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JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
APPLICANTS	IN THE MATTER OF THE ***COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT***, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF POSEIDON CONCEPTS CORP., POSEIDON CONCEPTS LTD., POSEIDON CONCEPTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND POSEIDON CONCEPTS INC.
DOCUMENT	**REPLY BRIEF OF THE MONITOR, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INC.**
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	**BENNETT JONES LLP** Barristers and Solicitors 4500 Bankers Hall East 855 – 2nd Street SW Calgary, Alberta T2P 4K7 Attention: Ken Lenz, Q.C. Telephone No.: 403-298-3317 Fax No.: 403-265-7219 Client File No.: 11866.66

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. ISSUES 1

III. LAW AND ARGUMENT 1

(1) Multiple Stakeholders are Affected by the Continuation of these Proceedings 1

(2) The Class Action Plaintiffs' Arguments are Based on a Hypothetical Plan Which is not Properly Before the Court 3

(3) No Undue Prejudice 4

IV. CONCLUSION 5

V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 6

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Monitor of Poseidon submits this Reply Brief to address in summary form the many issues newly raised by the Class Action Plaintiffs in their Brief and Affidavit served at the close of business on October 31, 2014 for the application returnable November 4, 2014.

2. The Monitor submits that an extension to the stay is appropriate. All stakeholders support this relief except the Class Action Plaintiffs. There is a real possibility of a Plan of Compromise which will benefit all concerned.

II. ISSUES

3. While a number of interesting issues have been raised by the Class Action Plaintiffs, almost none of those issues are either relevant to the application to extend the stay of proceedings, or properly before the Court. The only relevant issue is whether there is a serious possibility that Poseidon will put forward a Plan of Compromise that benefits its creditors.

III. LAW AND ARGUMENT

(1) Multiple Stakeholders are Affected by the Continuation of these Proceedings

4. As set out in the Twentieth Monitor's Report, Poseidon continues to deal with a number of lien claims in parallel proceedings in the United States, as well as other issues which are part of the CCAA proceedings. In addition, there are a multiplicity of claims arising out of actions taken by Poseidon and parties related to Poseidon. These include claims by Poseidon against its directors and officers, against KPMG LLP, and against certain corporate predecessors and their directors and officers. In addition, there are claims by the Lending Syndicate against Poseidon's directors and officers on the basis that they advanced money based on inaccurate financial information. The Lending Syndicate anticipates making a claim against KPMG LLP. The Class Action Plaintiffs have made claims in multiple jurisdictions against these parties, and against Poseidon's underwriters, among other persons. Some of these parties have issued third party claims and it is expected many more will do so. Many stakeholders and claims are involved, as illustrated by the fact that approximately 60 counsel attended at the two-day mediation which has been referenced.

5. The focal point which draws all of these claims and issues together is Poseidon. The directors and officers, the predecessor corporations and their directors and officers, KPMG LLP, the first secured Lending Syndicate, the Monitor, the lien holders, and the unsecured creditors all support the extension of the stay of proceedings as proposed. The only party that stands against the extension of the stay of proceedings is the Class Action Plaintiffs who represent one class of stakeholders and whose status as equity claimants in relation to Poseidon is at the bottom of the standard scheme of priorities.

6. The use of the CCAA to settle complex commercial disputes including class action claims is well-established. In *Canadian Red Cross* (Class Action Plaintiffs' Authorities, Tab 9) the CCAA was used to settle complex class action and other proceedings arising out of the Canadian tainted blood scandal. In the Asset Backed Commercial Paper case (Class Action Plaintiffs' Authorities, Tab 5), the CCAA was used to put a structure in place to settle a number of complex commercial claims. Noteworthy in that case was the fact that the court included and released a number of contributories who were not actually party to the proceedings and the case was not driven by preserving an ongoing company but by the goal of settling a number of complex commercial issues (paras. 55 – 57 and 74 – 81). There have been numerous cases where CCAA Plans have released class action claims, like *Re Allen-Vanguard Corporation*, (2011) ONSC 5107 **[TAB 1]**. In *Sino Forest Corporation (Re)*, (2012), 114 O.R. (3d) 304 **[TAB 2]**, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, the effect of which was to subordinate the claims of equity holders. Finally, in *Century Services* (Class Action Plaintiffs' Authorities, Tab 6), the Supreme Court of Canada expressly rejected the argument that the CCAA is limited to situations where the filing entity is likely to emerge as a viable company. Justice Deschamps stated for the Court at para. 77:

> The CCAA creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

7. With the exception of the Class Action litigants, all parties believe a resolution is possible and that the CCAA and a potential Plan of Arrangement is the best vehicle to effect such a resolution. The Monitor submits the relief requested is appropriate.

(2) The Class Action Plaintiffs' Arguments are Based on a Hypothetical Plan Which is not Properly Before the Court

8. Contrary to paragraph 5 of the Class Action Plaintiff's Brief, there is no Plan of Arrangement before the Court. The bulk of the Class Action Plaintiffs' Brief addresses a fictional and poorly defined Plan of Arrangement. It is impossible and inappropriate to respond to this hypothesis.

9. The Monitor continues to seek an all-party settlement, which would include the Class Action Plaintiffs, and the terms of that Plan of Arrangement are yet to be determined. It may be that agreement cannot be achieved with some stakeholders and if so, a Plan of Arrangement may be able to be formulated around those with whom agreement can be reached. <u>However, at this point, there is no agreement and no Plan of Arrangement.</u>

10. If there were a Plan of Arrangement, the law is clear that submissions on its fairness or legal propriety would be appropriate only at the final fairness hearing, after a vote. Indeed, even at the meeting order stage (where there is an actual Plan of Arrangement, unlike the present case), the court has refused to entertain fairness arguments, leaving those arguments for the jurisdiction of the judge when considering whether to approve the Plan under Section 6.

- *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.*, 2000 ABQB 442 at para. 96 and generally for an example, that numerous factors are considered at the fairness hearing **[TAB 3]**
- *Stelco Inc. (Re)* 2005 O.J. No. 4733 (CA) at para. 31 **[TAB 4]**

11. Accordingly, the bulk of the Class Action Plaintiffs' Brief address an issue that is not before the Court, and may never be before the Court. Were the issue of Poseidon's claim against its director and officer insurance before the Court, the Monitor would wish time and material to fully address that issue and expressly reserves that right. However, by way of abbreviated reply, the Encon insurance policy in this case allows Poseidon to make claims against its directors and officers because they are the "Insured Persons" under Section 1(a).

Poseidon is the "Entity". Unlike other insurance policies, there is no prohibition against the "Entity" making claims against the "Insured Persons". They are distinct persons. The cases cited by the Class Action Plaintiffs are all distinguishable on this basis. In those cases, the "Insured Person" represented by a bankruptcy trustee, was making a claim against the bankrupt "Insured Person". In short, Poseidon had the foresight to obtain insurance for breaches of duty of its own directors and officers.

12. In any event, as set out above, Poseidon's claims extend to a large number of other parties and grounds. These proceedings are about all stakeholders, not just Poseidon, and the hope to settle all claims or a majority of them. Attached under **TAB 5** is a copy of the Amended Statement of Claim filed by Poseidon which sets out in detail the substance of Poseidon's claims and the parties directly involved. Similar substantial pleadings have been filed by the Class Action Plaintiffs, the Lending Syndicate, and it is expected that Statements of Defence and Third Party Claims will be as substantial.

(3) No Undue Prejudice

13. Perhaps the only relevant point raised in the voluminous submissions of the Class Action Plaintiffs is whether there is undue prejudice as a result of continuing the stay. There is no such prejudice. The Monitor is proposing a claims process which will solicit the claims of creditors in an expedited manner. This is an efficient process which is necessary to put a Plan of Arrangement before the Court.

14. In paragraph 106 of its Brief, the Class Action Plaintiffs suggest that unequal treatment of stakeholders is unfair in some respect. It is difficult to know what is meant by this submission, but it is submitted that the ongoing stay is necessary and in the interests of all the stakeholders. The Class Action Plaintiffs have commenced three actions in Alberta, six in Ontario, four in Quebec and two in the United States. There are threats of applications being brought to determine the appropriate forum in more than one jurisdiction. The directors and officers' insurance is set at an amount, less legal costs. To the extent that multiple applications and multiple proceedings continue, that insurance is diminished. The Monitor notes that it has already been diminished by several million dollars.

15. The CCAA proceedings stand a reasonable prospect of resolving all of these disputes to the benefit of all stakeholders. The extension of the stay is appropriate in these circumstances.

IV. CONCLUSION

16. The Monitor submits that it is in the interests of all stakeholders that the stay of proceedings be granted and that the claims process be implemented. It continues to believe that an all-party settlement is possible. If it is not possible with all parties, a substantial number of parties may be able to settle their claims in this process and a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement is an appropriate vehicle to implement that settlement. Throughout, the Monitor continues to have due regard to the interests of all stakeholders, including the Class Action Plaintiffs, and encourages all parties to attempt to resolve these issues short of litigation which promises to take years and which may exhaust a substantial part of the funds available.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

BENNETT JONES LLP

Per: ______________________________
Ken Lenz, Q.C.
Counsel for the Monitor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1. *Re Allen-Vanguard Corporation*, (2011) ONSC 5107

2. *Sino Forest Corporation (Re)*, (2012), 114 O.R. (3d) 304

3. *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.*, 2000 ABQB 442

4. *Stelco Inc. (Re)* 2005 O.J. No. 4733 (CA)

5. Amended Statement of Claim of Poseidon Concepts Corp., et al., Alberta Court of Queen's Bench Action No. 1301-12927

Citation: Allen-Vanguard Corporation (Re), 2011 ONSC 5017
Court File No. CV-09-00008502-00CL
Date: 20110825

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF **ALLEN-VANGUARD CORPORATION** UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND SECTION 186 OF THE *ONTARIO BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT.*, R.S.O. 1990, c.B.16, AS AMENDED Applicants	*Ronald G. Slaght, Q.C., Eli S. Lederman* for the Directors and Officers of Allen-Vanguard Corporation *C. Scott Ritchie, Michael G. Robb, Daniel E.H. Bach* for class action plaintiffs *Alan L.W. D'Silva, Daniel S. Murdoch* for Underwriters **Heard**: November 16, 2010

<u>**C. CAMPBELL J.**</u>:

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] Two motions were heard together: the first by former directors and officers of Allen-Vanguard to enforce the terms of a Sanction Order, which the directors and officers say release them as well as Allen-Vanguard from all claims except those specifically provided for in section 5.1 (2) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA.") In addition, the former directors assert that the claims of the Plaintiffs in two proposed Class Actions are not sustainable against them in law under s. 5 .1 (2) of the CCAA.

[2] The second motion by the Underwriters of Allen-Vanguard seeks to dismiss or stay the action brought against the Underwriters by shareholders in a proposed Class Action.

[3] A cross-motion brought by Plaintiffs in the two proposed Class Actions seeks, if required, variation of the terms contained in the Sanction Order granted December 16, 2009, to permit the Class Actions to proceed.

[4] By way of an endorsement dated February 9, 2011, the Court sought further information from the parties with respect to the factual circumstances that surrounded the agreement that was embodied in the terms of the Sanction Order. That information has been provided and will be referred to later in these Reasons.

[5] The claims that the directors who are the moving parties seek to effectively enjoin are those brought in two Class Actions (hereinafter the "Laneville action" and the "Love action"), wherein former shareholders seek damages against directors, officers and Underwriters based on alleged misrepresentation to shareholders by the Defendants about the effect on Allen-Vanguard of its purchase of another company in 2007.

Background

[6] As of December 2009, Allen-Vanguard was insolvent. An Application was made on December 9 for an Initial Order under the CCAA, appointment of a Monitor and a Plan Filing and Meeting Order. The effect of the Initial Order among other matters stayed the existing Class proceeding.

[7] The circumstances that surrounded the Plan Filing/Meeting Order, the Court was advised, were necessary to avoid a bankruptcy. The subsequent vote on December 9, 2010 was approved in favour of the Plan by 100% of affected creditors.

[8] The circumstances that surrounded the December 9, 2010 Application and Order were a variation on a CCAA process that has come to be known as a "pre-packaged" Application. The secured creditors agreed to a restructuring of their secured debt in circumstances involving a going concern sale of assets where, had a bankruptcy ensued, there would have been no recovery for creditors or shareholders beyond very incomplete recovery for those secured creditors.

[9] The First Report of the then proposed Monitor, Deloiite and Touche, in support of the Initial Order, outlined the transaction that had been proposed to all creditors as early as September 2009, posted on SEDAR and to which (apart from the question of releases) no party was opposed on December 9.

[10] The Plan provided for the Secured Lenders foregoing a portion of their existing debt and fees, converting the remainder of the existing debt into a multi-year restructured term loan with terms more favourable to the Company and a new revolving credit facility.

[11] The Court accepted the opinion of Deloitte & Touche that without the proposed transaction, the Company would likely not be able to meet its financial obligations as they became due and would likely be unable to carry on the business beyond the very short-term, which would then necessitate liquidation.

[12] The conclusion by Deloitte & Touche, accepted by the Court, was that the restructuring process in the Plan maximized the value of the Company for the benefit of all stakeholders and represented the best offer from that process.

[13] The alternative faced by the Company was that of a forced liquidation, which as estimated by the Monitor would result in a shortfall to secured lenders in excess of $100 million.

The Laneville Action

[14] The proposed Class Action Plaintiff in the Laneville action issued on October 9, 2009 a Statement of Claim dated November 26, 2009, which sought appointment on behalf of a Representative Plaintiff and for a class of Allen-Vanguard shareholders who allege that Allen-Vanguard Corporation and its directors and officers are liable for various misrepresentations, negligence and oppression.

[15] The Statement of Claim detailed a transaction that occurred in 2007 for which the Class Plaintiffs claim the directors and officers failed to properly value and account for in the financial statements of Allen-Vanguard, when Allen-Vanguard purchased all of the shares of a private corporation called Mid-Eng Systems Inc.

[16] In addition, the Class Plaintiff claims damages for negligent misrepresentation not only under the common law but as well under s. 138.3 of the *Ontario Securities Act* in connection with the same transaction.

[17] The only creditor objection to the Plan taken at the time of the Initial Order was from counsel for the Proposed Class Plaintiff in the Laneville action, who sought an adjournment of the vote based on the wording of the proposed release terms.

[18] The adjournment of the vote was not granted given the financial fragility of Allen-Vanguard, and the sanction hearing, which was to deal with the wording of the proposed release terms, was set for December 16, 2009.

[19] The Second Report of the Monitor, dated December 10, 2010, advised the Court of the terms of the release and injunctions that had been negotiated, the terms of which were put forward for approval on an unopposed basis. No objection was taken at the sanction hearing by counsel for the Class Plaintiff and no amendment to the Release portion of the Sanction Order sought. Whatever had been negotiated between the parties came before the Court on an unopposed basis. Counsel for the Class Action Plaintiffs and for the Defendant directors had input into and agreed to the wording.

[20] The Court has been advised that by agreement of counsel, the wording of the Release was negotiated by the parties with the recognition that there would likely remain an issue on which the Court would have to rule. That issue is now the subject of the first motion and the cross motion. I have been advised as a result of the inquiry of February 9, 2011 and what is now obvious as a result of the recent correspondence (including an affidavit sworn June 30, 2011 and objected to) is that Plaintiffs' counsel in the Laneville action and counsel for the directors had quite different views in respect of the kinds of claims that could be included in s. 5.1(2).

[21] As I now understand it, counsel for the Allen-Vanguard Corporation made no representation or agreement that the claims in the Laneville action were within those permitted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[22] Counsel for the Plaintiff in the Laneville action believe that the language in the Sanction Order preserves the claims in both the Laneville action and the Love action, including the claims against the Underwriters. It is submitted by the Plaintiff that the jurisprudence in respect of s. 5.1(2) permits not only claims against directors but as well officers to the extent there is insurance coverage, and that the Plaintiffs' position is consistent with the jurisprudence under s. 5.1(2).

[23] Counsel for the Directors and for Underwriters submit that counsel for the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known at the time they agreed to the language of the Plan of Arrangement and the draft Sanction Order that the claims asserted against the Directors and Officers of Allen-Vanguard might nevertheless fail to meet one of the exceptions set out in s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[24] In the result, the issue of what was or was not agreed to as part of the Sanction Order comes down to the question of whether or not the wording of s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA, read in context of statutory interpretation, is sufficient to permit continuance of claims in the Laneville and Love actions.

