in January 2017 and now includes 57 active campaigns—is to improve return selection, identify noncompliance risk issues, and more effectively use limited LB&I resources. The new compliance campaigns were identified through LB&I data analysis and IRS employee suggestions.

2021 Compliance Assurance Program (CAP) program

The IRS on August 27, 2020 announced the opening of the application period for the 2021 CAP program, renewing its commitment to maintain CAP. The IRS made the 2021 program more flexible for eligible taxpayers whose operations and tax posture may have been affected by COVID-19. Specifically, it modified its open-year criteria, updated its requirements for the Tax Control Framework Questionnaire, removed certain privately held or foreign-held taxpayers from the program, and established a limit on the duration of the Bridge phase for taxpayers whose noncompliance risk does not warrant continued LB&I examinations. Applicants will be notified in February 2021 whether they have been accepted into the 2021 program.

High-wealth exams

In a June 4, 2020 letter to Commissioner Rettig, then-Senate Finance Chairman Grassley asked the IRS to respond to a May 2020 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) report that found that for tax years 2014 through 2016, nearly 900,000 high-income taxpayers who should have filed a tax return did not do so, resulting in $45.7 billion in unpaid taxes that were not pursued by the IRS. The report called for the IRS to develop a more effective strategy for addressing the large number of high-income nonfilers and ensuring their future compliance.

In response, the IRS LB&I Division on June 18 announced that on July 15 it planned to begin examining hundreds of high-income individuals and related entities, typically partnerships. The IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) Division also announced on June 18 that it expected to see increased audits of private foundations that have linkages with or that are interwoven into global high-wealth enterprises. An LB&I director on October 20 stated that several hundred exams of high-income taxpayers had been initiated.
Global tax policy

Long-standing controversies over global tax policies have been complicated by the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Severe economic stress related to the pandemic has led governments to make significant short-term changes to tax policies. The OECD last year released guidelines for policymakers to consider in responding to local needs. Some options recommended for consideration included temporary additional welfare and income support; temporary deferral or waiver of social security contributions or payroll taxes; deferred payment of VAT, customs, and excise duties on certain imports (such as food, medicine, and capital goods); increased loss offset provisions; and adjustments to tax payment requirements.

Pandemic-related economic challenges also were cited by government officials in Europe and elsewhere to assert that digital companies were profiting from their services during the crisis at the expense of many ‘traditional’ businesses. These claims bolstered efforts by some countries and nongovernmental organizations to put further pressure on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework to see that tech companies ‘pay their fair share.’ More generally, the significant drop in tax revenues in many countries combined with massive fiscal spending to protect economies from pandemic-related disruption puts increased strain on governments’ budgets. As a result, many governments are seeking new sources of revenue.

Observation: Companies should consider both the operational challenges and the reputational concerns that may arise from the ongoing discussion of changes to long-standing global tax policy. The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework proposals discussed below in particular will likely require additional compliance resources if implemented along the lines that currently are being considered. Increased public scrutiny of global business tax issues has been underway for several years, and companies should expect this to continue in light of the economic challenges being experienced by countries around the world.
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework

Originally established in 2016, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework made progress in 2020 toward reaching an agreement on addressing issues arising from the digitalization of the economy. Significant technical work was carried out with the October 2020 release of Blueprint Reports on proposals to rewrite profit allocation and nexus rules (Pillar One) and design a global minimum tax (Pillar Two).

However, efforts to secure a G20 endorsement of the Pillar One and Pillar Two proposals by the November 2020 Riyadh summit ultimately fell short. A G20 Finance Ministers statement issued at their October 2020 meeting offered some support for continued work on the Blueprints. The Ministers ‘welcomed’ the Blueprints and stated they ‘remain committed to further progress on both pillars and urge the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS to address the remaining issues with a view to reaching a global and consensus-based solution by mid-2021.’

Observation: A political consensus on the proposals currently appears elusive as the work of the 137-member Inclusive Framework continues. Nonetheless, the Inclusive Framework faces significant pressure to deliver an agreement within the first half of 2021, all while some countries frustrated with the timeline, as shown in Figure 13, are resorting to various unilateral actions, strongly opposed by the United States.

Figure 13: OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Timeline

Unofficial Project Timeline

- **January 2020**: Inclusive Framework meeting (political statement; Pillar 1 & 2 Outlines)
- **July 2020**: G20 Finance Ministers Meeting; reiterated commitment
- **Nov/Dec 2020**: US presidential election; Pillar 1 & 2 public consultations
- **December 2020/January 2021**: France resumes DST collection; USTR releases 301 reports (India/Italy/Turkey)
- **June 2021**: New deadline for political agreement on Pillars 1 & 2; EU action?

- **Through 2020**: Detailed technical work ongoing (Secretariat/Working Parties)
- **October 2020**: Full IF meeting; Blueprints released G20 Fin Min Mtg (endorsed 6-month extension)
- **2021**: Continued negotiations? Implementation? Trade wars?
The Pillar One Blueprint

Pillar One continues to envision creating a new taxing right for market countries where a company has active and sustained presence in a jurisdiction (even if only remote). A formulaic approach would reallocate a portion of an MNE’s residual profit among participating countries under an undefined allocation key (Amount A), as well as permit a fixed return (commensurate with an arm’s-length principle result) for certain baseline marketing and distribution activities occurring in the market jurisdiction (Amount B). A third key component of Pillar One is enhanced tax certainty, covering both dispute prevention and dispute resolution tools.

One of the most controversial issues of Pillar One remains the scope of Amount A. Currently, business activities considered to constitute ‘automated digital services (ADS)’ or ‘consumer facing businesses (CFB)’ will be in scope (if certain thresholds are met). The amount of residual profit to be allocated among the jurisdictions with Pillar One taxing rights remains undecided (although the OECD Secretariat’s economic analysis of Pillar One uses a 20% residual profit allocation over a 10% routine return as a placeholder).

Numerous technical elements are proposed in the Blueprint, but have not yet gained consensus political support. These elements include proposals for sourcing the revenue, determining the tax base, and eliminating double taxation. Scope for Amount B also remains up in the air, with Inclusive Framework members diverging on having a narrow or wide base of marketing and distribution activities covered. While members agree that additional certainty is needed, disagreements continue over the specific measures to adopt and whether some features might result in binding determinations.

The Pillar Two Blueprint

Pillar Two conceptually is targeted at addressing ‘remaining BEPS challenges’ and is centered around proposals for a global minimum tax regime. The primary rule—the income inclusion rule (IIR)—operates as a top-up tax levied on an MNE group’s foreign income where the effective tax rate is below a minimum threshold rate. An undertaxed payment rule (UTPR) acts as a backstop to apply a ‘top-up’ where a constituent entity’s income is not subject to an IIR. A subject-to-tax rule (STTR) allows source countries to deny treaty benefits for certain deductible intra-group payments where the payments are subject to no or low rates. A final rule—the switch-over rule (SOR)—deals with branch structures where a treaty uses an exemption method.