[25] As reported by the Monitor in the First Report, the Plan contemplated two releases: a General Release and an Equity Claims Release, both of which had been contemplated in the proposed Plan. Neither the Equity Claims Release nor the General Release was intended to release or deal with or affect in any respect claims under ss. 5.1(1), (2) and (3) of the CCAA, which read:

> 5.1 (1) a compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> 5.1 (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressed conduct of directors.
>
> 5.1 (3) the court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[26] The Monitor in its Second Report remarked as follows:

> 28. The injunctions provided in the Plan are limited by section 5.1 (2) of the CCAA. The injunctions barring any person from commencing, continuing or pursuing any proceeding on or after the Effective Time for a claim that such person may have against the Company or any current or former officer of the Company of the type referred to in subsection 5.1 (2) of the CCAA... but permit any such subsection 5.1 (2) claim to proceed against a current or former director of the company except that any such claim against a current or former director of the company is permitted recourse, and sole recourse, to the Company's insurance policies in respect of its current and former directors. The estimated value of any coverage under such insurance is $30 million as per the Luxton Affidavit.
>
> 29. The Monitor is aware of at least one group of stakeholders affected and by the Supplemental Injunction, being a group of current and former shareholders of the Company that have served a Notice of Action and Statement of Claim on the Company seeking approximately $80 million in damages from the Company and its directors and officers, as further described in the monitors First Report. As stated above the terms of the Supplemental Injunction would permit this claim to survive against the current and former directors of the Company with recourse limited to the Companies'insurance as referenced above."

[27] The Releases and Sanctions are contained in the language of the Sanction Order. A summary of the provisions with paragraph references to the Sanction Order is as follows:

> 22. Releases are essential to the Plan
>
> 23. All Persons give full release to each of the Released Parties including contribution and indemnity but directors not released in respect of any claim of the kind referred to in section 5 . 1 (2) of the CCAA.
>
> 24. Release of Applicant and current and former directors provided that nothing therein releases a director or current or former officer in respect of any claim of the kind referred to in section 5 .1 (2) of the CCAA.
>
> 25. All Persons enjoined and estopped from commencing or continuing actions with the exception of any claim against the directors of the kind referred to in section 5 .1 (2) of the CCAA..
>
> 26. Injunction and bar with respect to section 5 .1 (2) against the applicant... and that the sole recourse for any claims against a current or former director or officer of the Applicant Limited to any recoveries from the Applicants insurance policies in respect of current or former directors and officers
>
> 27. Laneville Action dismissed as against the Applicant without prejudice to discovery rights against representative of the Applicant.

The Love Action

[28] On February 8, 2010, after the Sanction Order had been made, another Proposed Representative Plaintiff, Gordon Love, commenced a second action and is represented by the same counsel as in the Laneville action. The Statement of Claim, dated March 10, 2010 against the directors and officers of Allen-Vanguard Corporation, includes claims against Cannacord Financial Ltd (and others collectively referred to as "Underwriters.")

[29] An Amended Statement of Claim dated August 10, 2010 asserts in the Love action claims for negligence against directors, officers and Underwriters, all arising out of the transaction and alleged failure to properly disclose the transaction in the financial statements and transaction referred to in paragraph 15 above in respect of a 2007 acquisition.

Issues

1. Do the Laneville action and the Love action and their proposed class claims fall within those claims non-exempt under s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA?
2. Does the language of the Release contained in the Sanction Order apart from s. 5.1(2) permit either the Laneville or Love actions, including that against Underwriters, to continue?
3. Is there any basis on which the Court could or should vary the terms of the Release section of the Sanction Order?

[30] Having reviewed the language of the Releases contained in the Sanction Order, I am satisfied that the only basis that the release language permits claims as against the directors is if they are those contemplated in s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA not to be released.

[31] The object of the CCAA is to facilitate the restructuring of an insolvent corporation. In order to effect restructuring, a compromise of creditors' claims is almost inevitably an essential ingredient of a Plan under the CCAA.

[32] The Plan, to be effective and to obtain Court approval, requires consensus and agreement by various classes of creditors. Many of the issues that arise before a Plan is approved by the Court involve a contestation between creditor groups as to how they should be classified and what extent of what group approval should be appropriately required. No motion was brought to seek to lift the stay in respect of actions provided for in the Initial Order.

[33] In this case, no creditor came forward to oppose approval of the Plan, including the terms of the release language as set out in the Sanction Order. The effect of a Sanction Order is to create a contract between creditors. (See *Canadian Red Cross Society* (2002), 35. C.B.R. (4^{th}) 43 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[34] The most significant feature of the CCAA Applications that have come before the Court in the last two or three years is that the negotiation has taken place to achieve consensus among creditors often before the Initial Order under the statute.

[35] One can rightly understand the reluctance on the part of a provider of interim financing to continue to do so on an indefinite basis, when the approval process may be dragged out for days, weeks or months.

[36] All secured creditors whose security continues to deteriorate during the period of negotiation will seek an early determination of the consensus necessary for approval of a Plan; otherwise, liquidation may be preferable.

[37] Such consensus requires agreement among many stakeholders, including not just creditors but as well current and former directors and officers, many of whose continued cooperation is necessary and integral to a Plan's success.

[38] To avoid the inequity that would result from creditor claims that were outstanding as against directors at the time of a CCAA application, s. 5.1(2) was amended in 1997 to its present form. As Hart J. noted in *Re-Liberty Oil & Gas Ltd.* 2002 ABQB 949 at paragraph 4, before the enactment of this section, the legislation provided for compromises of claims only against the petitioning company. The new section extends relief against directors of the petitioning company subject to exceptions.

[39] It is appropriate to approach statutory interpretation with the assumption that meaning is to be accorded to each of the words used in the provision within the overall purpose of the CCAA. The absence of other words can also be purposeful.

[40] The CCAA has been said to be a skeletal statute designed to give flexibility and expediency in the ability of the company, with the concurrence of its creditors, to accomplish a restructuring of its debt in the avoidance of liquidation or bankruptcy, and does not contain a

comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. (See *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments11 Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 per Blair J.A para. 44.)

[41] Since the hearing in this matter, the Supreme Court of Canada has rendered a decision in *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* 2010 SCC 60, which endorses the broad principles of the CCAA and the discretion granted to the Court to effect a restructuring if possible or an orderly liquidation.

[42] The case involved a contest between the deemed trust provisions of the *Excise Tax Act* and the CCAA. Madam Justice Deschamps, speaking for the majority, noted the need for clarity of the underlying purpose with respect to the CCAA.

[43] Paragraphs 12 to 14, 17, 58-59 and 63 of that decision read as follows:

> 12. Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.
>
> 13. Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing $1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.
>
> 14. Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of $5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.
>
> ...
>
> 17. Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).
>
> ...
>
> 58. *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the

> hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).
>
> 59. Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:
>
> > The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.
> > *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* reflex, (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting.)
>
> ...
>
> 63. Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

[44] I have quoted from the above decision at length to stress the nature of the discretion that is inherent in the CCAA statute to allow the Court to fashion a structure or process to best benefit stakeholders. Consistent with that purpose and as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is appropriate to look at the interpretation of s. 5.1(1) and (2) of the CCAA. Section 5.1 (1) deals with "obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations."

[45] A Plan can therefore provide for the compromise of claims against directors where a director may in law be liable for the payment of a company's obligation with the exceptions set out in s. 5.1(2).

[46] In my view, the best that can be said of s. 5 is that it is not as clearly drafted as it might have been.

[47] It is noteworthy that in the first line of s. 5.1(2), the only claims that may not be excluded in a compromise are those against "directors." Claims that can be excluded in a compromise include those against "officers" and the "company" itself. Why is this the case? One reason undoubtedly is the personal liability that directors face under both Federal and Provincial legislation, or the personal undertaking of a director to a creditor such as a personal guarantee. (See *C.I.T. Financial v Lambert* 2005 BCSC 1779.)

[48] By way of example, s. 131 (1) of the OBCA provides that directors are made personally liable for unpaid wages of the corporation's employees to a maximum of six months. Reading through s. 5.1 (1) and (2), there is nothing in the wording that would prevent the compromise of such claims against officers or the company itself, but not as against directors. The CCAA does not contain a definition of the word "creditor" but does of the terms "secured creditor," "unsecured creditor" and "shareholder." It would seem that for the purposes of the CCAA and in particular s. 5.1 (2), a creditor would include both a secured creditor and an unsecured creditor, but would not include a shareholder.

[49] Section 5.1(2) refers only to creditors and not shareholders as prospective claimants, whether in contract, tort or statutory oppression.

[50] In this case, the claims by the Class Action Plaintiffs are on behalf of shareholders against directors, since the effect of the CCAA stayed the action against the company Allen-Vanguard. The claims arise with respect to a 2007 transaction and the pre-filing financial statements, but the claims do not involve officers or the company, only directors.

[51] While framed in negligence, the claims in these actions seek to involve the remedy of oppression under the OBCA to enlist the broad scope of remedy possible under that statute. However, it is only in respect of unpaid obligations of the company and other contract-type claims where the law imposes liability on the Defendant directors that invokes the exception in s. 5.1 (2). It is noteworthy that the word "negligence" does not appear in the section at all.

[52] In their essence, the claims in the two actions allege a failure on the part of the directors in 2007 and the company to enter into a provident transaction and the transaction represented a misrepresentation to shareholders of the value of the transaction causing a reduction in shareholder value. Such claims are not of the same kind as those contemplated in section 5.1 (1). They do not relate to "obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable."

[53] The claims relate to transactions that were well in advance of the Initial CCAA Order. In *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* 2000 ABQB 442 (leave refused to ABCA and to SCC), it was held that claims against the directors should only be released if they arose prior to the date of the CCAA proceeding.

[54] I agree that the oppression remedy is expansive in scope and empowers the Court to make determinations and orders that can have a direct and even a radical impact on the internal management and status of a corporation, including even an order winding up the corporation. (See *820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd.* (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2nd) 113 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and *Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v. CanWest Global* 2001 CanLII 28395 (ON S.C.) at paragraphs 101-105.) Oppression as it occurs within s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA must be read within the context of the section itself.

[55] The claims in the Love and Laneville actions are in negligence and no other remedy is sought apart from a claim for damages and access to whatever insurance may be available to respond to claims against directors and officers. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the insurers, assuming there is a valid policy, are aware of the restriction on remedy.

[56] I see no basis from the pleadings in this action for which it would be appropriate to consider the scope of relief that might otherwise apply under the oppression remedy section of the OBCA. Counsel for the Plaintiffs in the Proposed Class Actions cannot bolster their position by limiting recovery to the applicable Directors and Officers Insurance, when there is no basis for the claim at all, either under the language of the Release or the meaning to be accorded to s. 5.1 (2).

[57] In *BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders*, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the expectations of stakeholders including but not limited to shareholders, in considering a Plan of Arrangement in the context of an oppression claim. Part of

the test for "oppression" referred to in that decision is an expectation on the part of the claimant to be "treated in a certain way and that failure to meet the expectation involved unfair conduct."

[58] I fail to understand how the expectation of one or more shareholder groups can be any different with respect to the impugned transaction than those of creditors or indeed the company itself vis-à-vis the directors, particularly since neither the officers nor the company itself is pursued.

[59] The Sanction Order in this case by its terms provided release of the claims now sought to be pursued. By the terms of the Sanction Order, the only reasonable expectation of stakeholders would be that unless specifically authorized by the Order, any claim against directors would be barred. Potential claims against directors were not assigned to class plaintiffs nor was direction sought by any party about the effect of s. 5.1 prior to the issuance of the Order. Given the issue now before the Court and the disagreement of the parties, perhaps the better practice would have been to advise the Court of the issue and "carve" it out of the Plan.

[60] The Court is put in a difficult position when asked in a very constrained timeframe to approve the restructuring with releases. It should certainly not be the expectation that in every instance, releases of the type here should be granted as a matter of course. Those with unpaid obligations of the company may assert that directors are liable if they fail to fulfill the company's obligation when they are legally bound to do so.

[61] I am of the view that third-party releases in particular should be the exception rather than the rule. There may very well be instances in which the releases are not integral or necessary to the restructuring and should not be approved. That was not suggested in the approval process here. There was no evidence presented at the time of the granting of the Sanction Order to suggest that directors were not important to the restructuring. Indeed, the only evidence before the Court was to the contrary: that the directors were integral to the Plan's success.

[62] In this case, the putative Plaintiffs did not oppose the granting of the Sanction Order and in effect took their chances that the Order might after the fact permit the limited claim referred to in the Monitor's Report.

[63] All of the other stakeholders, including the secured creditors, directors, officers and the Applicant Company, approved the form of Order.

[64] It is certainly speculative at this time to consider, had the form of Order proposed been objected to, to what extent the Court would have any jurisdiction to grant the language now sought by the Plaintiffs, without rejecting the Plan entirely.

[65] The duty of directors is first and foremost to the company itself. The oppression remedy does not in my view permit one group (shareholders) to claim oppression when other stakeholders, for example employees or creditors or indeed the company itself, have allegedly suffered a loss that results in insolvency and are unable to seek redress and still preserve restructuring.

[66] To vary or amend the Sanction Order now to permit the claims to continue might at the very least require the presence and concurrence of all of those who supported the form of Order in the first place.

[67] Counsel for the proposed Plaintiffs refer to several decisions, which they urged support the proposition that shareholder actions for oppression against directors are permitted under s. 5.1 (2) of the CCCA.

[68] Each of those decisions, while fact-specific, in my view is consistent with a narrow range of actions warranted for a shareholder against the director under the exception to s. 5.1 (2).

[69] In *Re-Liberty Oil & Gas Ltd.*, 2002 ABQB 949, where the action did proceed, the allegation involved a personal representation, indeed a fraudulent one, by the defendant director to two individuals who happened to be shareholders. The complained acts were not those of the company (as here), but rather personal and direct as between the director and shareholder. In other words, there was the proximity that one would expect in a tort situation.

[70] In *Worldwide Pork Corp.*, 2009 SK QB 414, the action was not permitted to proceed. At paragraphs 14 and15 Justice Dawson said:

> It must be remembered that the oppression remedy is not designed to settle every dispute of a corporation but only those that involve and abuse of the corporate system and for which a common-law remedy does not exist.
>
> As well, the plaintiffs have pled that their claim is for damages, for loss of profits and loss of pay out dividends. There must be a causal connection between the alleged opppresive conduct and the loss claimed to be suffered by the plaintiffs. That is, there must be a causal nexus between the alleged conduct and the loss suffered by the plaintiffs. There is no pleading which sets out how the alleged loss of profit or dividends resulted from the conduct alleged to be oppressive. But in any event the losses claimed are losses as a result of Worldwide Pork not being profitable, that is, being unable to provide a return to shareholders for their investment. Such a loss cannot support an action for oppression since it comes with in the exception contained in section 5.1 (2) (b.) of the CCAA.

[71] In *Re-Blue Star Battery Systems International Corp.* (2000), 10 B.L.R. (3d) 221, Farley J. of this Court dealt with a claim very much like that considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Century Services, supra,* as it involved G.S.T. At paragraph 12, he said

> Thus it appears to me that RevCan, not having put itself into position where it could (and did) perfect its derivative claims as set out in section 323 (2) (a) of the *Excise Tax Act* never had a claim against the directors which could survive the sanction of the Plan vis-à-vis the Applicants. Nothing that this Court could do at the present time (that is, at the time when considering the CCAA sanctioned motion) could crystallize a RevCan claim against the directors. RevCan would have to take additional multiple steps over some period of time to establish a claim against the directors."

[72] Farley J. went on to discuss the hypothetical of a claim in oppression against the directors as provided for in s. 5.1(2) in the context where the creditor had put the directors on notice of the promise of the company to pay the tax.

[73] The argument of the Proposed Plaintiffs here is that "oppressive conduct" is not to be carved out, but that wrongful conduct that involves directors, even though the action as against the company cannot continue, it can continue against the directors.

[74] What in my view is consistent with the decisions in the three cases mentioned and in the Québec case *Papiers Gaspésia* 2006 QCCS 1460 (CanLII) and with the interpretation of s. 5.1(2) is that the actions of the directors toward persons who may be regarded as creditors, and may in this context include a shareholder, are based on a direct relationship when a director takes on an obligation to make a payment that would otherwise be the obligation of the company and promises to do so or is obliged to do so by legislation. In most cases this will be a post-filing obligation. In other words, a promise by a director directly to a creditor stakeholder that is made following a CCAA Initial Order may attract liability to the director and should not be released.

[75] It would be inconsistent with the scheme of the CCAA to allow all claims in which shareholders claim oppression to proceed against directors for acts or omissions that they did in the name of the company prior to the Initial Order. There would be little if any incentive to directors to pursue restructuring if they were going to be so exposed. On the other hand, personal undertakings or obligations of directors made during the CCAA process should not easily be released.

[76] To permit the kind of claims as the Proposed Plaintiffs would see them would create a priority to that class of unsecured creditors that properly should belong to the creditors as a group. No leave to continue the Class action was sought before the Sanction Order was granted and even on this motion no submission was put forward for the exercise of discretion under section 5 .1 (3)..

[77] None of the cases referred to in argument dealing with s. 5.1(2) squarely deals with the issue raised here – that the section was intended to related to post-filing claims or personal undertakings of directors to creditors in connection with the proposed plan prior to filing.

[78] The final argument on behalf of Class Plaintiffs is that to deny the claim of shareholders as against directors would only benefit their insurers, since the Class Plaintiffs have agreed to limit any recovery to the amount of the insurance. I fail to see how this advances the position of the Proposed Plaintiffs. No information was put before the Court about the particulars of the insurance. The Court has no information to know whether or not the insurers even know of this issue.

[79] If the claim does not lie as against the directors in the first place under s. 5.1(2), the limitation of the claim as against the potentially available insurance does not advance the case of the class of Plaintiffs.

[80] There would be little meaning left to s. 5.1 if all claims of negligence and wrongful conduct against directors for pre-filing activity could not be released and no need for the discretion provided for in s. 5.1 (3) for Court to override this compromise as not being fair or reasonable. As noted above in the passages from the *Century Services* case, the purpose of the CCAA and the discretion granted to the Court are to permit restructuring to work, not create new causes of action.

[81] The concern of the Court, which necessitated the further inquiry, was that the language of the Sanction Order might imply on the part of the Applicant and directors who had knowledge of

the particulars of the claim that the facts could give rise to a s. 5.1(2) claim. I am satisfied based on the further information provided that no such admission is to be implied.

[82] The relief sought by the directors is therefore granted.

Underwriters

[83] Underwriters acted on share and warrant offerings of Allen-Vanguard in September 2007 and certified a related prospectus. The Love Class Action was commenced in February 2010 and the proposed Representative Plaintiff claims damages against Underwriters under s. 130 of the *Securities Act (Ontario)* and also makes claims on the basis of negligence, unjust enrichment and waiver of tort.

[84] Underwriters rely on the provisions of the releases granted by the Sanction Order and in particular the claims against the Applicant Company Allen- Vanguard. As well, Underwriters rely on the definition of "Equity Claims" in the Sanction Order and submit that because the provisions of the Order in paragraph 26 (ii) bar certain claims against third parties who might claim contribution and indemnity against the restructured company, they should be entitled to the benefit of that provision.

[85] The response of the proposed Class Plaintiffs in the Love litigation is that the claim against Underwriters is based on the negligence, fraud or wilful misconduct of Underwriters. It is submitted that Underwriters are not entitled to indemnity as against Allen-Vanguard for the several negligence of Underwriters, either at law or under s. 130 of the *Securities Act*.

[86] The proposed Class Plaintiff submits that given the nature of the claim as against Underwriters, Underwriters would never have had a right to an indemnity for the claims asserted in the Love Action and therefore there were no such claims to be released.

[87] It is submitted that Underwriters bargained any possible indemnity away by the terms of their contract with Allen-Vanguard in September 2007, and that even if they had the benefit of an indemnity, all that was required for the Plan's success was that Alan-Vanguard be protected from Underwriters, not that Mr. Love's claims against Underwriters be eliminated.

[88] Counsel for the Plaintiff in the Love Action also urges that Underwriters did not have the right of indemnity as at the time of the Initial Order, and the Sanction Order bars any indemnity that they might otherwise have had and there is nothing in the language of either Order to preclude the claim of the Class Plaintiff against Underwriters limited to Underwriters' negligence.

[89] Finally, it is submitted that since Underwriters did not "bring anything to the table" in respect of the restructuring, there is no basis on which the Court should vary the Sanction Order to now provide the indemnity that the Order fails to provide.

[90] In the alternative, the Class Plaintiffs suggest that the Sanction Order be clarified, if necessary, to clearly provide the right of the Class Plaintiff to proceed against Underwriters.

[91] In my view, there is a distinction to be made between the claim as against the directors and that against Underwriters, since in the case as against the directors, the parties appear to have bargained that if the claim could be brought under s. 5.1(2), it could proceed. That consideration was known to the parties who negotiated and agreed on the form of the Sanction Order and that was the only claim not otherwise covered by the Release terms.

[92] In the case of Underwriters, there was nothing to suggest that any discussion or negotiation took place with respect to specific protection for Underwriters or the allowance of a claim against Underwriters at the time that the Sanction Order was approved.

[93] This is another reason why in my view s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA should be read narrowly with respect to pre-filing claims or claims that relate to pre-filing activity.

[94] The *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990 c. B. 16 ("OBCA") contains a statutory process for that kind of action and remedy sought by the Class Plaintiffs in both actions. Section 246(1) reads as follows:

> **246.** (1) Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to the court for leave to bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate.

[95] The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of collective shareholder claims versus claims that are those of the corporation itself in *Hercules Management Ltd. et al. v. Ernst & Young*, 1997 CanLII 345, [1997] 2 S.C.R.165. The case involved a claim by shareholders of the corporation against its auditors for an alleged negligence in preparation of financial statements of the corporation. Paragraph 48 of the reasons refers to and adopts a statement of Farley J. in *Roman Corp. v Peat Marwick Thorne* (1992), 11 O.R. (3rd) 248 (Gen. Div.) at p 260.

> As a matter of law the only purpose for which shareholders receive an auditor's report is to provide the shareholders with information for the purpose of overseeing the management and affairs of the corporation and not for the purpose of guiding personal investment decisions or personal speculation with a view to profit.

[96] The plaintiffs in *Hercules* asserted reliance on financial statements in monitoring the value of their equity and then due to auditors' negligence, they failed to extract it before the financial demise of the company.

[97] The Supreme Court, in assessing the claim, referred at paragraph 59 to the rule in *Foss v Harbottle*:

> 59. The rule in *Foss v. Harbottle* provides that individual shareholders have no cause of action in law for any wrongs done to the corporation and that if an action is to be brought in respect of such losses, it must be brought either by the corporation itself (through management) or by way of a derivative action. The legal rationale behind the rule was eloquently set out by the English Court of Appeal in *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2)*, [1982] 1 All E.R. 354, at p. 367, as follows:
>
>> The rule [in *Foss v. Harbottle*] is the consequence of the fact that a corporation is a separate legal entity. Other consequences are limited liability and limited rights. The company is liable for its contracts and torts; the shareholder has no such liability. The company acquires causes of action for breaches of contract and for torts which damage the company. No cause of action vests in the shareholder. When the shareholder acquires a share he accepts the fact that the value of his

investment follows the fortunes of the company and that he can only exercise his influence over the fortunes of the company by the exercise of his voting rights in general meeting. The law confers on him the right to ensure that the company observes the limitations of its memorandum of association and the right to ensure that other shareholders observe the rule, imposed on them by the articles of association. If it is right that the law has conferred or should in certain restricted circumstances confer further rights on a shareholder the scope and consequences of such further rights require careful consideration.

To these lucid comments, I would respectfully add that the rule is also sound from a policy perspective, inasmuch as it avoids the procedural hassle of a multiplicity of actions.

60. The manner in which the rule in *Foss v. Harbottle, supra,* operates with respect to the appellants' claims can thus be demonstrated. As I have already explained, the appellants allege that they were prevented from properly overseeing the management of the audited corporations because the respondents' audit reports painted a misleading picture of their financial state. They allege further that had they known the true situation, they would have intervened to avoid the eventuality of the corporations' going into receivership and the consequent loss of their equity. The difficulty with this submission, I have suggested, is that it fails to recognize that in supervising management, the shareholders must be seen to be acting <u>as a body</u> in respect of the corporation's interests rather than as individuals in respect of their own ends. In a manner of speaking, the shareholders assume what may be seen to be a "managerial role" when, as a collectivity, they oversee the activities of the directors and officers through resolutions adopted at shareholder meetings. In this capacity, they cannot properly be understood to be acting simply as individual holders of equity. Rather, their collective decisions are made in respect of the corporation itself. Any duty owed by auditors in respect of this aspect of the shareholders' functions, then, would be owed not to shareholders *qua* individuals, but rather to all shareholders as a group, acting in the interests of the corporation. And if the decisions taken by the collectivity of shareholders are in respect of the corporation's affairs, then the shareholders' reliance on negligently prepared audit reports in taking such decisions will result in a wrong to the corporation for which the shareholders cannot, as individuals, recover.

61. This line of reasoning finds support in Lord Bridge's comments in *Caparo, supra,* at p. 580:

> The shareholders of a company have a collective interest in the company's proper management and in so far as a negligent failure of the auditor to report accurately on the state of the company's finances deprives the shareholders of the opportunity to exercise their powers in general meeting to call the directors to book and to ensure that errors in management are corrected, the shareholders ought to be entitled to a remedy. <u>But in practice no problem arises in this regard since the interest of the shareholders in the proper management of the company's affairs is indistinguishable from the interest of the company itself and any loss suffered by the shareholders . . . will be recouped by a claim against the auditor in the name of the company, not by individual shareholders</u>. [Emphasis in Supreme Court decision.]

It is also reflected in the decision of Farley J. in *Roman I, supra,* the facts of which were similar to those of the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff shareholders brought an action against the defendant auditors alleging, *inter alia,* that the defendant's audit reports were negligently prepared. That negligence, the shareholders contended, prevented them from properly overseeing management which, in turn, led to the winding up of the corporation and a loss to the shareholders of their equity therein. Farley J. discussed the rule in *Foss v. Harbottle* and concluded that it operated so as to preclude the shareholders from bringing personal actions based on an alleged inability to supervise the conduct of management.

62. One final point should be made here. Referring to the case of *Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill* (1974), 7 O.R. (2d) 216 (C.A.), the appellants submit that where a shareholder has been directly and individually harmed, that shareholder may have a personal cause of action even though the corporation may also have a separate and distinct cause of action. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs should be understood to detract from this principle. In finding that claims in respect of losses stemming from an alleged inability to oversee or supervise management are really derivative and not personal in nature, I have found only that shareholders cannot raise individual claims in respect of a wrong done <u>to the corporation</u>. Indeed, this is

> the limit of the rule in *Foss v. Harbottle*. Where, however, a separate and distinct claim (say, in tort) can be raised with respect to a wrong done to a shareholder *qua* individual, a personal action may well lie, assuming that all the requisite elements of a cause of action can be made out.

[98] The policy of limiting indeterminate liability as in *Hercules* is consistent with the basis for the limitation of claims under s. 5.1(2) as set out above. In my view the words of s. 5.1(2) do not create a cause of action that would otherwise not exist except by leave of the Court. It simply provides an exception to what otherwise could be included in a release.

[99] The release terms contained in the Sanction Order would deprive Underwriters from any claims for contribution or indemnity to which they would otherwise be entitled at law from the Company and its directors and officers should the actions of the Class Plaintiffs proceed.

[100] This is just one further reason to support not just what is required for a derivative action but also what is required to be taken into consideration before the Court issues a Sanction Order in this case in effect on consent.

[101] As noted above, what has come to be known as a "liquidating" CCAA application can provide problems not just for the parties but the Court itself. The presumption behind the timing of the Application in this case was that if not granted quickly, bankruptcy would have ensued with the inevitable loss of jobs, assets and creditor claims.

[102] The Class Plaintiffs are taken to have known of the CCAA proposal as early as September 2009 and could have sought leave to commence a derivative action prior to or during the CCAA process. No such step was taken.

[103] I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to stay the claims as against Underwriters in negligence and misrepresentation.

[104] The Claim against Underwriters also alleges fraud. If the only claim were in fraud and full particulars of alleged fraud were contained in the pleading, the claim might survive since the wording of the Release does not extend to fraud.

[105] Apart from fraud, claims in negligence against Underwriters are caught by the terms of the Release. Arguably, the claims are those of the Company that are specifically released.

Variation of the Sanction Order

[106] As noted above in reference to the decision in *Canadian Red Cross*, a Sanction Order in addition to being an Order of the Court and subject to the normal rules for variation thereof, represents an agreed contract between the creditors of an insolvent corporation.

[107] The Class Plaintiffs in the Laneville action did not seek to lift the stay at the time of the Initial Order. The Class Plaintiff accepted the Release provisions which extend to Underwriters when the Sanctioned Order was granted.

[108] Underwriters were released by the terms of the Sanction Order, and the Order, which was not appealed, represents a final determination of the rights of shareholders as against Underwriters.

[109] As was mentioned above, in respect of the suggestion of variation of the Sanction Order to permit the claim as against the directors, I conclude that it is not appropriate to vary a Sanction Order after the fact. The reliance that parties place on the finality of a Sanction Order is such that it would only be in extraordinary circumstances of a clear mistake, operative misrepresentation or fraud that would permit variation without re-opening the whole process.

[110] In *Extreme Retail (Canada) Inc. v. Bank of Montréal*, [2007] O.J. 3304 (Ont. S. J.) [Commercial List], Stinson J. held at paragraph 21 that an Approval and Vesting Order was a final determination of the rights of parties represented in that proceeding. Morawetz J. adopted those comments in *Royal Bank Body Blue Inc.* 2008 CanLII 19227 [ON S.C.] to the same effect at paragraphs 19 and 20. In my view the same principle applies to a Sanction Order.

[111] I see nothing in the requests of either Underwriters or the Class Plaintiffs that would be appropriate to permit variation of the Sanction Order as each of them have proposed.

[112] Should the Class Plaintiff in the Laneville action seek to pursue a claim against Underwriters limited alone in fraud, the action should be permitted to proceed subject to the Plaintiff persuading a judge that such a limited claim should be certified.

Conclusion

[113] For the above reasons the motion by the directors will succeed to enjoin the claims as against them in both the Love and Laneville actions. The motion of Underwriters to strike is granted, and motions for variation of the Sanction Order of both Underwriters and the Class Plaintiffs are dismissed. Counsel may make written submissions on the issue of costs.

C. CAMPBELL J.

Released:

Citation: Re Allen-Vanguard Corporation, 2011 ONSC 5017
Court File No. CV-09-00008502-00CL
Date: 20110825

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

ONTARIO

(Commercial List)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF **ALLEN-VANGUARD CORPORATION** UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND SECTION 186 OF THE *ONTARIO BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*., R.S.O. 1990, c.B.16, AS AMENDED

REASONS FOR DECISION

C. CAMPBELL J.

RELEASED: August 25, 2011

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sino-Forest Corporation

[Indexed as: Sino-Forest Corp. (Re)]

114 O.R. (3d) 304

2012 ONCA 816

Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Goudge, Hoy and Pepall JJ.A.
November 23, 2012

Debtor and creditor -- Arrangements -- Shareholders of company commencing class actions against company, underwriters and auditors for misrepresentation -- Plaintiffs alleging that misrepresentations artificially inflated price of company's shares -- Company successfully seeking protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") -- Underwriters and auditors filing proofs of claim against company seeking contribution and indemnity for any amounts they might be ordered to pay as damages in class actions -- Supervising judge not erring in finding that those claims were equity claims within meaning of s. 2(1) of CCAA despite fact that underwriters and auditors were not holders of an equity interest -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 2(1).

The appellant underwriters provided underwriting services in connection with three S Co. equity offerings and four S Co. note offerings. The appellant auditors served as S Co.'s auditors at the relevant time. Shareholders of S Co. brought proposed class actions against S Co. and, among others, the underwriters and auditors, alleging that S Co. repeatedly misrepresented its assets and financial situation and its compliance with generally accepted accounting principles in its public disclosure, that the auditors and underwriters failed to detect those misrepresentations, and that the auditors misrepresented that their audit reports [page305] were prepared in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. They claimed that the misrepresentations artificially inflated the price of S Co.'s shares and that proposed class members suffered damages when the shares fell after the truth was revealed. S Co. successfully sought protection pursuant to the provisions of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). The auditors and underwriters filed proofs of claim seeking contribution and indemnity for, among other things, any amounts that they were ordered to pay as damages to the plaintiffs in the class actions. S Co. applied for an order that the claims against it arising from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in the company, including shareholder claims, and any indemnification claim against it related to or arising from the shareholder claims, including the claims for contribution or indemnity, were equity claims under the CCAA. The application was granted. The underwriters and auditors appealed.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

The definition of equity claim in s. 2(1) of the CCAA focuses on the nature of the claim, and not the identity of the claimant. The appellants' claims for contribution and indemnity were clearly equity claims, despite the fact that the appellants did not have an equity interest in S Co. Parliament adopted expansive language in defining "equity claim". Parliament employed the phrase "in respect of" twice in defining equity claim: in the opening portion of the definition, it refers to an equity claim as a "claim that is in respect of an equity interest", and in para. (e) it refers to "contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d)". The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that the words "in respect of" are of the widest possible scope, conveying some link or connection between two related subjects. It was conceded that the shareholder claims against S Co. were claims for "a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest", within the meaning of para. (d) of the definition of "equity claim". There was an obvious link between the appellants' claims against S Co. for contribution and indemnity and the shareholders' claims against S Co. Parliament also defined equity claim as "including a claim for, among others", the claims described in paras. (a) to (e). The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "including" indicates that the preceding words -- "a claim that is in respect of an equity interest" -- should be given an expansive interpretation, and include matters which might not otherwise be within the meaning of the term. Accordingly, the appellants' claims, which clearly fell within para. (e), were included within the meaning of the phrase "claim that is in respect of an equity interest". Parliament chose not to include language in s. 2(1) restricting claims for contribution or indemnity to those made by shareholders. If only a person with an equity interest could assert an equity claim, para. (e) would be rendered meaningless. No legislative provision should be interpreted so as to render it mere surplusage. Looking at s. 2(1) as a whole, it appeared that the remedies available to shareholders were all addressed by s. 2(1)(a) to (d). The logic of s. 2(1)(a) to (e) therefore also supported the notion that para. (e) referred to claims for contribution and indemnity not by shareholders, but by others. The definition of "equity claim" was sufficiently clear to alter the pre-existing common law.