The Blueprint outlines a number of technical issues with the four rules, including scope, calculating effective tax rate (ETR), carryforwards, carve-outs, simplification measures, allocation keys, rule ordering, and dispute prevention. One noted issue particularly important for the United States is how Pillar Two will treat the GILTI regime, which is a precursor regime; no definitive resolution is presented.

Observation: While some government officials have portrayed Pillar Two as having fewer technical issues to resolve to reach political agreement, there are numerous areas that carry the possibility for significant administrative burdens for in-scope MNEs—such as dealing with timing differences, calculating ETR on a jurisdictional basis, and having the STTR apply before the IIR—along with likely divergence among implementing countries. A concern with both Pillar One and Pillar Two is that businesses will face heightened demands to provide governments with discrete transactional data that may not be currently captured or may be difficult to reformat.
Roles of Biden administration, Congress

Consistent with the long-standing position of both the Obama and Trump administrations, the US Treasury Department continued in 2020 to insist that the final results of any Inclusive Framework agreement must not ‘ring-fence’ US technology companies and must remain broad-based. Then-Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin also reaffirmed that the Inclusive Framework rules on the digitalizing economy should be treated as a ‘safe harbor.’ Despite telling several European countries that the negotiations seemed at an ‘impasse,’ the US government has remained actively engaged at all levels of the work program.

The Biden administration could reset the US approach to the Inclusive Framework’s ongoing work. However, the need to appoint new Treasury officials who will act as delegates to the OECD may take some time, and this may affect the ability of the new administration to engage with its foreign counterparts by the mid-2021 target date set by G20 Finance ministers for a political agreement.

Various members of Congress have affirmed repeatedly their desire for a multilateral solution to the digitalizing economy issues, and they have opposed on a bipartisan basis digital services taxes and other measures that are seen as targeting US multinational enterprises.

*Observation:* Since Congress must approve any domestic legislation or treaties (needing Senate approval) necessary to implement an OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework agreement, the OECD and foreign governments will need to consider the concerns being raised by congressional policymakers and the Biden administration. This provides US businesses an opportunity to share their views on Pillar One and Pillar Two with officials both in the Biden administration and on Capitol Hill.

Unilateral measures

The build-up of unilateral measures imposed or explored by countries worldwide escalated significantly in 2020. In addition to digital service taxes that became effective in France, Italy, and Austria at the beginning of 2020, Spain, Kenya, and the United Kingdom each passed final legislation last year enacting such taxes. In addition, India implemented an expanded equalization levy applicable to most nonresident e-commerce operators, while Indonesia adopted a framework that allows an ‘electronic transaction tax’ to be imposed on certain foreign companies (subject to implementing guidance). Canada, New Zealand, and other countries have indicated that they will pursue digital services taxes if the Inclusive Framework fails to reach a consensus solution by mid-2021.

Many of these measures are structured as a gross receipts tax on revenues generated by specific activities. Gross receipt taxes are particularly insensitive to losses encountered by many businesses across industries in a financial downturn, such as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The digital services taxes and retaliatory tariffs represent a difficult issue for the Biden administration to navigate early in its term. France and the United States brokered a temporary agreement in early 2020 that saw the United States hold off imposing tariffs under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in exchange for France not collecting payment from US companies subject to the French DST. This agreement broke down by the end of the year, when France resumed collecting DST payments. However, the outgoing USTR decided to indefinitely delay imposing the threatened additional sanctions, so that the incoming USTR can develop a comprehensive approach.
USTR in mid-2020 initiated 10 new investigations under Section 301 into digital tax regimes adopted or contemplated by Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Initial reports on the Austrian, Indian, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, and United Kingdom regimes found that such measures were discriminatory, unreasonable, and burdened US commerce, but withheld taking any official action for the time being. The remaining investigations are ongoing, with USTR expressing similar concerns around the subject measures.

EU activities

The European Union this year is expected to pursue the ambitious agenda on numerous tax initiatives that was outlined last year. EU officials called for measures addressing how large technology companies are taxed to be pursued at both an international level and also bloc-wide. EU officials announced they would let the Inclusive Framework discussions play out in hopes that a multilateral solution can be achieved, but strongly noted that if no agreement is reached by mid-2021, then they will pursue their own digital tax measures at the EU level.

Observation: If global cooperation fails, the EU Commission could take up its own version of the Pillar One architecture as a first step, while advancing future additional rules targeting the ‘fair taxation’ of large MNEs.

An added factor that may affect possible digital tax scenarios is that the EU has adopted a budget which relies on adopting a ‘digital levy’ as one of several new ‘Own Resources’ that will raise funds to pay back borrowed monies used for expenditures related to COVID-19. The Commission will have to release a proposal on an EU digital levy by mid-2021 for it to become effective by the beginning of 2023 (as mandated by the budget agreement).

A number of other new Own Resources are contemplated, including a carbon border adjustment mechanism. This measure, which will be proposed by mid-2021, aligns with several ‘European Green Deal’ initiatives being pursued by the Commission, such as a revised emissions trading scheme, an unrecycled plastics levy, and an updated energy tax directive.

The European Commission also continues to discuss measures to expand country-by-country (CbC) reporting by making such reports public, with more attention to this issue likely in 2021. In order to avoid the unanimity requirements for tax provisions, the Commission has characterized it as an accounting requirement, to increase the likelihood of approval and implementation. So far they have not been able to gain a ‘qualified majority’ to support the proposal, but that may change in 2021.

An EU-wide financial transaction tax is another potential tax-related measure that might be considered this year.

Work also continues on enhancing administrative cooperation among Member State tax authorities. Exchange of information on activities of platform sellers (DAC7) will move toward finalization in 2021, as well as a proposal on information exchange of crypto-assets and e-money (DAC8).
**Tax certainty**

The OECD continues to push forward projects meant to increase tax certainty. The International Compliance Assurance Program (ICAP) is expanding, with an open call now for new countries to join in the process of using CbC reports to assess risk with volunteering MNE taxpayers. The use of joint audits is growing, with tax administrations seeking cooperation as a means to achieve compliance and reduce resources spent on disputes.

In 2020, the OECD released several more batches of peer reports on Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP), noting trends in the number of active cases and time for resolution. The OECD’s review of BEPS Action 13 regarding CbC reporting is ongoing, with a proposal expected for adjustments to the data to be reported and possibly the reporting threshold as well.

**Tax transparency**

Significant developments occurred in 2020 impacting the level of transparency that taxpayers and governments are expected to provide to the public.

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—a civil society creator of ESG standards to which companies can voluntarily sign up—added a tax module (Tax 207-4) that in large part takes many CbCR components and makes them public. For example, the names of resident entities, number of employees, non-cash tangible assets, and a reconciliation of accrued corporate incomes taxes versus the statutory rate applied to the profit/loss before tax margin all would be publicly disclosed in a report. For companies that are looking to label themselves as GRI-compliant, the Tax 207-4 standard applies for reports filed after January 1, 2021.