Cases referred to

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Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., [1956] S.C.R. 610, [1956] S.C.J. No. 37, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 28 C.P.R. 25, 56 D.T.C. 1060; In Re: Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc., 228 B.R. 816 (Bankr. Del. 1999); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, [2003] S.C.J. No. 8, 2003 SCC 9, 239 F.T.R. 159, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 17, 300 N.R. 321, J.E. 2003-506, 2003 D.T.C. 5185, 120 A.C.W.S. (3d) 532; National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd., [2002] A.J. No. 6, 2002 ABCA 5, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 215, 317 A.R. 319, affg [2001] A.J. No. 918, 2001 ABQB 583, [2001] 10 W.W.R. 305, 95 Alta. L.R. (3d) 166, 294 A.R. 15, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 228, 107 A.C.W.S. (3d) 182 (Q.B.); National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Katsikonouris, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1029, [1990] S.C.J. No. 95, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 197, 115 N.R. 42, J.E. 90-1410, 32 Q.A.C. 250, 50 C.C.L.I. 1, [1990] I.L.R. 1-2663 at 10478, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 74; Nelson Financial Group Ltd. (Re), [2010] O.J. No. 4903, 2010 ONSC 6229, 75 B.L.R. (4th) 302, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 153 (S.C.J.); Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 324, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157, [2003] S.C.J. No. 42, 2003 SCC 42, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 308 N.R. 271, 177 O.A.C. 235, J.E. 2003-1790, 7 Admin. L.R. (4th) 177, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, [2003] CLLC 220-062, 125 A.C.W.S. (3d) 85; R. v. Nowegijick, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, [1983] S.C.J. No. 5, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 46 N.R. 41, [1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 89, [1983] C.T.C. 20, 83 D.T.C. 5041, 18 A.C.W.S. (2d) 2; R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, 2000 SCC 5, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, J.E. 2000-264, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, 44 W.C.B. (2d) 479; Return on Innovation Capital Ltd. v. Gandi Innovations Ltd., [2011] O.J. No. 3827, 2011 ONSC 5018, 83 C.B.R. (5th) 123, 206 A.C.W.S. (3d) 464 (S.C.J.) [Leave to appeal refused [2012] O.J. No. 31, 2012 ONCA 10, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 141, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 264]; Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 276, 14 B.L.R. (4th) 260, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 78, 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 194 (S.C.J.)

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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 2 [as am.], 121 [as am.]

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.S. 502(e)(1)(B)

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 [as

am.], ss. 2(1) [as am], (a)-(e), 6(8), 22.1 [as am.]
Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.1 [as am.], s. 2
Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4, s. 203(1) [as am.], (10)
Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, s. 131(1) [as am.], (11)
Securities Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S-13, s. 130(1), (8)
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Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 130(1) [as am.], (8)
Securities Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-3.1, s. 111(1), (12)
Securities Act, R.S.Q., c. V-1.1, ss. 218 [as am.], 219, 221 [as am.]
Securities Act, S.N.B. 2004, c. S-5.5, s. 149(1), (9)
Securities Act, S.N.W.T. 2008, c. 10, s. 111(1), (12)
Securities Act, S.Nu. 2008, c. 12, s. 111(1), (12)
Securities Act, S.Y. 2007, c. 16, s. 111(1), (13)
The Securities Act, C.C.S.M. c. S50, s. 141(1), (11)
The Securities Act, 1988, S.S. 1988-89, c. S-42.2, s. 137(1), (9)

Authorities referred to

Driedger, Elmer A., Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) [page307]

APPEAL from the order of Morawetz J., [2012] O.J. No. 3627, 2012 ONSC 4377 (S.C.J.) declaring that the appellants' claims were equity claims within the meaning of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne and Shara Roy, for appellant Ernst & Young LLP.

Sheila Block and David Bish, for appellants Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation (now known as DWM Securities Inc.), RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd. (now known as Canaccord Genuity Corp.), Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC.

Kenneth Dekker, for appellant BDO Limited.

Robert W. Staley, Derek J. Bell and Jonathan Bell, for respondent Sino-Forest Corporation.

Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick and Julie Rosenthal, for respondent Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Clifton Prophet, for monitor FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Kirk M. Baert, A. Dimitri Lascaris and Massimo Starnino, for respondent Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers.

Emily Cole, for respondent Allen Chan.

Erin Pleet, for respondent David Horsley.

David Gadsden, for respondent Pyry (Beijing).

Larry Lowenstein and Edward A. Sellers, for respondent board of directors.

BY THE COURT: --

I Overview

[1] In 2009, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("CCAA"), was amended to expressly provide that general creditors are to be paid in full before an equity claim is paid.

[2] This appeal considers the definition of "equity claim" in s. 2(1) of the CCAA. More particularly, the central issue is whether claims by auditors and underwriters against the respondent debtor, Sino-Forest Corporation ("Sino-Forest"), for contribution and indemnity fall within that definition. The claims arise out of proposed shareholder class actions for misrepresentation. [page308]

[3] The appellants argue that the supervising judge erred in concluding that the claims at issue are equity claims within

the meaning of the CCAA and in determining the issue before the claims procedure established in Sino-Forest's CCAA proceeding had been completed.

[4] For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the supervising judge did not err and accordingly dismiss this appeal.

II The Background

(a) The parties

[5] Sino-Forest is a Canadian public holding company that holds the shares of numerous subsidiaries, which in turn own, directly or indirectly, forestry assets located principally in the People's Republic of China. Its common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Sino-Forest also issued approximately $1.8 billion of unsecured notes, in four series. Trading in Sino-Forest shares ceased on August 26, 2011, as a result of a cease-trade order made by the Ontario Securities Commission.

[6] The appellant underwriters [See Note 1 below] provided underwriting services in connection with three separate Sino-Forest equity offerings in June 2007, June 2009 and December 2009, and four separate Sino-Forest note offerings in July 2008, June 2009, December 2009 and October 2010. Certain underwriters entered into agreements with Sino-Forest in which Sino-Forest agreed to indemnify the underwriters in connection with an array of matters that could arise from their participation in these offerings.

[7] The appellant BDO Limited ("BDO") is a Hong Kong-based accounting firm that served as Sino-Forest's auditor between 2005 and August 2007, and audited its annual financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2006.

[8] The engagement agreements governing BDO's audits of Sino-Forest provided that the company's management bore the primary responsibility for preparing its financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") [page309] and implementing internal controls to

prevent and detect fraud and error in relation to its financial reporting.

[9] BDO's audit report for 2006 was incorporated by reference into a June 2007 prospectus issued by Sino-Forest regarding the offering of its shares to the public. This use by Sino-Forest was governed by an engagement agreement dated May 23, 2007 in which Sino-Forest agreed to indemnify BDO in respect of any claims by the underwriters or any third party that arose as a result of the further steps taken by BDO in relation to the issuance of the June 2007 prospectus.

[10] The appellant Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y") served as Sino-Forest's auditor for the years 2007 to 2012, and delivered auditors' reports with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Sino-Forest for fiscal years ended December 31, 2007 to 2010, inclusive. In each year for which it prepared a report, E&Y entered into an audit engagement letter with Sino-Forest in which Sino-Forest undertook to prepare its financial statements in accordance with GAAP, design and implement internal controls to prevent and detect fraud and error, and provide E&Y with its complete financial records and related information. Some of these letters contained an indemnity in favour of E&Y.

[11] The respondent Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders consists of noteholders owning approximately one-half of Sino-Forest's total noteholder debt. [See Note 2 below] They are creditors who have debt claims against Sino-Forest; they are not equity claimants.

[12] Sino-Forest has insufficient assets to satisfy all the claims against it. To the extent that the appellants' claims are accepted and are treated as debt claims rather than equity claims, the noteholders' recovery will be diminished.

(b) The class actions

[13] In 2011 and January of 2012, proposed class actions were commenced in Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York State against, amongst others, Sino-Forest, certain of its officers, directors and employees, BDO, E&Y and the underwriters. Sino-

Forest is sued in all actions. [See Note 3 below] [page310]

[14] The proposed representative plaintiffs in the class actions are shareholders of Sino-Forest. They allege that Sino-Forest repeatedly misrepresented its assets and financial situation and its compliance with GAAP in its public disclosure; the appellant auditors and underwriters failed to detect these misrepresentations; and the appellant auditors misrepresented that their audit reports were prepared in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"). The representative plaintiffs claim that these misrepresentations artificially inflated the price of Sino-Forest's shares and that proposed class members suffered damages when the shares fell after the truth was revealed in 2011.

[15] The representative plaintiffs in the Ontario class action seek approximately $9.2 billion in damages. The Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York class actions do not specify the quantum of damages sought.

[16] To date, none of the proposed class actions has been certified.

(c) CCAA protection and proofs of claim

[17] On March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest sought protection pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA. Morawetz J. granted the initial order which, among other things, appointed FTI Consulting Canada Inc. as the monitor and stayed the class actions as against Sino-Forest. Since that time, Morawetz J. has been the supervising judge of the CCAA proceedings. The initial stay of the class actions was extended and broadened by order dated May 8, 2012.

[18] On May 14, 2012, the supervising judge granted an unopposed claims procedure order which established a procedure to file and determine claims against Sino-Forest.

[19] Thereafter, all of the appellants filed individual proofs of claim against Sino-Forest seeking contribution and indemnity for, among other things, any amounts that they are

ordered to pay as damages to the plaintiffs in the class actions. Their proofs of claim advance several different legal bases for Sino-Forest's alleged obligation of contribution and indemnity, including breach of contract, contractual terms of indemnity, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation in tort, and the provisions of the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.1.

(d) Order under appeal

[20] Sino-Forest then applied for an order that the following claims are equity claims under the CCAA: claims against Sino-Forest arising from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity [page311] interest in the company, including shareholder claims ("shareholder claims"); and any indemnification claims against Sino-Forest related to or arising from the shareholder claims, including the appellants' claims for contribution or indemnity ("related indemnity claims").

[21] The motion was supported by the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

[22] On July 27, 2012, the supervising judge granted the order sought by Sino-Forest and released a comprehensive endorsement.

[23] He concluded that it was not premature to determine the equity claims issue. It had been clear from the outset of Sino-Forest's CCAA proceedings that this issue would have to be decided and that the expected proceeds arising from any sales process would be insufficient to satisfy the claims of creditors. Furthermore, the issue could be determined independently of the claims procedure and without prejudice being suffered by any party.

[24] He also concluded that both the shareholder claims and the related indemnity claims should be characterized as equity claims. In summary, he reasoned that

- the characterization of claims for indemnity turns on the characterization of the underlying primary claims. The shareholder claims are clearly equity claims and they led to and underlie the related indemnity claims;
- the plain language of the CCAA, which focuses on the nature

of the claim rather than the identity of the claimant, dictates that both shareholder claims and related indemnity claims constitute equity claims;

-- the definition of "equity claim" added to the CCAA in 2009 broadened the scope of equity claims established by pre-amendment jurisprudence;

-- this holding is consistent with the analysis in Return on Innovation Capital Ltd. v. Gandi Innovations Ltd., [2011] O.J. No. 3827, 2011 ONSC 5018, 83 C.B.R. (5th) 123 (S.C.J.), which dealt with contractual indemnification claims of officers and directors. Leave to appeal was denied by this court, [2012] O.J. No. 31, 2012 ONCA 10, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 141; and

-- "[i]t would be totally inconsistent to arrive at a conclusion that would enable either the auditors or the underwriters, through a claim for indemnification, to be treated as creditors [page312] when the underlying actions of shareholders cannot achieve the same status" (para. 82). To hold otherwise would run counter to the scheme established by the CCAA and would permit an indirect remedy to the shareholders when a direct remedy is unavailable.

[25] The supervising judge did not characterize the full amount of the claims of the auditors and underwriters as equity claims. He excluded the claims for defence costs on the basis that while it was arguable that they constituted claims for indemnity, they were not necessarily in respect of an equity claim. That determination is not appealed.

III Interpretation of "Equity Claim"

(a) Relevant statutory provisions

[26] As part of a broad reform of Canadian insolvency legislation, various amendments to the CCAA were proclaimed in force as of September 18, 2009.

[27] They included the addition of s. 6(8):

6(8) No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

Section 22.1, which provides that creditors with equity claims may not vote at any meeting unless the court orders otherwise, was also added.

[28] Related definitions of "claim", "equity claim" and "equity interest" were added to s. 2(1) of the CCAA:

2(1) In this Act,

. . . . .

"claim" means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim provable within the meaning of section 2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act;

. . . . .

"equity claim" means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others,

(a) a dividend or similar payment,
(b) a return of capital,
(c) a redemption or retraction obligation, [page313]
(d) a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec, the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or
(e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);

"equity interest" means

(a) in the case of a company other than an income trust, a share in the company -- or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a share in the company -- other than one that is derived from a convertible debt, and
(b) in the case of an income trust, a unit in the income trust -- or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a unit in the income trust -- other than one that is derived from a convertible debt[.]

(Emphasis added)

[29] Section 2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C.

1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") defines a "claim provable in bankruptcy". Section 121 of the BIA in turn specifies that claims provable in bankruptcy are those to which the bankrupt is subject.

> 2. "claim provable in bankruptcy", "provable claim" or "claim provable" includes any claim or liability provable in proceedings under this Act by a creditor;
>
> . . . . .
>
> 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(Emphasis added)

(b) The legal framework before the 2009 amendments

[30] Even before the 2009 amendments to the CCAA codified the treatment of equity claims, the courts subordinated shareholder equity claims to general creditors' claims in an insolvency. As the supervising judge described [at paras. 23-25]:

> Essentially, shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditor claims are not being paid in full. Simply put, shareholders have no economic interest in an insolvent enterprise.
>
> The basis for the differentiation flows from the fundamentally different nature of debt and equity investments. Shareholders have unlimited upside potential when purchasing shares. Creditors have no corresponding upside potential. [page314]
>
> As a result, courts subordinated equity claims and denied such claims a vote in plans of arrangement.

(Citations omitted) [See Note 4 below]

(c) The appellants' submissions

[31] The appellants essentially advance three arguments.

[32] First, they argue that on a plain reading of s. 2(1), their claims are excluded. They focus on the opening words of the definition of "equity claim" and argue that their claims against Sino-Forest are not claims that are "in respect of an equity interest" because they do not have an equity interest in Sino-Forest. Their relationships with Sino-Forest were purely contractual and they were arm's-length creditors, not shareholders with the risks and rewards attendant to that position. The policy rationale behind ranking shareholders below creditors is not furthered by characterizing the appellants' claims as equity claims. They were service providers with a contractual right to an indemnity from Sino-Forest.

[33] Second, the appellants focus on the term "claim" in para. (e) of the definition of "equity claim", and argue that the claims in respect of which they seek contribution and indemnity are the shareholders' claims against them in court proceedings for damages, which are not "claims" against Sino-Forest provable within the meaning of the BIA and, therefore, not "claims" within s. 2(1). They submit that the supervising judge erred in focusing on the characterization of the underlying primary claims.

[34] Third, the appellants submit that the definition of "equity claim" is not sufficiently clear to have changed the existing law. It is assumed that the legislature does not intend to change the common law without "expressing its intentions to do so with irresistible clearness": Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 324, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157, [2003] S.C.J. No. 42, 2003 SCC 42, at para. 39, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., [1956] S.C.R. 610, [1956] S.C.J. No. 37, at p. 614 S.C.R. The appellants argue that the supervising judge's interpretation of "equity claim" dramatically alters the common [page315] law as reflected in National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd., [2001] A.J. No. 918, 2001 ABQB 583, 294 A.R. 15, affd [2002] A.J. No. 6, 2002 ABCA 5, 317 A.R. 319. There, the court

determined that in an insolvency, claims of auditors and underwriters for indemnification are not to be treated in the same manner as claims by shareholders. Furthermore, the Senate debates that preceded the enactment of the amendments did not specifically comment on the effect of the amendments on claims by auditors and underwriters. The amendments should be interpreted as codifying the pre-existing common law as reflected in National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd.

[35] The appellants argue that the decision of Return on Innovation Capital Ltd. v. Gandi Innovations Ltd. is distinguishable because it dealt with the characterization of claims for damages by an equity investor against officers and directors, and it predated the 2009 amendments. In any event, this court confirmed that its decision denying leave to appeal should not be read as a judicial precedent for the interpretation of the meaning of "equity claim" in s. 2(1) of the CCAA.

(d) Analysis

(i) Introduction

[36] The exercise before this court is one of statutory interpretation. We are therefore guided by the following oft-cited principle from Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87:

> [T]he words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[37] We agree with the supervising judge that the definition of equity claim focuses on the nature of the claim, and not the identity of the claimant. In our view, the appellants' claims for contribution and indemnity are clearly equity claims.

[38] The appellants' arguments do not give effect to the expansive language adopted by Parliament in defining "equity claim" and read in language not incorporated by Parliament. Their interpretation would render para. (e) of the definition meaningless and defies the logic of the section.

(ii) The expansive language used

[39] The definition incorporates two expansive terms.