The World Economic Forum’s International Business Council (IBC) also took concrete actions in 2020 to increase reporting of tax metrics by its members. Although an initial proposal would have largely adopted the GRI Tax 207-4 standard, a revised proposal by IBC instead calls for members to disclose the total amount of taxes classified as borne by the company (e.g., corporate income taxes, property taxes, and payroll taxes). An optional metric would allow companies to also disclose the total amount of taxes collected by the company (e.g., VAT and employee-related taxes).

As noted elsewhere in this report, the European Union is actively seeking to advance public CbCR in its 2021 agenda.

In the United States, there have been several recent attempts to pass legislation that would require the SEC or other regulatory agencies to broadly collect the same categories of information as the IRS does on country-by-country financial metrics. With a new presidential administration, disclosure advocates may seek to make headway on the issue of enhanced public disclosure.

*Observation:* With increasing pressures across the globe for greater disclosure of tax reporting, companies should proactively prepare for public scrutiny. Several important considerations include what data is currently collected within a business, how internal systems process that data, what story will be told by the data if it is made public, and how a company’s tax policy goals align with the metrics shown by the data.
**Tax treaties**

The Biden administration will have an opportunity to refocus the direction of US tax treaty negotiations with other countries.

US tax treaties traditionally have been considered in the Senate under unanimous consent procedures, which permits ratification of the treaties without requiring Senate floor time for debate and formal vote, but that changed with Senator Rand Paul’s (R-KY) election in 2010. Senator Paul placed a hold on the consideration of tax treaties due to privacy concerns related to treaty exchange of information provisions, which have been expanded in recent years as part of a global effort to prevent tax evasion. To advance past this delay, Senate leadership in July 2019 filed a cloture motion that resulted in the Senate’s ratification of four long-pending protocols to US tax treaties with Spain, Switzerland, Japan, and Luxembourg.

Further Senate consideration of long-pending tax treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland, however, was subsequently delayed because of reservations requested by Treasury regarding the BEAT provision, which was enacted as part of the 2017 tax reform act after the tax treaties had been negotiated. Treasury officials at one point indicated that the Trump administration might withdraw and re-negotiate the treaties if the Senate did not agree to the reservations, but no action was taken.

The Biden administration may seek to reopen tax treaty negotiations with Chile, Hungary, and Poland, given the history of Senate debate on the proposed agreements. Alternatively, the Biden administration could resubmit the treaties to the Senate, but then would likely need to request a BEAT exception similar to that sought by the previous administration. Based on public comments, Treasury officials are expected to consider updates to the 2016 US model tax treaty to reflect BEAT and other changes enacted as part of the 2017 Act.

Treasury officials have commented in public forums that work is underway to update the existing treaty network, including efforts to open negotiations with Croatia, the only EU member country with which the United States does not have an existing tax treaty. Previous comments from Treasury officials indicate that negotiations may be resumed with Vietnam, Norway, Romania, Colombia, and the Netherlands.

**Other international developments**

- A number of countries, including Argentina, New Zealand, and the UK, are considering ‘wealth taxes’ that could affect high net-wealth individuals.

- As BEPS continues to be implemented around the globe, two countries (Bahrain and North Macedonia) signed up to the multilateral instrument (MLI) agreement in 2020, with 21 countries submitting instruments of ratification (Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, and Uruguay).

- Implementation of DAC6 on mandatory disclosure rules (MDR), applicable for the reporting of certain transactions involving ‘aggressive tax planning,’ was postponed by some EU Member States due to the pandemic, but reporting will become mandatory in 2021.
Trade policy

Global trade will play a key role in economic recovery efforts in the United States and around the world. As shown in Figure 14, many of the world’s major economies are forecast to be still smaller at the end of 2021 than in 2019. Trade relations with the rest of the world are expected to be an important focus for the Biden administration as part of overall efforts to promote US economic recovery.

Figure 14: Economic growth forecast for major economies for 2021 relative to 2019

Real GDP in 2021 Q4 relative to 2019 Q4 (percent)

Source: OECD, December 1, 2020

US Trade Representative

President Biden has nominated Katherine Tai, currently chief trade counsel for the House Ways and Means Committee, to lead the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). As chief trade counsel, Tai played a significant role in working with the Trump administration during negotiations of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which went into effect on July 1, 2020. Tai previously served in the USTR’s Office of General Counsel as associate general counsel from 2007 to 2011. In 2011, Tai, who speaks fluent Mandarin, was appointed USTR chief counsel for China trade enforcement, overseeing US litigation against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO). House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Neal has named Alexandra Whittaker to replace Tai as chief trade counsel.
US-China trade

The Biden administration is expected to continue recent US policies that seek to address a range of concerns with respect to China, while also seeking to increase coordination with allies in Europe and other parts of the world.

Recent US-China trade negotiations
Former President Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He on January 15, 2020 signed Phase One of a multibillion-dollar trade agreement, which calls for certain actions by China, including structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime regarding intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange practices. The agreement also includes a commitment by China to increase purchases of US agricultural goods, energy, and manufactured goods by $200 billion over the next two years.
The US-China Phase One agreement was reached after multiple rounds of tariff increases by both the United States and China. The Phase One agreement leaves in place the 25% and 7.5% tariffs on approximately $250 billion and $120 billion worth, respectively, of Chinese imports. The Trump administration said in August that the tariffs would remain in place until the two sides successfully negotiate Phase Two of the trade agreement. President Biden has given no indication of a new direction with respect to the tariffs, and it appears likely that the tariffs would remain in place at least for the near term.

Former President Trump imposed the China tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which provides the president with the ability to take retaliatory actions against any country that violates or otherwise denies benefits under any trade agreement with the United States. The WTO said in a September 15, 2020 report that the Section 301 tariffs imposed in 2018 on billions of dollars of Chinese imports violate the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The WTO announced on October 26, 2020 that the United States had appealed the ruling, but the appeal has not been heard due to a lack of appellate body members to preside over the case.

Former President Trump on May 29, 2020 announced that the United States will begin the process of ending Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s (SAR’s) special trade status in response to China’s enactment of new national security laws. As a result, the Department of Commerce suspended all license exceptions for the shipment of dual-use items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Hong Kong SAR. In addition, Hong Kong SAR is subject to the same arms embargo that is in effect for China.

**Human rights**

The Biden administration and the new 117th Congress may consider additional measures to address US concerns about human rights in China.

The Treasury Department on July 9, 2020 adopted sanctions against Chinese officials and entities citing abuses relating to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, which was enacted on June 17, 2020. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) last year also began taking enforcement measures based on the June legislation. Specifically, on December 2, 2020, DHS announced that US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel at all US ports of entry will detain shipments containing cotton and cotton products originating from Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). CBP’s Office of Trade issued a withhold release order against cotton products made by the XPCC based on information that it concluded reasonably indicates the use of forced labor, including prison labor.