[40] First, Parliament employed the phrase "in respect of" twice in defining equity claim: in the opening portion of the definition, it refers to an equity claim as a "claim that is in respect of [page316] an equity interest", and in para. (e) it refers to "contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d)" (emphasis added).

[41] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that the words "in respect of" are "of the widest possible scope", conveying some link or connection between two related subjects. In CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, [1998] S.C.J. No. 87, at para. 16, citing R. v. Nowegijick, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, [1983] S.C.J. No. 5, at p. 39 S.C.R., the Supreme Court held as follows:

> The words "in respect of" are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as "in relation to", "with reference to" or "in connection with". The phrase "in respect of" is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.

(Emphasis added in CanadianOxy)

That court also stated as follows in Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, [2003] S.C.J. No. 8, 2003 SCC 9, at para. 26:

> The words "in respect of" have been held by this Court to be words of the broadest scope that convey some link between two subject matters.

(Citations omitted)

[42] It is conceded that the shareholder claims against Sino-Forest are claims for "a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest", within the meaning of para. (d) of the definition of "equity claim". There is an obvious link between the appellants' claims against Sino-Forest for contribution and indemnity and the shareholders'

claims against Sino-Forest. The legal proceedings brought by the shareholders asserted their claims against Sino-Forest together with their claims against the appellants, which gave rise to these claims for contribution and indemnity. The causes of action asserted depend largely on common facts and seek recovery of the same loss.

[43] The appellants' claims for contribution or indemnity against Sino-Forest are therefore clearly connected to or "in respect of" a claim referred to in para. (d), namely, the shareholders' claims against Sino-Forest. They are claims in respect of equity claims by shareholders and are provable in bankruptcy against Sino-Forest.

[44] Second, Parliament also defined equity claim as "including a claim for, among others", the claims described in paras. (a) to (e). The Supreme Court has held that this phrase "including" indicates that the preceding words -- "a claim that is in respect of an equity interest" -- should be given an expansive [page317] interpretation, and include matters which might not otherwise be within the meaning of the term, as stated in National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Katsikonouris, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1029, [1990] S.C.J. No. 95, at p. 1041 S.C.R.:

> [T]hese words are terms of extension, designed to enlarge the meaning of preceding words, and not to limit them.
>
> [T]he natural inference is that the drafter will provide a specific illustration of a subset of a given category of things in order to make it clear that that category extends to things that might otherwise be expected to fall outside it.

[45] Accordingly, the appellants' claims, which clearly fall within para. (e), are included within the meaning of the phrase a "claim that is in respect of an equity interest".

(iii) What Parliament did not say

[46] "Equity claim" is not confined by its definition, or by the definition of "claim", to a claim advanced by the holder of

an equity interest. Parliament could have, but did not, include language in para. (e) restricting claims for contribution or indemnity to those made by shareholders.

(iv) An interpretation that avoids surplusage

[47] A claim for contribution arises when the claimant for contribution has been sued. Section 2 of the Negligence Act provides that a tortfeasor may recover contribution or indemnity from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the damage to any person suffering damage as a result of a tort. The securities legislation of the various provinces provides that an issuer, its underwriters and, if they consented to the disclosure of information in the prospectus, its auditors, among others, are jointly and severally liable for a misrepresentation in the prospectus, and provides for rights of contribution. [See Note 5 below] [page318]

[48] Counsel for the appellants were unable to provide a satisfactory example of when a holder of an equity interest in a debtor company would seek contribution under para. (e) against the debtor in respect of a claim referred to in any of paras. (a) to (d). In our view, this indicates that para. (e) was drafted with claims for contribution or indemnity by non-shareholders rather than shareholders in mind.

[49] If the appellants' interpretation prevailed, and only a person with an equity interest could assert such a claim, para. (e) would be rendered meaningless, and as Lamer C.J.C. wrote in R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, 2000 SCC 5, at para. 28:

> It is a well accepted principle of statutory interpretation that no legislative provision should be interpreted so as to render it mere surplusage.

(v) The scheme and logic of the section

[50] Moreover, looking at s. 2(1) as a whole, it would appear that the remedies available to shareholders are all addressed by s. 2(1)(a) to (d). The logic of s. 2(1)(a) to (e) therefore also supports the notion that para. (e) refers to claims for

contribution or indemnity not by shareholders, but by others.

(vi) The legislative history of the 2009 amendments

[51] The appellants and the respondents each argue that the legislative history of the amendments supports their respective interpretation of the term "equity claim". We have carefully considered the legislative history. The limited commentary is brief and imprecise. The clause-by-clause analysis of Bill C-12 comments that "[a]n equity claim is defined to include any claim that is related to an equity interest". [See Note 6 below] While, as the appellants submit, there was no specific reference to the position of auditors and underwriters, the desirability of greater conformity with United States insolvency law to avoid forum shopping by debtors was highlighted in 2003, some four years before the definition of "equity claim" was included in Bill C-12.

[52] In this instance, the legislative history ultimately provided very little insight into the intended meaning of the amendments. We have been guided by the plain words used by Parliament in reaching our conclusion. [page319]

(vii) Intent to change the common law

[53] In our view, the definition of "equity claim" is sufficiently clear to alter the pre-existing common law. National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd., an Alberta decision, was the single case referred to by the appellants that addressed the treatment of auditors' and underwriters' claims for contribution and indemnity in an insolvency before the definition was enacted. As the supervising judge noted, in a more recent decision, Return on Innovation Capital Ltd. v. Gandi Innovations Ltd., the courts of this province adopted a more expansive approach, holding that contractual indemnification claims of directors and officers were equity claims.

[54] We are not persuaded that the practical effect of the change to the law implemented by the enactment of the definition of "equity claim" is as dramatic as the appellants suggest. The operations of many auditors and underwriters extend to the United States, where contingent claims for

reimbursement or contribution by entities "liable with the debtor" are disallowed pursuant to 502(e)(1)(B) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.S. [See Note 7 below]

(viii) The purpose of the legislation

[55] The supervising judge indicated that if the claims of auditors and underwriters for contribution and indemnity were not included within the meaning of "equity claim", the CCAA would permit an indirect remedy to the shareholders when a direct remedy is not available. We would express this concept differently.

[56] In our view, in enacting s. 6(8) of the CCAA, Parliament intended that a monetary loss suffered by a shareholder (or other holder of an equity interest) in respect of his or her equity interest not diminish the assets of the debtor available to general creditors in a restructuring. If a shareholder sues auditors and underwriters in respect of his or her loss, in addition to the debtor, and the auditors or underwriters assert claims of contribution or indemnity against the debtor, the assets of the debtor available to general creditors would be diminished by the amount of the claims for contribution and indemnity. [page320]

IV Prematurity

[57] We are not persuaded that the supervising judge erred by determining that the appellants' claims were equity claims before the claims procedure established in Sino-Forest's CCAA proceeding had been completed.

[58] The supervising judge noted, at para. 7 of his endorsement, that from the outset, Sino-Forest, supported by the monitor, had taken the position that it was important that these proceedings be completed as soon as possible. The need to address the characterization of the appellants' claims had also been clear from the outset. The appellants have not identified any prejudice that arises from the determination of the issue at this stage. There was no additional information that the appellants have identified that was not before the supervising judge. The monitor, a court-appointed officer, supported the motion procedure. The supervising judge was well positioned to

determine whether the procedure proposed was premature and, in our view, there is no basis on which to interfere with the exercise of his discretion.

V Summary

[59] In conclusion, we agree with the supervising judge that the appellants' claims for contribution or indemnity are equity claims within s. 2(1)(e) of the CCAA.

[60] We reach this conclusion because of what we have said about the expansive language used by Parliament, the language Parliament did not use, the avoidance of surplusage, the logic of the section and what, from the foregoing, we conclude is the purpose of the 2009 amendments as they relate to these proceedings.

[61] We see no basis to interfere with the supervising judge's decision to consider whether the appellants' claims were equity claims before the completion of the claims procedure.

VI Disposition

[62] This appeal is accordingly dismissed. As agreed, there will be no costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Notes

Note 1: Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation (now known as DWM Securities Inc.), RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd. (now known as Canaccord Genuity Corp.), Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC.

Note 2: Noteholders holding in excess of $1.296 billion, or 72 per cent, of Sino-Forest's approximately $1.8 billion in noteholders' debt have executed written support agreements in favour of the Sino-Forest CCAA plan as of March 30, 2012. These include noteholders represented by the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Note 3: None of the appellants are sued in Saskatchewan and all are sued in Ontario. E&Y is also sued in Quebec and New York and the appellant underwriters are also sued in New York.

Note 4: The supervising judge cited the following cases as authority for these propositions: Blue Range Resource Corp., (Re), [2000] A.J. No. 14, 2000 ABQB 4, 259 A.R. 30; Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 276, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 78 (S.C.J.); Central Capital Corp. (Re) (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 494, [1996] O.J. No. 359 (C.A.); Nelson Financial Group Ltd. (Re), [2010] O.J. No. 4903, 2010 ONSC 6229, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 153 (S.C.J.); EarthFirst Canada Inc. (Re), [2009] A.J. No. 749, 2009 ABQB 316, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 102.

Note 5: Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 130(1), (8); Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4, s. 203(1), (10); Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, s. 131(1), (11); The Securities Act, C.C.S.M. c. S50, s. 141(1), (11); Securities Act, S.N.B. 2004, c. S-5.5, s. 149(1), (9); Securities Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S-13, s. 130(1), (8); Securities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 418, s. 137(1), (8); Securities Act, S.Nu. 2008, c. 12, s. 111(1), (12); Securities Act, S.N.W.T. 2008, c. 10, s. 111(1), (12); Securities Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-3.1, s. 111(1), (12); Securities Act, R.S.Q., c. V-1.1, ss. 218, 219, 221; The Securities Act, 1988, S.S. 1988-89, c. S-42.2, s. 137(1), (9); Securities Act, S.Y. 2007, c. 16, s. 111(1), (13).

Note 6: We understand that this analysis was before the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in 2007.

Note 7: The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In Re: Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc., 228 B.R. 816 (Bankr. Del. 1999) indicated that this provision applies to underwriters' claims, and reflects the policy rationale that such stakeholders are in a better position to evaluate the risks associated with the issuance of stock than are general creditors.

Re Canadian Airlines Corporation, 2000 ABQB 442

Date: 20000627

Action No. 0001-05071

IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED;

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT* (ALBERTA) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, AS AMENDED, SECTION 185

AND IN THE MATTER OF CANADIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION AND CANADIAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL LTD.

REASONS FOR DECISION
of the
HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE M. S. PAPERNY

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAIL") seek the court's sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the ***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*** ("CCAA") and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation ("Air Canada"). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

[2] The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value. Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada's financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

[3] Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. BACKGROUND

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

[4] CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the ***Business Corporations Act*** of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 ("ABCA"). 82% of CAC's shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd.("853350") and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC's principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited ("CRAL"). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as "Canadian" in these reasons.

[5] In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines ("PWA") to one of Canada's two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited ("CP Air"), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. ("Nordair") and Eastern Provincial Airways ("Eastern"). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, "Canadian Airlines International Ltd.", which was launched in April, 1987.

[6] By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

[7] CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("CRAL 98") provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

[8] CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

Events Leading up to the CCAA Proceedings

[9] Canadian's financial difficulties significantly predate these proceedings.

[10] In the early 1990s, Canadian experienced significant losses from operations and deteriorating liquidity. It completed a financial restructuring in 1994 (the "1994 Restructuring") which involved employees contributing $200,000,000 in new equity in return for receipt of entitlements to common shares. In addition, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc. ("Aurora"), a subsidiary of AMR Corporation ("AMR"), subscribed for $246,000,000 in preferred shares of CAIL. Other AMR subsidiaries entered into comprehensive services and marketing arrangements with CAIL. The governments of Canada, British Columbia and Alberta provided an aggregate of $120,000,000 in loan guarantees. Senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders of CAC and CAIL and its subsidiaries converted approximately $712,000,000 of obligations into common shares of CAC or convertible notes issued jointly by CAC and CAIL and/or received warrants entitling the holder to purchase common shares.

[11] In the latter half of 1994, Canadian built on the improved balance sheet provided by the 1994 Restructuring, focussing on strict cost controls, capacity management and aircraft utilization. The initial results were encouraging. However, a number of factors including higher than expected fuel costs, rising interest rates, decline of the Canadian dollar, a strike by

pilots of Time Air and the temporary grounding of Inter-Canadien's ATR-42 fleet undermined this improved operational performance. In 1995, in response to additional capacity added by emerging charter carriers and Air Canada on key transcontinental routes, CAIL added additional aircraft to its fleet in an effort to regain market share. However, the addition of capacity coincided with the slow-down in the Canadian economy leading to traffic levels that were significantly below expectations. Additionally, key international routes of CAIL failed to produce anticipated results. The cumulative losses of CAIL from 1994 to 1999 totalled $771 million and from January 31, 1995 to August 12, 1999, the day prior to the issuance by the Government of Canada of an Order under Section 47 of the *Canada Transportation Act* (relaxing certain rules under the *Competition Act* to facilitate a restructuring of the airline industry and described further below), the trading price of Canadian's common shares declined from $7.90 to $1.55.

[12] Canadian's losses incurred since the 1994 Restructuring severely eroded its liquidity position. In 1996, Canadian faced an environment where the domestic air travel market saw increased capacity and aggressive price competition by two new discount carriers based in western Canada. While Canadian's traffic and load factor increased indicating a positive response to Canadian's post-restructuring business plan, yields declined. Attempts by Canadian to reduce domestic capacity were offset by additional capacity being introduced by the new discount carriers and Air Canada.

[13] The continued lack of sufficient funds from operations made it evident by late fall of 1996 that Canadian needed to take action to avoid a cash shortfall in the spring of 1997. In November 1996, Canadian announced an operational restructuring plan (the "1996 Restructuring") aimed at returning Canadian to profitability and subsequently implemented a payment deferral plan which involved a temporary moratorium on payments to certain lenders and aircraft operating lessors to provide a cash bridge until the benefits of the operational restructuring were fully implemented. Canadian was able successfully to obtain the support of its lenders and operating lessors such that the moratorium and payment deferral plan was able to proceed on a consensual basis without the requirement for any court proceedings.

[14] The objective of the 1996 Restructuring was to transform Canadian into a sustainable entity by focussing on controllable factors which targeted earnings improvements over four years. Three major initiatives were adopted: network enhancements, wage concessions as supplemented by fuel tax reductions/rebates, and overhead cost reductions.

[15] The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring were reflected in Canadian's 1997 financial results when Canadian and its subsidiaries reported a consolidated net income of $5.4 million, the best results in 9 years.

[16] In early 1998, building on its 1997 results, Canadian took advantage of a strong market for U.S. public debt financing in the first half of 1998 by issuing U.S. $175,000,000 of senior secured notes in April, 1998 ("Senior Secured Notes") and U.S. $100,000,000 of unsecured notes in August, 1998 ("Unsecured Notes").

[17] The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring continued in 1998 but were not sufficient to offset a number of new factors which had a significant negative impact on financial

performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of $137.6 million for 1998.

[18] As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the **oneworldTM** Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL 's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

[19] Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

[20] Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

[21] Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

[22] Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

[23] Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity

investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

[24] In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

[25] On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. ("AirCo") (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

[26] On or about September 20, 1999 the Board of Directors of Air Canada recommended against the AirCo offer. On or about October 19, 1999, Air Canada announced its own proposal to its shareholders to repurchase shares of Air Canada. Air Canada's announcement also indicated Air Canada's intention to make a bid for CAC and to proceed to complete a merger with Canadian subject to a restructuring of Canadian's debt.

[27] There were several rounds of offers and counter-offers between AirCo and Air Canada. On November 5, 1999, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the AirCo offer for Air Canada violated the provisions of the *Air Canada Public Participation Act*. AirCo immediately withdrew its offers. At that time, Air Canada indicated its intention to proceed with its offer for CAC.

[28] Following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer to purchase CAC, and notwithstanding Air Canada's stated intention to proceed with its offer, there was a renewed uncertainty about Canadian's future which adversely affected operations. As described further below, Canadian lost significant forward bookings which further reduced the company's remaining liquidity.

Offer by 853350

[29] On November 11, 1999, 853350 (a corporation financed by Air Canada and owned as to 10% by Air Canada) made a formal offer for all of the common and non-voting shares of CAC. Air Canada indicated that the involvement of 853350 in the take-over bid was necessary in order to protect Air Canada from the potential adverse effects of a restructuring of Canadian's debt and that Air Canada would only complete a merger with Canadian after the completion of a debt restructuring transaction. The offer by 853350 was conditional upon, among other things, a satisfactory resolution of AMR's claims in respect of Canadian and a satisfactory resolution of certain regulatory issues arising from the announcement made on

October 26, 1999 by the Government of Canada regarding its intentions to alter the regime governing the airline industry.