During the previous Congress, the House on September 22, 2020 passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 6210), which would go beyond the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act by requiring companies to establish that products coming from the Xinjiang region in China were not made using forced labor; the Senate did not act on the bill. The Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act (H.R. 6270), which had been introduced in the House, would take yet a further step by requiring that publicly held companies disclose whether the use of internment camp labor or other forced labor occurs in its supply chains.
Other US-China issues

President Biden is expected to review executive orders issued by former President Trump that affect specific Chinese companies. On August 6, 2020, then-President Trump issued two executive orders that effectively would ban the internet applications TikTok and WeChat in the United States. Judge Carl Nichols of the US District Court for the District of Columbia on September 27, 2020 issued a preliminary injunction against former President Trump’s order that banned further downloads of TikTok from US app stores pending a full hearing. Additionally on September 27, 2020, US Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler issued a preliminary injunction preventing the US Commerce Department officials from implementing a ban on WeChat downloads. While US representatives remained firm in their belief that the apps pose national security risks, China could launch an official legal complaint with the WTO on this matter.

National security impacts on trade (CFIUS, sanctions, and export controls)

The Biden administration will have an opportunity to utilize significantly enhanced US export controls, when such actions are considered appropriate, under legislation enacted in 2018. Export controls and sanctions affect all companies with US nexus, including US persons abroad, all persons while they are in the United States, and companies owned and controlled by US persons. US companies with global operations and non-US companies with touchpoints to the US financial system must comply with applicable regulations, giving particular attention to the extraterritorial application of US regulations, including re-export/retransfer controls and trade sanctions, which are increasingly used to safeguard and support US national security interests.

Recent and ongoing regulatory changes, which are administered by three primary government agencies but involve more than 20 agencies, have focused on the following key areas:

- Cross-border transactions;
- Limiting certain high technology exports to parties of national security concern; and
- Trade with Hong Kong SAR and China.

In February 2020, the Treasury Department issued regulations implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). The statute expanded the scope of cross-border transactions subject to review and oversight by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS, Committee), to focus on protecting critical technologies as described in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA). FIRRMA also imposes mandatory filing requirements for ‘covered transactions’ as defined in the regulations. US companies that may be acquired by or have controlling interest by non-US parties and US companies located in proximity to government facilities should consider the potential impact that CFIUS review may have on a contemplated transaction. The Committee also is requiring mandatory filings for companies involved in activities subject to US export controls, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)—which is housed within the US Department of Commerce and which administers and enforces the EAR—issued regulations implementing ECRA provisions to delineate emerging and foundational technologies included in the FIRMA definition of critical technologies. BIS in November 2020 proposed new controls on software for nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers. Earlier in 2020, BIS eliminated license exception CIV (Civil End-Use), which had been widely used to ship items that otherwise would have required an export license, and is considering additional restrictions on other license exceptions.

In addition, BIS amended General Prohibition Three of the EAR, also known as the ‘foreign direct product rule,’ to prohibit parties designated on the Entity List from receiving items and technology, including certain products made outside the United States using US equipment or technology. China was added to Russia and Venezuela as destinations subject to a revised and expanded ‘military end-user rule’ that included a broader list of product categories subject to military end-use restrictions. Lastly, a growing number of Chinese parties were added to the Entity List, which imposes a licensing requirement with a presumption of denial for items subject to the EAR. BIS recently updated export licensing policy for items controlled for national security reasons when destined to China, Russia, or Venezuela.

US companies, including overseas subsidiaries and affiliates, as well as foreign companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates in the United States must comply with US sanctions regulations as administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Departments of State and Commerce, among others. Recent actions expanded lists of entities subject to US sanctions. In June 2020, pursuant to Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999, the Department of Defense published an initial list of 20 Chinese companies said to directly support China’s military (Communist Chinese Military Companies). This list was expanded in August and December. Former President Trump on November 12, 2020 signed an Executive Order prohibiting US investments in Communist Chinese Military Companies and requiring divestiture of existing investments by January 11, 2021. Sanctions programs continue to evolve, with this being the first time that the Magnitsky Act has been used to designate Chinese entities.

These actions join those taken by other executive branch departments and agencies aimed at countering China’s ability to disrupt US national security, critical infrastructure, and economic stability. These include the Department of Energy’s designation of China as a ‘foreign adversary,’ an executive order directing the Interior Department to step up efforts to strengthen the US supply chain for ‘critical minerals,’ and continued implementation of Section 889 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, prohibiting the use of certain Chinese-origin telecommunications and video surveillance equipment in US government systems and by government contractors and subcontractors.

These actions further align with the Federal Communications Commission’s actions ordering the removal of Huawei Technologies equipment from carriers in the United States, heightened scrutiny of Chinese telecommunications operators in the United States, and strengthening the authority of Team Telecom. Lastly, the Justice Department has continued its ‘China Initiative’ aimed at uncovering and stopping Chinese economic espionage and theft of intellectual property, which carries particular compliance implications for US universities, medical centers, and research facilities. Limitations on visas for Chinese nationals who are members of the Chinese Communist Party also are intended to limit the potential for harm to US national security.
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)

USMCA took effect on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new free-trade agreement leaves in place the basic NAFTA framework, but updates the arrangement with new labor and environmental standards, a new chapter on trade in digital goods, stronger intellectual property protections, and a more stringent set of requirements for automobiles and automotive parts to qualify for tariff-free access in North America.

House Ways and Means Democrats on November 2, 2020 released a USMCA implementation report card detailing their concerns with implementation and enforcement as well as listed issues that they are closely monitoring. The USTR on December 9 announced the first enforcement action under USMCA to address Canada’s allocation of dairy tariff-rate quotas that the USTR says are contrary to the provisions of the agreement and harm US dairy farmers.

Presidential trade and tariff authority

President Biden will have broad authority to negotiate trade agreements. Congress in June 2015 enacted legislation renewing trade promotion authority (TPA) for six years. TPA provides presidents with authority to negotiate comprehensive reciprocal free trade agreements with major trading partners, which then are considered in Congress under an expedited process. Under TPA procedures, trade agreements are limited to debate (i.e., no filibuster) and an up-or-down vote (i.e., no amendments allowed) when all debate time expires. Also known as ‘fast track’ trade negotiating authority, TPA is subject to certain conditions, including Congressional consultation and access to information during all phases of trade negotiations. Unless Congress takes action to renew TPA, it will expire on July 1, 2021.

US-EU trade relations

The WTO on October 2, 2019 ruled that the United States may levy tariffs of up to $7.5 billion on imports from the EU in response to the EU’s subsidies to a European aircraft manufacturer. The WTO in May 2018 had ruled that the EU subsidies of the aircraft manufacturer were illegal. USTR Robert Lighthizer announced that beginning October 18, 2019, the United States would impose tariffs of 10% on large civil aircraft and 25% on agricultural and other products, mostly on imports from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the four EU countries responsible for the illegal subsidies. The United States on March 18, 2020 increased the additional tariffs imposed on aircraft imported from the EU from 10% to 15%. The USTR on August 12 announced a modification to the list of products subject to WTO-authorized additional duties would become effective September 1.

The WTO on October 26, 2020 authorized the EU to impose countermeasures in the amount of $4 billion in the case against an American airline manufacturer. The countermeasures, effective November 10, 2020, include additional tariffs of 15% on aircraft as well as additional tariffs of 25% on a range of agricultural and industrial products imported from the United States. USTR Lighthizer said that because Washington State in April 2020 eliminated a preferential tax rate for aerospace manufacturing in response to a WTO panel decision, the EU could not unilaterally impose retaliatory tariffs. The United States, effective January 12, 2021, modified and added to its tariffs on EU products. The USTR said the United States is in negotiations with the EU to resolve the dispute.
US-UK Trade Agreement

Even before a post-Brexit EU-UK trade agreement was reached (see below), the United States and the United Kingdom completed five rounds of talks working toward a comprehensive US-UK Free Trade Agreement (US-UK FTA). The latest round focused on market access for goods, which determines whether a product can benefit from preferential tariffs. The focus of the talks includes economic recovery efforts in light of the pandemic including services and investment, as well as digital trade. Thus far, the negotiators have been able to separate the US-UK FTA negotiations from the US Section 301 investigation into the UK’s digital services tax in order to move forward with the talks.

*Observation:* While the outlook for a US-UK deal appears positive, the Biden administration’s early policy focus on domestic economic issues and the time needed to stand up a new trade team at USTR likely means a US-UK deal could not be concluded early in 2021.

EU-UK Free Trade Agreement

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union on January 31, 2020 was followed by a transition period, during which the UK was to abide by all EU rules (and enjoy all benefits except involvement in EU institutions), until December 31, 2020. EU and UK negotiators on December 24, 2020 agreed to the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which took effect on January 1, 2021 and sets forth a framework on how the EU and UK will interact after the end of the transition period. The TCA, which aims to preserve long-standing cooperation between the EU and UK, includes a Free Trade Agreement (EU-UK FTA), a close partnership on citizens’ security, and an overarching governance framework.

The EU-UK FTA covers trade in goods and services as well as investment, competition, State aid, tax transparency, air and road transport, energy and sustainability, fisheries, data protection, and social security coordination. The FTA provides for zero tariffs and quotas on goods that comply with the appropriate rules of origin, certain protections and joint management rights, continued transportation connectivity, a new model for energy trading and interconnectivity, social security coordination, and the UK’s continued participation in EU programs for the years 2021–2027.

Miscellaneous tariff bill

Congress regularly considers miscellaneous tariff bills (MTBs) to temporarily suspend or reduce tariffs on imported products with zero or insufficient domestic availability. Most recently, Congress passed the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018, which was estimated to reduce tax revenues by more than $1 billion between October 2018 and the end of 2020. Tariff suspensions under the 2018 MTB expired on December 31, 2020.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

The GSP was established by the Trade Act of 1974 to provide non-reciprocal, duty-free treatment to certain products from 119 designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and territories. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-141) extended the GSP program until December 31, 2020.
State tax policy

State and local budget processes were significantly disrupted by the impact of COVID-19. The pandemic’s impact began to be felt as most legislative sessions were underway, and many states chose to delay difficult budget decisions until the fiscal effects were better known along with the scope of potential federal aid to state and local governments. At the start of 2021, neither of these issues is settled, and as a result states and localities will confront difficult tax and budget choices during their upcoming legislative sessions.

Budget conditions driving tax policy

The impact of the pandemic on state finances has been uneven. The hardest-hit states have volatile revenue sources, such as sharply progressive income taxes or a heavy reliance on the energy sector. Some of these same states saw increased revenue collections as the economy rebounded in the second half of 2020.

While improving finances are generating calls for tax relief, most states will face some degree of budget shortfall as they write their FY 2022 budgets this year. The continuing effects of the pandemic may mitigate the desire of some states to provide tax relief and incentives, while also prompting other states to consider revenue-raising proposals.
Past recessionary policies return

Of the few states that have enacted significant new tax policies in the wake of the pandemic, most have resembled policies adopted in prior years. In California, for example, lawmakers adopted a net operating loss suspension and credit limitations as part of the FY 2021 budget. These same policies had been adopted by California in 2009 and might be considered by other states as a way to buttress business tax receipts.

Another trend that may emerge in 2021 is a continuation of ‘temporary’ tax increases and freezing or reversing phased-in tax cuts. New Jersey, for example, extended and increased its corporate surcharge last September.

Federal tax conformity decisions may be revisited to increase state revenues, such as regarding foreign income, net operating losses, or the interest expense limitation. Some states decoupled from select CARES Act benefits in 2020, and this trend may continue in 2021.

Individual income taxes are another area where some states have sought to increase revenues. For example, in September, New Jersey adopted a ‘millionaire’s tax’ that had long been sought by Governor Phil Murphy (D). Similar high-earner rate increases have been considered in California and New York, and Arizona voters approved such a policy at the ballot box in November.

Potential for novel state tax policies

Several policies proposed to address wealth disparity concerns in recent years could advance in the current environment. Some assert that those individuals and businesses that have prospered during the pandemic should shoulder a heavier tax burden to lighten the load on those impacted more significantly. New York, for example, has seen the introduction of an ‘excess profits tax’ modeled after taxes on wartime profits.

Corporate surcharges based on a ‘CEO pay ratio’ have been proposed in California and other states, and in November, San Francisco voters approved such a measure. A ‘payroll expense’ tax bill has been drafted in Washington State, just as Seattle’s version of this tax takes effect this year.

States also may focus on wealth derived from intangible investments. Stock transfer taxes again may be considered in New Jersey and New York, and taxes on individual net worth or ‘mark-to-market’ taxes accelerating capital gains also may be considered, particularly in California and New York.

Finally, consumption taxes and gross receipts taxes have attracted attention in past recessions because they can raise large amounts of revenue, either to meet budget needs or fund tax reductions and incentives. While broadly expanding state and local sales and use taxes can be politically difficult, narrower levies (such as on digital advertising services) and limitations on business-to-business exemptions might be considered by policymakers.

Looking ahead

States will be closing out their FY 2021 budgets and writing their FY 2022 budgets. This will be a challenging process for state and local policymakers, and actions taken early in the year may require mid-year or late-year adjustments as conditions continue to evolve. The course of the pandemic and the possibility of future federal aid to states and localities will be key factors in the state tax policy decision-making process.
Prospects for action on at least some of President Biden’s tax proposals have increased significantly with the Georgia US Senate runoff election results. Democrats now control the Senate—a de facto 51-50 majority with the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Harris—and have a slim majority in the House. The scope of any tax increase proposals will be limited by the need to gain the near-unanimous support of House Democrats and the support of all 50 Democratic Senators.