[30] As noted above, AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates had certain agreements with Canadian arising from AMR's investment (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc.) in CAIL during the 1994 Restructuring. In particular, the Services Agreement by which AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates provided certain reservations, scheduling and other airline related services to Canadian provided for a termination fee of approximately $500 million (as at December 31, 1999) while the terms governing the preferred shares issued to Aurora provided for exchange rights which were only retractable by Canadian upon payment of a redemption fee in excess of $500 million (as at December 31, 1999). Unless such provisions were amended or waived, it was practically impossible for Canadian to complete a merger with Air Canada since the cost of proceeding without AMR's consent was simply too high.

[31] Canadian had continued its efforts to seek out all possible solutions to its structural problems following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer on November 5, 1999. While AMR indicated its willingness to provide a measure of support by allowing a deferral of some of the fees payable to AMR under the Services Agreement, Canadian was unable to find any investor willing to provide the liquidity necessary to keep Canadian operating while alternative solutions were sought.

[32] After 853350 made its offer, 853350 and Air Canada entered into discussions with AMR regarding the purchase by 853350 of AMR's shareholding in CAIL as well as other matters regarding code sharing agreements and various services provided to Canadian by AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The parties reached an agreement on November 22, 1999 pursuant to which AMR agreed to reduce its potential damages claim for termination of the Services Agreement by approximately 88%.

[33] On December 4, 1999, CAC's Board recommended acceptance of 853350's offer to its shareholders and on December 21, 1999, two days before the offer closed, 853350 received approval for the offer from the Competition Bureau as well as clarification from the Government of Canada on the proposed regulatory framework for the Canadian airline industry.

[34] As noted above, Canadian's financial condition deteriorated further after the collapse of the AirCo Arrangement transaction. In particular:

a) the doubts which were publicly raised as to Canadian's ability to survive made Canadian's efforts to secure additional financing through various sale-leaseback transactions more difficult;
b) sales for future air travel were down by approximately 10% compared to 1998;
c) CAIL's liquidity position, which stood at approximately $84 million (consolidated cash and available credit) as at September 30, 1999, reached a critical point in late December, 1999 when it was about to go negative.

[35] In late December, 1999, Air Canada agreed to enter into certain transactions designed to ensure that Canadian would have enough liquidity to continue operating until the scheduled completion of the 853350 take-over bid on January 4, 2000. Air Canada agreed to purchase rights to the Toronto-Tokyo route for $25 million and to a sale-leaseback arrangement involving certain unencumbered aircraft and a flight simulator for total proceeds of approximately $20 million. These transactions gave Canadian sufficient liquidity to continue operations through the holiday period.

[36] If Air Canada had not provided the approximate $45 million injection in December 1999, Canadian would likely have had to file for bankruptcy and cease all operations before the end of the holiday travel season.

[37] On January 4, 2000, with all conditions of its offer having been satisfied or waived, 853350 purchased approximately 82% of the outstanding shares of CAC. On January 5, 1999, 853350 completed the purchase of the preferred shares of CAIL owned by Aurora. In connection with that acquisition, Canadian agreed to certain amendments to the Services Agreement reducing the amounts payable to AMR in the event of a termination of such agreement and, in addition, the unanimous shareholders agreement which gave AMR the right to require Canadian to purchase the CAIL preferred shares under certain circumstances was terminated. These arrangements had the effect of substantially reducing the obstacles to a restructuring of Canadian's debt and lease obligations and also significantly reduced the claims that AMR would be entitled to advance in such a restructuring.

[38] Despite the $45 million provided by Air Canada, Canadian's liquidity position remained poor. With January being a traditionally slow month in the airline industry, further bridge financing was required in order to ensure that Canadian would be able to operate while a debt restructuring transaction was being negotiated with creditors. Air Canada negotiated an arrangement with the Royal Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") to purchase a participation interest in the operating credit facility made available to Canadian. As a result of this agreement, Royal Bank agreed to extend Canadian's operating credit facility from $70 million to $120 million in January, 2000 and then to $145 million in March, 2000. Canadian agreed to supplement the assignment of accounts receivable security originally securing Royal's $70 million facility with a further Security Agreement securing certain unencumbered assets of Canadian in consideration for this increased credit availability. Without the support of Air Canada or another financially sound entity, this increase in credit would not have been possible.

[39] Air Canada has stated publicly that it ultimately wishes to merge the operations of Canadian and Air Canada, subject to Canadian completing a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to complete the acquisition on a financially sound basis. This pre-condition has been emphasized by Air Canada since the fall of 1999.

[40] Prior to the acquisition of majority control of CAC by 853350, Canadian's management, Board of Directors and financial advisors had considered every possible alternative for restoring Canadian to a sound financial footing. Based upon Canadian's extensive efforts over the past year in particular, but also the efforts since 1992 described

above, Canadian came to the conclusion that it must complete a debt restructuring to permit the completion of a full merger between Canadian and Air Canada.

[41] On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders. As a result of this moratorium Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases. Absent the assistance provided by this moratorium, in addition to Air Canada's support, Canadian would not have had sufficient liquidity to continue operating until the completion of a debt restructuring.

[42] Following implementation of the moratorium, Canadian with Air Canada embarked on efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. The further damage to public confidence which a CCAA filing could produce required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection.

[43] Before the Petitioners started these CCAA proceedings, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

[44] Canadian and Air Canada have also been able to reach agreement with the remaining affected secured creditors, being the holders of the U.S. $175 million Senior Secured Notes, due 2005, (the "Senior Secured Noteholders") and with several major unsecured creditors in addition to AMR, such as Loyalty Management Group Canada Inc.

[45] On March 24, 2000, faced with threatened proceedings by secured creditors, Canadian petitioned under the CCAA and obtained a stay of proceedings and related interim relief by Order of the Honourable Chief Justice Moore on that same date. Pursuant to that Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc. was appointed as the Monitor, and companion proceedings in the United States were authorized to be commenced.

[46] Since that time, due to the assistance of Air Canada, Canadian has been able to complete the restructuring of the remaining financial obligations governing all aircraft to be retained by Canadian for future operations. These arrangements were approved by this Honourable Court in its Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000, as described in further detail below under the heading "The Restructuring Plan".

[47] On April 7, 2000, this court granted an Order giving directions with respect to the filing of the plan, the calling and holding of meetings of affected creditors and related matters.

[48] On April 25, 2000 in accordance with the said Order, Canadian filed and served the plan (in its original form) and the related notices and materials.

[49] The plan was amended, in accordance with its terms, on several occasions, the form of Plan voted upon at the Creditors' Meetings on May 26, 2000 having been filed and served on May 25, 2000 (the "Plan").

The Restructuring Plan

[50] The Plan has three principal aims described by Canadian:

(a) provide near term liquidity so that Canadian can sustain operations;
(b) allow for the return of aircraft not required by Canadian; and
(c) permanently adjust Canadian's debt structure and lease facilities to reflect the current market for asset values and carrying costs in return for Air Canada providing a guarantee of the restructured obligations.

[51] The proposed treatment of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Unaffected Secured Creditors- Royal Bank, CAIL's operating lender, is an unaffected creditor with respect to its operating credit facility. Royal Bank holds security over CAIL's accounts receivable and most of CAIL's operating assets not specifically secured by aircraft financiers or the Senior Secured Noteholders. As noted above, arrangements entered into between Air Canada and Royal Bank have provided CAIL with liquidity necessary for it to continue operations since January 2000.

Also unaffected by the Plan are those aircraft lessors, conditional vendors and secured creditors holding security over CAIL's aircraft who have entered into agreements with CAIL and/or Air Canada with respect to the restructuring of CAIL's obligations. A number of such agreements, which were initially contained in the form of letters of intent ("LOIs"), were entered into prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, while a total of 17 LOIs were completed after that date. In its Second and Fourth Reports the Monitor reported to the court on these agreements. The LOIs entered into after the proceedings commenced were reviewed and approved by the court on April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000.

The basis of the LOIs with aircraft lessors was that the operating lease rates were reduced to fair market lease rates or less, and the obligations of CAIL under the leases were either assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. Where the aircraft was subject to conditional sale agreements or other secured indebtedness, the value of the secured debt was reduced to the fair market value of the aircraft, and the interest rate payable was reduced to current market rates reflecting Air Canada's credit. CAIL's obligations under those agreements have also been assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. The claims of these creditors for reduced principal and interest amounts, or reduced lease payments, are Affected Unsecured Claims under the Plan. In a number of cases these claims have been assigned to Air Canada and Air Canada disclosed that it would vote those claims in favour of the Plan.

2. Affected Secured Creditors- The Affected Secured Creditors under the Plan are the Senior Secured Noteholders with a claim in the amount of US$175,000,000. The Senior Secured Noteholders are secured by a diverse package of Canadian's assets, including its inventory of aircraft spare parts, ground equipment, spare engines, flight simulators, leasehold interests at Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary airports, the shares in CRAL 98 and a $53 million note payable by CRAL to CAIL.

The Plan offers the Senior Secured Noteholders payment of 97 cents on the dollar. The deficiency is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditor class and the Senior Secured Noteholders advised the court they would be voting the deficiency in favour of the Plan.

3. Unaffected Unsecured Creditors-In the circular accompanying the November 11, 1999 853350 offer it was stated that:

> The Offeror intends to conduct the Debt Restructuring in such a manner as to seek to ensure that the unionized employees of Canadian, the suppliers of new credit (including trade credit) and the members of the flying public are left unaffected.
> The Offeror is of the view that the pursuit of these three principles is essential in order to ensure that the long term value of Canadian is preserved.

Canadian's employees, customers and suppliers of goods and services are unaffected by the CCAA Order and Plan.
Also unaffected are parties to those contracts or agreements with Canadian which are not being terminated by Canadian pursuant to the terms of the March 24, 2000 Order.

4. Affected Unsecured Creditors- CAIL has identified unsecured creditors who do not fall into the above three groups and listed these as Affected Unsecured Creditors under the Plan. They are offered 14 cents on the dollar on their claims. Air Canada would fund this payment.

The Affected Unsecured Creditors fall into the following categories:

a. Claims of holders of or related to the Unsecured Notes (the "Unsecured Noteholders");
b. Claims in respect of certain outstanding or threatened litigation involving Canadian;
c. Claims arising from the termination, breach or repudiation of certain contracts, leases or agreements to which Canadian is a party other than aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
d. Claims in respect of deficiencies arising from the termination or re-negotiation of aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
e. Claims of tax authorities against Canadian; and
f. Claims in respect of the under-secured or unsecured portion of amounts due to the Senior Secured Noteholders.

[52] There are over $700 million of proven unsecured claims. Some unsecured creditors have disputed the amounts of their claims for distribution purposes. These are in the process of determination by the court-appointed Claims Officer and subject to further appeal to the court. If the Claims Officer were to allow all of the disputed claims in full and this were confirmed by the court, the aggregate of unsecured claims would be approximately $1.059 million.

[53] The Monitor has concluded that if the Plan is not approved and implemented, Canadian will not be able to continue as a going concern and in that event, the only foreseeable

alternative would be a liquidation of Canadian's assets by a receiver and/or a trustee in bankruptcy. Under the Plan, Canadian's obligations to parties essential to ongoing operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights and statutory priorities, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if Canadian were to cease operations as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would be in excess of $1.1 billion.

[54] In connection with its assessment of the Plan, the Monitor performed a liquidation analysis of CAIL as at March 31, 2000 in order to estimate the amounts that might be recovered by CAIL's creditors and shareholders in the event of disposition of CAIL's assets by a receiver or trustee. The Monitor concluded that a liquidation would result in a shortfall to certain secured creditors, including the Senior Secured Noteholders, a recovery by ordinary unsecured creditors of between one cent and three cents on the dollar, and no recovery by shareholders.

[55] There are two vociferous opponents of the Plan, Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence") who acts on behalf of its and/or its affiliate client accounts and four shareholders of CAC. Resurgence is incorporated pursuant to the laws of New York, U.S.A. and has its head office in White Plains, New York. It conducts an investment business specializing in high yield distressed debt. Through a series of purchases of the Unsecured Notes commencing in April 1999, Resurgence clients hold $58,200,000 of the face value of or 58.2% of the notes issued. Resurgence purchased 7.9 million units in April 1999. From November 3, 1999 to December 9, 1999 it purchased an additional 20,850,000 units. From January 4, 2000 to February 3, 2000 Resurgence purchased an additional 29,450,000 units.

[56] Resurgence seeks declarations that: the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 constitute an amalgamation, consolidation or merger with or into Air Canada or a conveyance or transfer of all or substantially all of Canadian's assets to Air Canada; that any plan of arrangement involving Canadian will not affect Resurgence and directing the repurchase of their notes pursuant to the provisions of their trust indenture and that the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 are oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to it pursuant to section 234 of the Business Corporations Act.

[57] Four shareholders of CAC also oppose the plan. Neil Baker, a Toronto resident, acquired 132,500 common shares at a cost of $83,475.00 on or about May 5, 2000. Mr. Baker sought to commence proceedings to "remedy an injustice to the minority holders of the common shares". Roger Midiaty, Michael Salter and Hal Metheral are individual shareholders who were added as parties at their request during the proceedings. Mr. Midiaty resides in Calgary, Alberta and holds 827 CAC shares which he has held since 1994. Mr. Metheral is also a Calgary resident and holds approximately 14,900 CAC shares in his RRSP and has held them since approximately 1994 or 1995. Mr. Salter is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona and is the beneficial owner of 250 shares of CAC and is a joint beneficial owner of 250 shares with his wife. These shareholders will be referred in the Decision throughout as the "Minority Shareholders".

[58] The Minority Shareholders oppose the portion of the Plan that relates to the reorganization of CAIL, pursuant to section 185 of the ***Alberta Business Corporations Act*** ("ABCA"). They characterize the transaction as a cancellation of issued shares unauthorized by section 167 of the ABCA or alternatively is a violation of section 183 of the ABCA. They submit the application for the order of reorganization should be denied as being unlawful, unfair and not supported by the evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

[59] Section 6 of the CCAA provides that:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

[60] Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

> (1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;
> (2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
> (3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

[61] A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in ***Re Northland Properties Ltd.*** (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.) at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example ***Re Sammi Atlas Inc.*** (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172 and ***Re T. Eaton Co.***, [1999] O.J. No. 5322 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

[62] Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

> (a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000;
(c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;
(d) the creditors were properly classified;
(e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;
(f) the voting was properly carried out; and
(g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

[63] I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

(a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

(b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000.

(c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.

(d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.

(e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence"), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable".

2. Matters Unauthorized

[64] This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in ***Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*** (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in ***Cadillac Fairview (Re)*** (1995), 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 305 (Ont. Gen. Div.), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

[65] In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario

Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly, certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

[66] Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

> (2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

[67] Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

> a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for $1.00; and
> b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

[68] The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles of Incorporation to effect the proposed reorganization:

> (a) consolidating all of the issued and outstanding common shares into one common share;
> (b) redesignating the existing common shares as "Retractable Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Retractable Shares so that the Retractable Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital;
> (c) cancelling the Non-Voting Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are currently issued and outstanding, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Non-Voting Shares;
> (d) changing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Preferred Shares of the corporation into Class A Preferred Shares, on the basis of one (1) Class A Preferred Share for each one (1) Class B Preferred Share presently issued and outstanding;
> (e) redesignating the existing Class A Preferred Shares as "Common Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Common Shares so that the Common Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital; and
> (f) cancelling the Class B Preferred Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are issued and outstanding after the change in paragraph (d) above, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Class B Preferred Shares;

Section 167 of the ABCA

[69] Reorganizations under section 185 of the ABCA are subject to two preconditions:
a. The corporation must be "subject to an order for re-organization"; and
b. The proposed amendments must otherwise be permitted under section 167 of the ABCA.

[70] The parties agreed that an order of this court sanctioning the Plan would satisfy the first condition.

[71] The relevant portions of section 167 provide as follows:

> 167(1) Subject to sections 170 and 171, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to
> (e) change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued,
> (f) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series,
> (g.1) cancel a class or series of shares where there are no issued or outstanding shares of that class or series,

[72] Each change in the proposed CAIL Articles of Reorganization corresponds to changes permitted under s. 167(1) of the ABCA, as follows:

Proposed Amendment in Schedule "D"	Subsection 167(1), ABCA
(a) – consolidation of Common Shares	167(1)(f)
(b) – change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(c) – cancellation	167(1)(g.1)
(d) – change in shares	167(1)(f)
(e) – change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(f) – cancellation	167(1)(g.1)

[73] The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

[74] In R. Dickerson et al, ***Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada,*** Vol.1: Commentary (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

[75] The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

> For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

[76] The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

[77] The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of ***Royal Oak Mines Inc.***, [1999] O.J. No. 4848 and ***Re T Eaton Co.,*** *supra* in which Farley J.of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

[78] Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

[79] In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

[80] The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for $1.00.

[81] I disagree with this creative characterization. The proposed transaction is a reorganization as contemplated by section 185 of the ABCA. As recognized in ***Savage v.***

Amoco Acquisition Company Ltd, [1988] A.J. No. 68 (Q.B.), aff'd, 68 C.B.R. (3d) 154 (Alta. C.A.), the fact that the same end might be achieved under another section does not exclude the section to be relied on. A statute may well offer several alternatives to achieve a similar end.

Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1

[82] The Minority Shareholders also submitted the proposed reorganization constitutes a "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission. Under the Policy, transactions are subject to disclosure, minority approval and formal valuation requirements which have not been followed here. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the Petitioners were therefore in breach of the Policy unless and until such time as the court is advised of the relevant requirements of the Policy and grants its approval as provided by the Policy.

[83] These shareholders asserted that in the absence of evidence of the going concern value of CAIL so as to determine whether that value exceeds the rights of the Preferred Shares of CAIL, the Court should not waive compliance with the Policy.

[84] To the extent that this reorganization can be considered a "related party transaction", I have found, for the reasons discussed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", that the Plan, including the proposed reorganization, is fair and reasonable and accordingly I would waive the requirements of Policy 9.1.

b. Release

[85] Resurgence argued that the release of directors and other third parties contained in the Plan does not comply with the provisions of the CCAA.

[86] The release is contained in section 6.2(2)(ii) of the Plan and states as follows:

> As of the Effective Date, each of the Affected Creditors will be deemed to forever release, waive and discharge all claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts, rights, causes of action and liabilities...that are based in whole or in part on any act, omission, transaction, event or other occurrence taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to the Applicants and Subsidiaries, the CCAA Proceedings, or the Plan against:(i) The Applicants and Subsidiaries; (ii) The Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries in each case as of the date of filing (and in addition, those who became Officers and/or Directors thereafter but prior to the Effective Date); (iii) The former Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries, or (iv) the respective current and former professionals of the entities in subclauses (1) to (3) of this s.6.2(2) (including, for greater certainty, the Monitor, its counsel and its current Officers and Directors, and current and former Officers, Directors, employees, shareholders and professionals of the released parties) acting in such capacity.

[87] Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

(3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[88] Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly. Resurgence relied on ***Barrette v. Crabtree Estate,*** [1993], 1 S.C.R. 1027 at 1044 and ***Bruce Agra Foods Limited v. Proposal of Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of)*** (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 5 in this regard.

[89] With respect to Resurgence's complaint regarding the breadth of the claims covered by the release, the Petitioners asserted that the release is not intended to override section 5.1(2). Canadian suggested this can be expressly incorporated into the form of release by adding the words **"excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA"** immediately prior to subsection (iii) and clarifying the language in Section 5.1 of the Plan. Canadian also acknowledged, in response to a concern raised by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, that in accordance with s. 5.1(1) of the CCAA, directors of CAC and CAIL could only be released from liability arising before March 24, 2000, the date these proceedings commenced. Canadian suggested this was also addressed in the proposed amendment. Canadian did not address the propriety of including individuals in addition to directors in the form of release.

[90] In my view it is appropriate to amend the proposed release to expressly comply with section 5. 1(2) of the CCAA and to clarify Section 5.1 of the Plan as Canadian suggested in its brief. The additional language suggested by Canadian to achieve this result shall be included in the form of order. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is apparently satisfied with the Petitioners' acknowledgement that claims against directors can only be released to the date of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA, having appeared at this hearing to strongly support the sanctioning of the Plan, so I will not address this concern further.

[91] Resurgence argued that its claims fell within the categories of excepted claims in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and accordingly, its concern in this regard is removed by this amendment. Unsecured creditors JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2 suggested there may be possible wrongdoing in the acts of the directors during the restructuring process which should not be immune from scrutiny and in my view this complaint would also be caught by the exception captured in the amendment.

[92] While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception.

[93] Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

3. Fair and Reasonable

[94] In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in ***Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.***, *supra*, at page 9:

> "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity - and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

[95] The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: ***Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* v. *Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.***, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 at 574 (Alta.Q.B.); ***Northland Properties Ltd.* v. *Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada***, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 at 368 (B.C.C.A.).

[96] The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
d. Oppression;
e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and
f. The public interest.

a. Composition of the unsecured vote

[97] As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position then the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of ***Olympia & York Developments Ltd.***, *supra:*

> As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

[98] However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example ***Quintette Coal Ltd.***, (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3rd) 14 (B.C.S.C) and ***Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co.*** (1890) 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior Secured Noteholders, who voted their deficiency in the unsecured class, were decisive.

[99] The results of the unsecured vote, as reported by the Monitor, are:

1. For the resolution to approve the Plan: 73 votes (65% in number) representing $494,762,304 in claims (76% in value);
2. Against the resolution: 39 votes (35% in number) representing $156,360,363 in claims (24% in value); and
3. Abstentions: 15 representing $968,036 in value.

[100] The voting results as reported by the Monitor were challenged by Resurgence. That application was dismissed.

[101] The members of each class that vote in favour of a plan must do so in good faith and the majority within a class must act without coercion in their conduct toward the minority. When asked to assess fairness of an approved plan, the court will not countenance secret agreements to vote in favour of a plan secured by advantages to the creditor: see for example, ***Hochberger v. Rittenberg*** (1916), 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.)

[102] ***In Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)*** (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 192-3 (B.C.S.C) aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.), dissenting priority mortgagees argued the plan violated the principle of equality due to an agreement between the debtor company and another priority mortgagee which essentially amounted to a preference in exchange for voting in favour of the plan. Trainor J. found that the agreement was freely disclosed and commercially reasonable and went on to approve the plan, using the three part test. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld this result and in commenting on the minority complaint McEachern J.A. stated at page 206:

> In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at p.29:
>
>> I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an order absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.
>> Certainly, those minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

[103] Resurgence submitted that Air Canada manipulated the indebtedness of CAIL to assure itself of an affirmative vote. I disagree. I previously ruled on the validity of the deficiency when approving the LOIs and found the deficiency to be valid. I found there was consideration for the assignment of the deficiency claims of the various aircraft financiers to Air Canada, namely the provision of an Air Canada guarantee which would otherwise not have been available until plan sanction. The Monitor reviewed the calculations of the deficiencies and determined they were calculated in a reasonable manner. As such, the court approved those transactions. If the deficiency had instead remained with the aircraft financiers, it is reasonable to assume those claims would have been voted in favour of the plan. Further, it would have been entirely appropriate under the circumstances for the aircraft financiers to have retained the deficiency and agreed to vote in favour of the Plan, with the same result to Resurgence. That the financiers did not choose this method was explained by the testimony of Mr. Carty and Robert Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for Air Canada; quite simply it amounted to a desire on behalf of these creditors to shift the "deal risk" associated with the Plan to Air Canada. The agreement reached with the Senior Secured Noteholders was also disclosed and the challenge by Resurgence regarding their vote in the unsecured class was dismissed There

is nothing inappropriate in the voting of the deficiency claims of Air Canada or the Senior Secured Noteholders in the unsecured class. There is no evidence of secret vote buying such as discussed in ***Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)***.

[104] If the Plan is approved, Air Canada stands to profit in its operation. I do not accept that the deficiency claims were devised to dominate the vote of the unsecured creditor class, however, Air Canada, as funder of the Plan is more motivated than Resurgence to support it. This divergence of views on its own does not amount to bad faith on the part of Air Canada. Resurgence submitted that only the Unsecured Noteholders received 14 cents on the dollar. That is not accurate, as demonstrated by the list of affected unsecured creditors included earlier in these Reasons. The Senior Secured Noteholders did receive other consideration under the Plan, but to suggest they were differently motivated suggests that those creditors did not ascribe any value to their unsecured claims. There is no evidence to support this submission.

[105] The good faith of Resurgence in its vote must also be considered. Resurgence acquired a substantial amount of its claim after the failure of the Onex bid, when it was aware that Canadian's financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Thereafter, Resurgence continued to purchase a substantial amount of this highly distressed debt. While Mr. Symington maintained that he bought because he thought the bonds were a good investment, he also acknowledged that one basis for purchasing was the hope of obtaining a blocking position sufficient to veto a plan in the proposed debt restructuring. This was an obvious ploy for leverage with the Plan proponents

[106] The authorities which address minority creditors' complaints speak of "substantial injustice" (***Keddy Motor Inns Ltd. (Re)*** (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S.C.A.), "confiscation" of rights (***Campeau Corp. (Re)*** (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.Div.); ***Skydome Corp. (Re)*** (1999), 87 A.C.W.S (3d) 421 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)) and majorities "feasting upon" the rights of the minority (***Quintette Coal Ltd. (Re)***, (1992), 13 C.B.R.(3d) 146 (B.C.S.C.). Although it cannot be disputed that the group of Unsecured Noteholders represented by Resurgence are being asked to accept a significant reduction of their claims, as are all of the affected unsecured creditors, I do not see a "substantial injustice", nor view their rights as having been "confiscated" or "feasted upon" by being required to succumb to the wishes of the majority in their class. No bad faith has been demonstrated in this case. Rather, the treatment of Resurgence, along with all other affected unsecured creditors, represents a reasonable balancing of interests. While the court is directed to consider whether there is an injustice being worked within a class, it must also determine whether there is an injustice with respect the stakeholders as a whole. Even if a plan might at first blush appear to have that effect, when viewed in relation to all other parties, it may nonetheless be considered appropriate and be approved: ***Algoma Steel Corp.* v. *Royal Bank*** (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.)and ***Northland Properties (Re)***, *supra* at 9.

[107] Further, to the extent that greater or discrete motivation to support a Plan may be seen as a conflict, the Court should take this same approach and look at the creditors as a whole and to the objecting creditors specifically and determine if their rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests and have the pain of compromise borne equally.

[108] Resurgence represents 58.2% of the Unsecured Noteholders or $96 million in claims. The total claim of the Unsecured Noteholders ranges from $146 million to $161 million. The

affected unsecured class, excluding aircraft financing, tax claims, the noteholders and claims under $50,000, ranges from $116.3 million to $449.7 million depending on the resolutions of certain claims by the Claims Officer. Resurgence represents between 15.7% - 35% of that portion of the class.

[109] The total affected unsecured claims, excluding tax claims, but including aircraft financing and noteholder claims including the unsecured portion of the Senior Secured Notes, ranges from $673 million to $1,007 million. Resurgence represents between 9.5% - 14.3% of the total affected unsecured creditor pool. These percentages indicate that at its very highest in a class excluding Air Canada's assigned claims and Senior Secured's deficiency, Resurgence would only represent a maximum of 35% of the class. In the larger class of affected unsecured it is significantly less. Viewed in relation to the class as a whole, there is no injustice being worked against Resurgence.

[110] The thrust of the Resurgence submissions suggests a mistaken belief that they will get more than 14 cents on liquidation. This is not borne out by the evidence and is not reasonable in the context of the overall Plan.

b. Receipts on liquidation or bankruptcy

[111] As noted above, the Monitor prepared and circulated a report on the Plan which contained a summary of a liquidation analysis outlining the Monitor's projected realizations upon a liquidation of CAIL ("Liquidation Analysis").

[112] The Liquidation Analysis was based on: (1) the draft unaudited financial statements of Canadian at March 31, 2000; (2) the distress values reported in independent appraisals of aircraft and aircraft related assets obtained by CAIL in January, 2000; (3) a review of CAIL's aircraft leasing and financing documents; and (4) discussions with CAIL Management.

[113] Prior to and during the application for sanction, the Monitor responded to various requests for information by parties involved. In particular, the Monitor provided a copy of the Liquidation Analysis to those who requested it. Certain of the parties involved requested the opportunity to question the Monitor further, particularly in respect to the Liquidation Analysis and this court directed a process for the posing of those questions.

[114] While there were numerous questions to which the Monitor was asked to respond, there were several areas in which Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders took particular issue: pension plan surplus, CRAL, international routes and tax pools. The dissenting groups asserted that these assets represented overlooked value to the company on a liquidation basis or on a going concern basis.

Pension Plan Surplus

[115] The Monitor did not attribute any value to pension plan surplus when it prepared the Liquidation Analysis, for the following reasons:

1) The summaries of the solvency surplus/deficit positions indicated a cumulative net deficit position for the seven registered plans, after consideration of contingent liabilities;
2) The possibility, based on the previous splitting out of the seven plans from a single plan in 1988, that the plans could be held to be consolidated for financial purposes, which would remove any potential solvency surplus since the total estimated contingent liabilities exceeded the total estimated solvency surplus;
3) The actual calculations were prepared by CAIL's actuaries and actuaries representing the unions could conclude liabilities were greater; and
4) CAIL did not have a legal opinion confirming that surpluses belonged to CAIL.

[116] The Monitor concluded that the entitlement question would most probably have to be settled by negotiation and/or litigation by the parties. For those reasons, the Monitor took a conservative view and did not attribute an asset value to pension plans in the Liquidation Analysis. The Monitor also did not include in the Liquidation Analysis any amount in respect of the claim that could be made by members of the plan where there is an apparent deficit after deducting contingent liabilities.

[117] The issues in connection with possible pension surplus are: (1) the true amount of any of the available surplus; and (2) the entitlement of Canadian to any such amount.

[118] It is acknowledged that surplus prior to termination can be accessed through employer contribution holidays, which Canadian has taken to the full extent permitted. However, there is no basis that has been established for any surplus being available to be withdrawn from an ongoing pension plan. On a pension plan termination, the amount available as a solvency surplus would first have to be further reduced by various amounts to determine whether there was in fact any true surplus available for distribution. Such reductions include contingent benefits payable in accordance with the provisions of each respective pension plan, any extraordinary plan wind up cost, the amounts of any contribution holidays taken which have not been reflected, and any litigation costs.

[119] Counsel for all of Canadian's unionized employees confirmed on the record that the respective union representatives can be expected to dispute all of these calculations as well as to dispute entitlement.

[120] There is a suggestion that there might be a total of $40 million of surplus remaining from all pension plans after such reductions are taken into account. Apart from the issue of entitlement, this assumes that the plans can be treated separately, that a surplus could in fact be realized on liquidation and that the Towers Perrin calculations are not challenged. With total pension plan assets of over $2 billion, a surplus of $40 million could quickly disappear with relatively minor changes in the market value of the securities held or calculation of liabilities. In the circumstances, given all the variables, I find that the existence of any surplus is doubtful at best and I am satisfied that the Monitor's Liquidation Analysis ascribing it zero value is reasonable in this circumstances.

CRAL

[121] The Monitor's liquidation analysis as at March 31, 2000 of CRAL determined that in a distress situation, after payments were made to its creditors, there would be a deficiency of approximately $30 million to pay Canadian Regional's unsecured creditors, which include a claim of approximately $56.5 million due to Canadian. In arriving at this conclusion, the Monitor reviewed internally prepared unaudited financial statements of CRAL as of March 31, 2000, the Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin, distress valuation dated January 21, 2000 and the Simat Helliesen and Eichner valuation of selected CAIL assets dated January 31, 2000 for certain aircraft related materials and engines, rotables and spares. The Avitas Inc., and Avmark Inc. reports were used for the distress values on CRAL's aircraft and the CRAL aircraft lease documentation. The Monitor also performed its own analysis of CRAL's liquidation value, which involved analysis of the reports provided and details of its analysis were outlined in the Liquidation Analysis.

[122] For the purpose of the Liquidation Analysis, the Monitor did not consider other airlines as comparable for evaluation purposes, as the Monitor's valuation was performed on a distressed sale basis. The Monitor further assumed that without CAIL's national and international network to feed traffic into and a source of standby financing, and considering the inevitable negative publicity which a failure of CAIL would produce, CRAL would immediately stop operations as well.

[123] Mr. Peterson testified that CRAL was worth $260 million to Air Canada, based on Air Canada being a special buyer who could integrate CRAL, on a going concern basis, into its network. The Liquidation Analysis assumed the windup of each of CRAL and CAIL, a completely different scenario.

[124] There is no evidence that there was a potential purchaser for CRAL who would be prepared to acquire CRAL or the operations of CRAL 98 for any significant sum or at all. CRAL has value to CAIL, and in turn, could provide value to Air Canada, but this value is attributable to its ability to feed traffic to and take traffic from the national and international service operated by CAIL. In my view, the Monitor was aware of these features and properly considered these factors in assessing the value of CRAL on a liquidation of CAIL.

[125] If CAIL were to cease operations, the evidence is clear that CRAL would be obliged to do so as well immediately. The travelling public, shippers, trade suppliers, and others would make no distinction between CAIL and CRAL and there would be no going concern for Air Canada to acquire.

International Routes

[126] The Monitor ascribed no value to Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis. In discussions with CAIL management and experts available in its aviation group, the Monitor was advised that international routes are unassignable licenses and not property rights. They do not appear as assets in CAIL's financials. Mr. Carty and Mr. Peterson explained that routes and slots are <u>not</u> treated as assets by airlines, but rather as rights in the control of the Government of Canada. In the event of bankruptcy/receivership of CAIL, CAIL's trustee/receiver could not sell them and accordingly they are of no value to CAIL.

[127] Evidence was led that on June 23, 1999 Air Canada made an offer to purchase CAIL's international routes for $400 million cash plus $125 million for aircraft spares and inventory, along with the assumption of certain debt and lease obligations for the aircraft required for the international routes. CAIL evaluated the Air Canada offer and concluded that the proposed purchase price was insufficient to permit it to continue carrying on business in the absence of its international routes. Mr. Carty testified that something in the range of $2 billion would be required.