Based on the current balance of power in Congress and public statements by key Congressional Democrats, we expect to see strong efforts to enact:

- A corporate rate increase;
- Increased taxation of foreign operations; and
- A return of the top individual rate to 39.6%.

Additional elements of the Biden tax plan also could be enacted.

The specific details (including effective dates), as well as the precise timing, of any tax legislative changes remain uncertain, but legislative action appears likely before the end of 2021. It is not too early for businesses to examine how increases to the corporate tax rate, the proposed minimum tax, or other proposed changes (for example, an increase in taxes on foreign income) could affect all aspects of their business, including particularly any impact on jobs, cash flows, investments, and deals.
Many important provisions of the tax law that may affect a business’s tax profile are scheduled to change without further congressional action—some as soon as 2022—putting pressure on companies' cash flows and effective tax rates. Tax law changes scheduled to go into effect in 2022 include:

- Tighter limits on the ability to deduct interest, and
- A move to R&E expenditure capitalization.

Companies may wish to consider engagement with policymakers regarding these scheduled unfavorable tax changes.

As discussed above, the next six to 12 months will be vitally important for the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework’s effort to remake the international tax system and avoid uncoordinated, unilateral actions by many countries. ‘Success’ or ‘failure’ of this effort will likely have significant effects on US and non-US companies. Engagement with the incoming Biden administration and the new Congress on global tax policy issues should be considered as they are likely to take a fresh look at the Trump administration’s approach to the OECD initiative.

Finally, multiple non-tax factors are driving companies to re-examine their global supply chains:

- The pandemic, which exposed vulnerabilities for many companies;
- Trade tensions with China, which are likely to persist; and
- Climate change concerns, which are leading many companies to make carbon reduction pledges.

As companies assess the tax effects of these changes to global supply chains, they will need to consider not just current law, but also how changes in the US tax system (possible rate increases and changes to the international tax rules) might alter the relative benefits of these business-led restructurings.
Appendix A: Key policymakers

Congressional leadership in the 117th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Leadership</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker of the House</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leader</td>
<td>Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Whip</td>
<td>James E. Clyburn (D-SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Democratic Leader</td>
<td>Katherine Clark (D-MA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Caucus Chair</td>
<td>Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Caucus Vice Chair</td>
<td>Pete Aguilar (D-CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair</td>
<td>Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Minority Leader                         | Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)                            |
| Minority Whip                          | Steve Scalise (R-LA)                             |
| Republican Conference Chair            | Liz Cheney (R-WY)                                |
| Republican Conference Vice Chair       | Mike Johnson (R-LA)                              |
| Republican Policy Committee Chair      | Gary Palmer (R-AL)                               |
| Republican Congressional Campaign Committee Chair | Tom Emmer (R-MN)                                |
### Senate Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President of the Senate</td>
<td>Kamala Harris (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Pro Tempore</td>
<td>Patrick Leahy (D-VT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leader and Democratic Conference Chair</td>
<td>Chuck Schumer (D-NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Whip</td>
<td>Dick Durbin (D-IL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Majority Leader</td>
<td>Patty Murray (D-WA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policy and Communications Chair</td>
<td>Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policy and Communications Vice-Chair</td>
<td>Joe Manchin, III (D-WV), Cory Booker (D-NJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Conference Vice-Chairs</td>
<td>Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Mark Warner (D-VA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Conference Secretary</td>
<td>Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair</td>
<td>Gary Peters (D-MI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Steering Committee Chair</td>
<td>Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Outreach Committee Chair</td>
<td>Bernie Sanders (I-VT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Outreach Committee Vice Chair</td>
<td>Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leader</td>
<td>Mitch McConnell (R-KY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Whip</td>
<td>John Thune (R-SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Conference Chair</td>
<td>John Barrasso (R-WY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Conference Vice Chair</td>
<td>Joni Ernst (R-IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Policy Committee Chair</td>
<td>Roy Blunt (R-MO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair</td>
<td>Rick Scott (R-FL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
House and Senate tax-writing committees

House Ways and Means Committee

The Ways and Means Committee membership is currently composed of 25 Democrats and 18 Republicans.

House Ways and Means Committee Members, 117th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Neal (D-MA), Chairman</td>
<td>Kevin Brady (R-TX), Ranking Minority Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)</td>
<td>Devin Nunes (R-CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Thompson (D-CA)</td>
<td>Vern Buchanan (R-FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Larson (D-CT)</td>
<td>Adrian Smith (R-NE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)</td>
<td>Tom Reed (R-NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Kind (D-WI)</td>
<td>Mike Kelly (R-PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Pascrell Jr. (D-NJ)</td>
<td>Jason Smith (R-MO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danny Davis (D-IL)</td>
<td>Tom Rice (R-SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Sanchez (D-CA)</td>
<td>David Schweikert (R-AZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Higgins (D-NY)</td>
<td>Jackie Walorski (R-IN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terri Sewell (D-AL)</td>
<td>Darin LaHood (R-IL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzan DelBene (D-WA)</td>
<td>Brad Wenstrup (R-OH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy Chu (D-CA)</td>
<td>Jodey Arrington (R-TX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwen Moore (D-WI)</td>
<td>Drew Ferguson (R-GA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Kildee (D-MI)</td>
<td>Ron Estes (R-KS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brendan Boyle (D-PA)</td>
<td>Carol Miller (R-WV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Beyer (D-VA)</td>
<td>Lloyd Smucker (R-PA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight Evans (D-PA)</td>
<td>Kevin Hern (R-OK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brad Schneider (D-IL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tom Suozzi (D-NY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jimmy Panetta (D-CA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephanie Murphy (D-FL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jimmy Gomez (D-CA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steven Horsford (D-NV)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stacey Plaskett (D-VI)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Senate Finance Committee

The Finance Committee membership is currently composed of 14 Democrats and 14 Republicans.

Senate Finance Committee Members, 117th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ron Wyden (D-OR), Chairman</td>
<td>Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ranking Minority Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)</td>
<td>Charles Grassley (R-IA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Cantwell (D-WA)</td>
<td>John Cornyn (R-TX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Menendez (D-NJ)</td>
<td>John Thune (R-SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Carper (D-DE)</td>
<td>Richard Burr (R-NC)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)</td>
<td>Rob Portman (R-OH)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherrod Brown (D-OH)</td>
<td>Patrick J. Toomey (R-PA)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Bennet (D-CO)</td>
<td>Tim Scott (R-SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Casey, Jr. (D-PA)</td>
<td>Bill Cassidy (R-LA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Warner (D-VA)</td>
<td>James Lankford (R-OK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)</td>
<td>Steve Daines (R-MT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maggie Hassan (D-NH)</td>
<td>Todd Young (R-IN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)</td>
<td>Ben Sasse (R-NE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)</td>
<td>John Barrasso (R-WY)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Senators subject to re-election in 2022 in **bold**

* Not running for re-election

Key Treasury and other Administration officials

Current (non-italic) and designated (italic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Secretary</td>
<td>Janet Yellen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, National Economic Council</td>
<td>Brian Deese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Office of Management and Budget</td>
<td>Neera Tanden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair, Council of Economic Advisers</td>
<td>Cecilia Rouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS Commissioner</td>
<td>Charles Rettig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS Chief Counsel</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B: Senators up for election in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bennet, Michael (D-CO)</strong></td>
<td>Blunt, Roy (R-MO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blumenthal, Richard (D-CT)</td>
<td>Boozman, John (R-AR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cortez Masto, Catherine (D-NV)</strong></td>
<td>Burr, Richard (R-NC)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duckworth, Tammy (D-IL)</td>
<td>Crapo, Mike (R-ID)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hassan, Maggie (D-NH)</strong></td>
<td>Grassley, Charles (R-IA)</td>
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<td>Kelly, Mark (D-AZ)</td>
<td>Hoeven, John (R-ND)</td>
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<td>Leahy, Patrick (D-VT)</td>
<td>Johnson, Ron (R-WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Patty (D-WA)</td>
<td>Kennedy, John (R-LA)</td>
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<td>Padilla, Alex (D-CA)</td>
<td>Lankford, James (R-OK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schatz, Brian (D-HI)</td>
<td>Lee, Mike (R-UT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schumer, Charles (D-NY)</td>
<td>Moran, Jerry (R-KS)</td>
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<td>Van Hollen, Chris (D-MD)</td>
<td>Murkowski, Lisa (R-AK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warnock, Raphael (D-GA)</td>
<td>Paul, Rand (R-KY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wyden, Ron (D-OR)</strong></td>
<td>Portman, Rob (R-OH)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rubio, Marco (R-FL)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scott, Tim (R-SC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shelby, Richard (R-AL)</td>
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<td>Thune, John (R-SD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Toomey, Patrick (R-PA)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young, Todd (R-IN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not running for re-election

Senate Finance Committee members shown in **bold**
## Appendix C: Biden campaign tax proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Current law</th>
<th>Biden proposal</th>
<th>$ Billions (2021-2030)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business tax provisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Tax Rate</td>
<td>21% rate for tax years beginning after 12/31/2017.</td>
<td>Increase corporate income tax rate to 28%.</td>
<td>$727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-base erosion regime (Subpart F)</td>
<td>US shareholders of CFCs subject to current US tax on GILTI with a 50% deduction. An 80% foreign tax credit is permitted. The deduction is reduced to 37.5% for tax years beginning after 12/31/2025.</td>
<td>Double the minimum (GILTI) tax on profits earned by foreign subsidiaries of US firms from 10.5% to 21%; eliminate 10% QBAI exception; and apply on country-by-country basis.</td>
<td>$442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass-through entities</td>
<td>20% deduction for non-wage portion of pass-through income. Deduction limited to the greater of 50% of W-2 wages or 25% of W-2 wages plus 2.5% of the unadjusted basis, immediately after acquisition, of all qualified property held in the qualified business for taxpayers with income over $315,000 (married) or $157,500 (individuals).</td>
<td>Phase out 20% deduction for income above $400,000.</td>
<td>$143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Income Minimum Tax</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Impose 15% minimum tax on large companies’ book income, with credit for taxes paid to other countries; allow loss carryover from non-profitable years.</td>
<td>$109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry-Specific</td>
<td>Businesses generally may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is funded by premiums that banks and savings associations pay for deposit insurance coverage.</td>
<td>Eliminate tax preferences for fossil fuels. Eliminate deduction for prescription drug advertising. Eliminate certain tax preferences for real estate investors with over $400,000 of income (such as like-kind exchange and accelerated depreciation for rental housing). Institute a financial fee on certain liabilities of large financial institutions with over $50 billion in assets.</td>
<td>$25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy Tax Incentives</strong></td>
<td>Available incentives include the investment credit, renewable energy credit, and renewable fuels credit.</td>
<td>Reinstall the renewable energy investment tax credit.</td>
<td>-$24</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Enhance tax incentives for carbon capture, use, and storage.</td>
<td>-$6</td>
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<td>Provide tax credits for deploying low-carbon technologies.</td>
<td>-$2</td>
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<td>Expand deductions for emissions-reducing investments in commercial buildings.</td>
<td>-$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Credits</strong></td>
<td>Available credits include the work opportunity credit, low income housing credit, new markets credit, and employee retention credit.</td>
<td>Expand and make permanent the new markets tax credit.</td>
<td>-$41</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expand the low-income housing tax credit.</td>
<td>-$9</td>
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<td>Reform opportunity zones.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
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<td>New childcare facility construction credit.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worker classification</strong></td>
<td>Determined using all relevant facts based on control and relationship factors.</td>
<td>Tighten the rules for classifying independent contractors by increasing penalties for misclassification.</td>
<td>$11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Onshoring</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>New <strong>offshoring tax penalty</strong>: 10% surtax on profits of any production (or services) by a US company overseas for sales back to the United States.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New ‘Made in America’ tax credit: 10% advanceable tax credit for companies making investments that will create jobs for American workers.</td>
<td>-$230</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tighten anti-inversion rules</td>
<td>$22</td>
</tr>
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<td>New incentives to make critical products in the United States.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>New manufacturing communities tax credit.</td>
<td>-$1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage pharmaceutical production in the United States.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deny deductions for moving jobs or production overseas.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establish ‘claw-back’ provision to require return of public investments and tax benefits if production moves overseas.</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Individual tax provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Payroll tax</strong></td>
<td>12.4% Social Security tax applies to annually adjusted wage base limit ($142,800 for 2021). Apply Social Security payroll tax to income above $400,000.</td>
<td>$740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital gain/Qualified dividend rates (individuals)</strong></td>
<td>Maximum 20% rate for long-term capital gains and qualified dividends. Unrealized capital gains not taxed at death. Tax capital gains and dividends as ordinary income for individuals with income above $1 million. Tax unrealized capital gains at death.</td>
<td>$373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estate tax</strong></td>
<td>Maximum 40% tax rate ($11,580,000 exemption for 2020). Value of property included in gross estate is FMV on the decedent’s date of death. Step-up in basis to FMV. Restore estate, gift, and GST rules at 2009 levels (45% tax rate, $3.5 million unindexed exemption). Retain step-up in basis (but see separate capital gains proposal to tax gains at death).</td>
<td>$218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual itemized deductions</strong></td>
<td>No overall limitation on itemized deductions. Deduction for state and local sales, income, and property taxes is capped at $10,000. Limit tax benefit of itemized deductions to 28%. Restore pre-2017 tax reform limitation on itemized deductions for individuals with income above $400,000.</td>
<td>$224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual rates</strong></td>
<td>Seven rate brackets (10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and 37%). Restore pre-2017 tax reform rates for income above $400,000 (including an increase in the highest rate to 39.6%).</td>
<td>$112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy tax credits</strong></td>
<td>Available credits may include nonbusiness energy credits and alternative motor vehicle credits. Restore full electric vehicle tax credit. Reinvest tax credits for residential energy efficiency.</td>
<td>$21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other credits</strong></td>
<td>Available credits may include child and dependent care credit, education credits, child tax credit, and earned income tax credit (EITC). New family caregiver credit. Extend EITC to workers age 65 and older without qualifying children. Exclude student loan forgiveness from taxable income. Increase child and dependent care credit. Temporarily increase child tax credit. Provide first-time homebuyer credit. Provide low-income renter credit.</td>
<td>$84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retirement plans</strong></td>
<td>Elective deferral to 401(k) plans ($19,500 limit for 2021). IRA contributions ($6,000 limit for 2021) subject to income limitations. Replace deductibility of contributions to 401(k) plans and IRAs with a 26% refundable tax credit. Provide automatic enrollment in IRAs for workers who do not have a pension or 401(k)-type plan.</td>
<td>-$151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Tax Policy Center – Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, Nov. 6, 2020 (TPC assumes a Jan. 1, 2022 effective date for most provisions.)
Appendix D: Expired or expiring tax provisions

Provisions expiring in 2021

- Computation of adjusted taxable income without regard to any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization, or depletion for purposes of the limitation on business interest
- Beginning-of-construction date for increased credit for business solar energy property
- Credit for residential energy property
- Beginning-of-construction date for fiber optic solar lighting system property, geothermal heat pump property, qualified fuel cell and stationary microturbine power plant property, combined heat and power property, and small wind property
- Five-year cost recovery for certain energy property
- Temporary increase in limit on cover-over of rum excise tax revenues (from $10.50 to $13.25 per proof gallon) to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
- Credit for certain nonbusiness energy property
- Beginning-of-construction date for non-wind renewable power facilities eligible to claim the electricity production credit or investment credit in lieu of the production credit
- Second generation biofuel producer credit
- Credit for qualified fuel cell motor vehicles
- Credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property
- Credit for two-wheeled plug-in electric vehicles
- Credit for production of Indian coal
- Credit for construction of new energy efficient homes
- Incentives for alternative fuel and alternative fuel mixtures
- Credit for health insurance costs of eligible individuals
- Premiums for mortgage insurance deductible as interest that is qualified residence interest
- Three-year depreciation for race horses two years old or younger
- Mine rescue team training credit
- Indian employment credit
- Accelerated depreciation for business property on an Indian reservation
- Black Lung Disability Trust Fund: increase in amount of excise tax on coal
- American Samoa economic development credit.
Provisions expiring in 2022

- Highway Trust Fund excise tax rates:
  - All but 4.3 cents-per-gallon of the taxes on highway gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, and alternative fuels
  - Reduced rate of tax on partially exempt methanol or ethanol fuel
  - Tax on retail sale of heavy highway vehicles
  - Tax on heavy truck tires
- Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund financing rate
- Railroad track maintenance credit
- Incentives for biodiesel and renewable diesel:
  - Income tax credits for biodiesel fuel, biodiesel used to produce a qualified mixture, and small agri-biodiesel producers
  - Income tax credits for renewable diesel fuel and renewable diesel used to produce a qualified mixture
  - Excise tax credits and outlay payments for biodiesel fuel mixtures
  - Excise tax credits and outlay payments for renewable diesel fuel mixtures

Provisions expiring in 2023

- Highway Trust Fund excise tax rates:
  - Annual use tax on heavy highway vehicles
- Airport and Airway Trust Fund excise taxes:
  - All tax rates (except for the permanent 4.3-cents-per-gallon rate) on noncommercial aviation kerosene and noncommercial aviation gasoline
  - Domestic and international air passenger ticket taxes and ticket tax exemption for aircraft in fractional ownership aircraft programs
  - Air cargo tax
  - Surtax on fuel used in aircraft in a fractional ownership program
- Beginning-of-construction date for certain qualified carbon dioxide sequestration facilities
- Beginning-of-construction date for increased credit for business solar energy property
- Credit for residential energy property
- Waste energy recovery property eligible for energy investment tax credit
Provisions expiring in 2025

- Look-through rule for payments between related controlled foreign corporations
- Rate on modified taxable income and treatment of credits in the calculation of base erosion minimum tax amount
- Deduction percentage for foreign-derived intangible income and global intangible low-taxed income
- Modification of individual income tax rates and special rules for unearned income of children
- Child tax credit: Increased credit amount, increased refundable amount, reduced earned income threshold, modification of identification requirements
- Increase in exemption amount and phaseout threshold of individual AMT
- Increase in standard deduction of individuals
- Suspension of miscellaneous itemized deduction
- Suspension of limitation on itemized deductions
- Tax exemption for student loan discharges on account of death or disability
- Treatment of certain individuals performing services in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt
- Suspension of exclusion for reimbursement of bicycle commuting
- Suspension of exclusion for moving expense reimbursement
- Suspension of deduction for personal exemptions
- Reduction in limitation on deduction for qualified residence interest, suspension of deduction for home equity interest
- Discharge of indebtedness on principal residence excluded from gross income of individuals
- Limitation on deduction for State, local, etc., taxes
- Personal casualty losses limited to Federally declared disaster areas
- Modification of rules relating to computation of wagering losses
- Increased percentage limitation on cash contributions to public charities
- Qualified business income deduction
- Suspension of deduction for moving expenses
- Deductibility of employer de minimis meals and related eating facility, and meals for the convenience of the employer
- Transfer of excess pension assets to retiree health and life insurance accounts
- Limitation on excess business losses of noncorporate taxpayers
- ABLE accounts:
  - Contributions eligible for saver’s credit
  - Rollovers from qualified tuition programs permitted
  - Increased contributions limit
• Increase in estate and gift tax exemption
• New markets tax credit
• Work opportunity credit
• Seven-year recovery period for motorsports entertainment complexes
• Special expensing rules for certain film, television, and live theatrical productions
• Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund financing rate
• Empowerment Zone tax incentives
• Employer credit for paid family and medical leave
• Beginning-of-construction date for energy credit for offshore wind facilities
• Beginning-of-construction date for certain qualified carbon dioxide sequestration facilities

**Provisions expiring in 2026**

• Additional first-year depreciation with respect to qualified property
• Election of additional depreciation for certain plants bearing fruits and nuts
• Election to invest capital gains in an opportunity zone

**Provisions expiring in 2027**

• Expensing of certain costs of replanting citrus plants lost by reason of casualty

**Provisions expiring in 2029**

• Specified health insurance policy fee
• Self-insured health plan fee

**Sources:** The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260; JCT staff report on expiring federal tax provisions 2020-2029 (JCX-1-20)
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