[128] CAIL was in desperate need of cash in mid December, 1999. CAIL agreed to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route for $25 million. The evidence, however, indicated that the price for the Toronto - Tokyo route was not derived from a valuation, but rather was what CAIL asked for, based on its then-current cash flow requirements. Air Canada and CAIL obtained Government approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

[129] Resurgence complained that despite this evidence of offers for purchase and actual sales of international routes and other evidence of sales of slots, the Monitor did not include Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis and only attributed a total of $66 million for all intangibles of Canadian. There is some evidence that slots at some foreign airports may be bought or sold in some fashion. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute any value to other slots which CAIL has at foreign airports. It would appear given the regulation of the airline industry, in particular, the ***Aeronautics Act*** and the ***Canada Transportation Act***, that international routes for a Canadian air carrier only have full value to the extent of federal government support for the transfer or sale, and its preparedness to allow the then-current license holder to sell rather than act unilaterally to change the designation. The federal government was prepared to allow CAIL to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route to Air Canada in light of CAIL's severe financial difficulty and the certainty of cessation of operations during the Christmas holiday season in the absence of such a sale.

[130] Further, statements made by CAIL in mid-1999 as to the value of its international routes and operations in response to an offer by Air Canada, reflected the amount CAIL needed to sustain liquidity without its international routes and was not a representation of market value of what could realistically be obtained from an arms length purchaser. The Monitor concluded on its investigation that CAIL's Narida and Heathrow slots had a realizable value of $66 million , which it included in the Liquidation Analysis. I find that this conclusion is supportable and that the Monitor properly concluded that there were no other rights which ought to have been assigned value.

Tax Pools

[131] There are four tax pools identified by Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders that are material: capital losses at the CAC level, undepreciated capital cost pools, operating losses incurred by Canadian and potential for losses to be reinstated upon repayment of fuel tax rebates by CAIL.

Capital Loss Pools

[132] The capital loss pools at CAC will not be available to Air Canada since CAC is to be left out of the corporate reorganization and will be severed from CAIL. Those capital losses

can essentially only be used to absorb a portion of the debt forgiveness liability associated with the restructuring. CAC, who has virtually all of its senior debt compromised in the plan, receives compensation for this small advantage, which cost them nothing.

Undepreciated capital cost ("UCC")

[133] There is no benefit to Air Canada in the pools of UCC unless it were established that the UCC pools are in excess of the fair market value of the relevant assets, since Air Canada could create the same pools by simply buying the assets on a liquidation at fair market value. Mr. Peterson understood this pool of UCC to be approximately $700 million . There is no evidence that the UCC pool, however, could be considered to be a source of benefit. There is no evidence that this amount is any greater than fair market value.

Operating Losses

[134] The third tax pool complained of is the operating losses. The debt forgiven as a result of the Plan will erase any operating losses from prior years to the extent of such forgiven debt.

Fuel tax rebates

[135] The fourth tax pool relates to the fuel tax rebates system taken advantage of by CAIL in past years. The evidence is that on a consolidated basis the total potential amount of this pool is $297 million. According to Mr. Carty's testimony, CAIL has not been taxable in his ten years as Chief Financial Officer. The losses which it has generated for tax purposes have been sold on a 10 - 1 basis to the government in order to receive rebates of excise tax paid for fuel. The losses can be restored retroactively if the rebates are repaid, but the losses can only be carried forward for a maximum of seven years. The evidence of Mr. Peterson indicates that Air Canada has no plan to use those alleged losses and in order for them to be useful to Air Canada, Air Canada would have to complete a legal merger with CAIL, which is not provided for in the plan and is not contemplated by Air Canada until some uncertain future date. In my view, the Monitor's conclusion that there was no value to any tax pools in the Liquidation Analysis is sound.

[136] Those opposed to the Plan have raised the spectre that there may be value unaccounted for in this liquidation analysis or otherwise. Given the findings above, this is merely speculation and is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

c. Alternatives to the Plan

[137] When presented with a plan, affected stakeholders must weigh their options in the light of commercial reality. Those options are typically liquidation measured against the plan proposed. If not put forward, a hope for a different or more favourable plan is not an option and no basis upon which to assess fairness. On a purposive approach to the CCAA, what is fair and reasonable must be assessed against the effect of the Plan on the creditors and their various claims, in the context of their response to the plan. Stakeholders are expected to decide their fate based on realistic, commercially viable alternatives (generally seen as the prime motivating factor in any business decision) and not on speculative desires or hope for the

future. As Farley J. stated in ***Re T. Eaton Co.*** (1999) O.J. No. 4216 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 6:

> One has to be cognizant of the function of a balancing of their prejudices. Positions must be realistically assessed and weighed, all in the light of what an alternative to a successful plan would be. Wishes are not a firm foundation on which to build a plan; nor are ransom demands.

[138] The evidence is overwhelming that all other options have been exhausted and have resulted in failure. The concern of those opposed suggests that there is a better plan that Air Canada can put forward. I note that significant enhancements were made to the plan during the process. In any case, this is the Plan that has been voted on. The evidence makes it clear that there is not another plan forthcoming. As noted by Farley J. in ***T. Eaton Co, supra***, "no one presented an alternative plan for the interested parties to vote on" (para. 8).

d. Oppression

Oppression and the CCAA

[139] Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders originally claimed that the Plan proponents, CAC and CAIL and the Plan supporters 853350 and Air Canada had oppressed, unfairly disregarded or unfairly prejudiced their interests, under Section 234 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders (for reasons that will appear obvious) have abandoned that position.

[140] Section 234 gives the court wide discretion to remedy corporate conduct that is unfair. As remedial legislation, it attempts to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and management to ensure adequate investor protection and maximum management flexibility. The Act requires the court to judge the conduct of the company and the majority in the context of equity and fairness: ***First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd.***, (1988) 40 B.L.R.28 (Alta. Q.B.). Equity and fairness are measured against or considered in the context of the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of the complainants: ***Re Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna*** (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C).

[141] The starting point in any determination of oppression requires an understanding as to what the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations are and what the damaging or detrimental effect is on them. MacDonald J. stated in ***First Edmonton Place, supra*** at 57:

> In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

[142] While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: ***Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.*** (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.).

[143] Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: ***Re Royal Oak Mines Ltd.***, *supra*, para. 4., ***Re Cadillac Fairview***, [1995] O.J. 707 (Ont. Sup. Ct), and ***Re T. Eaton Company***, *supra.*

[144] To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

[145] It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

[146] Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

[147] The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this

moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

[148] The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

[149] It is asserted that because the Plan proponents engaged in a restructuring of Canadian's debt before the filing under the CCAA, that its use of the Act for only a small group of creditors, which includes Resurgence is somehow oppressive.

[150] At the outset, it cannot be overlooked that the CCAA does not require that a compromise be proposed to <u>all</u> creditors of an insolvent company. The CCAA is a flexible, remedial statute which recognizes the unique circumstances that lead to and away from insolvency.

[151] Next, Air Canada made it clear beginning in the fall of 1999 that Canadian would have to complete a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to acquire CAIL on a financially sound basis and as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following the implementation of the moratorium, absent which Canadian could not have continued to operate, Canadian and Air Canada commenced efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. They perceived that further damage to public confidence that a CCAA filing could produce, required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection. Before the Petitioners started the CCAA proceedings on March 24, 2000, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

[152] The purpose of the CCAA is to create an environment for negotiations and compromise. Often it is the stay of proceedings that creates the necessary stability for that process to unfold. Negotiations with certain key creditors in advance of the CCAA filing, rather than being oppressive or conspiratorial, are to be encouraged as a matter of principle if their impact is to provide a firm foundation for a restructuring. Certainly in this case, they were of critical importance, staving off liquidation, preserving cash flow and allowing the Plan to proceed. Rather than being detrimental or prejudicial to the interests of the other stakeholders, including Resurgence, it was beneficial to Canadian and all of its stakeholders.

[153] Resurgence complained that certain transfers of assets to Air Canada and its actions in consolidating the operations of the two entities prior to the initiation of the CCAA proceedings were unfairly prejudicial to it.

[154] The evidence demonstrates that the sales of the Toronto - Tokyo route, the Dash 8s and the simulators were at the suggestion of Canadian, who was in desperate need of operating cash. Air Canada paid what Canadian asked, based on its cash flow requirements. The

evidence established that absent the injection of cash at that critical juncture, Canadian would have ceased operations. It is for that reason that the Government of Canada willingly provided the approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

[155] Similarly, the renegotiation of CAIL's aircraft leases to reflect market rates supported by Air Canada covenant or guarantee has been previously dealt with by this court and found to have been in the best interest of Canadian, not to its detriment. The evidence establishes that the financial support and corporate integration that has been provided by Air Canada was not only in Canadian's best interest, but its only option for survival. The suggestion that the renegotiations of these leases, various sales and the operational realignment represents an assumption of a benefit by Air Canada to the detriment of Canadian is not supported by the evidence.

[156] I find the transactions predating the CCAA proceedings, were in fact Canadian's life blood in ensuring some degree of liquidity and stability within which to conduct an orderly restructuring of its debt. There was no detriment to Canadian or to its creditors, including its unsecured creditors. That Air Canada and Canadian were so successful in negotiating agreements with their major creditors, including aircraft financiers, without resorting to a stay under the CCAA underscores the serious distress Canadian was in and its lenders recognition of the viability of the proposed Plan.

[157] Resurgence complained that other significant groups held negotiations with Canadian. The evidence indicates that a meeting was held with Mr. Symington, Managing Director of Resurgence, in Toronto in March 2000. It was made clear to Resurgence that the pool of unsecured creditors would be somewhere between $500 and $700 million and that Resurgence would be included within that class. To the extent that the versions of this meeting differ, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr. Carty. Resurgence wished to play a significant role in the debt restructuring and indicated it was prepared to utilize the litigation process to achieve a satisfactory result for itself. It is therefore understandable that no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, the original offer to affected unsecured creditors has been enhanced since the filing of the plan on April 25, 2000. The enhancements to unsecured claims involved the removal of the cap on the unsecured pool and an increase from 12 to 14 cents on the dollar.

[158] The findings of the Commissioner of Competition establishes beyond doubt that absent the financial support provided by Air Canada, Canadian would have failed in December 1999. I am unable to find on the evidence that Resurgence has been oppressed. The complaint that Air Canada has plundered Canadian and robbed it of its assets is not supported but contradicted by the evidence. As described above, the alternative is liquidation and in that event the Unsecured Noteholders would receive between one and three cents on the dollar. The Monitor's conclusions in this regard are supportable and I accept them.

e. Unfairness to Shareholders

[159] The Minority Shareholders essentially complained that they were being unfairly stripped of their only asset in CAC - the shares of CAIL. They suggested they were being squeezed out by the new CAC majority shareholder 853350, without any compensation or any

vote. When the reorganization is completed as contemplated by the Plan , their shares will remain in CAC but CAC will be a bare shell.

[160] They further submitted that Air Canada's cash infusion, the covenants and guarantees it has offered to aircraft financiers, and the operational changes (including integration of schedules, "quick win" strategies, and code sharing) have all added significant value to CAIL to the benefit of its stakeholders, including the Minority Shareholders. They argued that they should be entitled to continue to participate into the future and that such an expectation is legitimate and consistent with the statements and actions of Air Canada in regard to integration. By acting to realign the airlines before a corporate reorganization, the Minority Shareholders asserted that Air Canada has created the expectation that it is prepared to consolidate the airlines with the participation of a minority. The Minority Shareholders take no position with respect to the debt restructuring under the CCAA, but ask the court to sever the corporate reorganization provisions contained in the Plan.

[161] Finally, they asserted that CAIL has increased in value due to Air Canada's financial contributions and operational changes and that accordingly, before authorizing the transfer of the CAIL shares to 853350, the current holders of the CAIL Preferred Shares, the court must have evidence before it to justify a transfer of 100% of the equity of CAIL to the Preferred Shares.

[162] That CAC will have its shareholding in CAIL extinguished and emerge a bare shell is acknowledged. However, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that those shares, CAC's "only asset", have no value. That the Minority Shareholders are content to have the debt restructuring proceed suggests by implication that they do not dispute the insolvency of both Petitioners, CAC and CAIL.

[163] The Minority Shareholders base their expectation to remain as shareholders on the actions of Air Canada in acquiring only 82% of the CAC shares before integrating certain of the airlines' operations. Mr. Baker (who purchased <u>after</u> the Plan was filed with the Court and almost six months after the take over bid by Air Canada) suggested that the contents of the bid circular misrepresented Air Canada's future intentions to its shareholders. The two dollar price offered and paid per share in the bid must be viewed somewhat skeptically and in the context in which the bid arose. It does not support the speculative view that some shareholders hold, that somehow, despite insolvency, their shares have some value on a going concern basis. In any event, any claim for misrepresentation that Minority Shareholders might have arising from the take over bid circular against Air Canada or 853350 , if any, is unaffected by the Plan and may be pursued after the stay is lifted.

[164] In considering Resurgence's claim of oppression I have already found that the financial support of Air Canada during this restructuring period has benefited Canadian and its stakeholders. Air Canada's financial support and the integration of the two airlines has been critical to keeping Canadian afloat. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that without this support Canadian would have ceased operations. However it has not transformed CAIL or CAC into solvent companies.

[165] The Minority Shareholders raise concerns about assets that are ascribed limited or no value in the Monitor's report as does Resurgence (although to support an opposite proposition). Considerable argument was directed to the future operational savings and profitability forecasted for Air Canada, its subsidiaries and CAIL and its subsidiaries. Mr. Peterson estimated it to be in the order of $650 to $800 million on an annual basis, commencing in 2001. The Minority Shareholders point to the tax pools of a restructured company that they submit will be of great value once CAIL becomes profitable as anticipated. They point to a pension surplus that at the very least has value by virtue of the contribution holidays that it affords. They also look to the value of the compromised claims of the restructuring itself which they submit are in the order of $449 million. They submit these cumulative benefits add value, currently or at least realizable in the future. In sharp contrast to the Resurgence position that these acts constitute oppressive behaviour, the Minority Shareholders view them as enhancing the value of their shares. They go so far as to suggest that there may well be a current going concern value of the CAC shares that has been conveniently ignored or unquantified and that the Petitioners must put evidence before the court as to what that value is.

[166] These arguments overlook several important facts, the most significant being that CAC and CAIL are insolvent and will remain insolvent until the debt restructuring is fully implemented. These companies are not just technically or temporarily insolvent, they are massively insolvent. Air Canada will have invested upward of $3 billion to complete the restructuring, while the Minority Shareholders have contributed nothing. Further, it was a fundamental condition of Air Canada's support of this Plan that it become the sole owner of CAIL. It has been suggested by some that Air Canada's share purchase at two dollars per share in December 1999 was unfairly prejudicial to CAC and CAIL's creditors. Objectively, any expectation by Minority Shareholders that they should be able to participate in a restructured CAIL is not reasonable.

[167] The Minority Shareholders asserted the plan is unfair because the effect of the reorganization is to extinguish the common shares of CAIL held by CAC and to convert the voting and non-voting Preferred Shares of CAIL into common shares of CAIL. They submit there is no expert valuation or other evidence to justify the transfer of CAIL's equity to the Preferred Shares. There is no equity in the CAIL shares to transfer. The year end financials show CAIL's shareholder equity at a deficit of $790 million. The Preferred Shares have a liquidation preference of $347 million. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Canada's interim support has rendered either of these companies solvent, it has simply permitted operations to continue. In fact, the unaudited consolidated financial statements of CAC for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 show total shareholders equity went from a deficit of $790 million to a deficit of $1.214 million, an erosion of $424 million.

[168] The Minority Shareholders' submission attempts to compare and contrast the rights and expectations of the CAIL preferred shares as against the CAC common shares. This is not a meaningful exercise; the Petitioners are not submitting that the Preferred Shares have value and the evidence demonstrates unequivocally that they do not. The Preferred Shares are merely being utilized as a corporate vehicle to allow CAIL to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Air Canada. For example, the same result could have been achieved by issuing new shares rather than changing the designation of 853350's Preferred Shares in CAIL.

[169] The Minority Shareholders have asked the court to sever the reorganization from the debt restructuring, to permit them to participate in whatever future benefit might be derived from the restructured CAIL. However, a fundamental condition of this Plan and the expressed intention of Air Canada on numerous occasions is that CAIL become a wholly owned subsidiary. To suggest the court ought to sever this reorganization from the debt restructuring fails to account for the fact that it is not two plans but an integral part of a single plan. To accede to this request would create an injustice to creditors whose claims are being seriously compromised, and doom the entire Plan to failure. Quite simply, the Plan's funder will not support a severed plan.

[170] Finally, the future profits to be derived by Air Canada are not a relevant consideration. While the object of any plan under the CCAA is to create a viable emerging entity, the germane issue is what a prospective purchaser is prepared to pay in the circumstances. Here, we have the one and only offer on the table, Canadian's last and only chance. The evidence demonstrates this offer is preferable to those who have a remaining interest to a liquidation. Where secured creditors have compromised their claims and unsecured creditors are accepting 14 cents on the dollar in a potential pool of unsecured claims totalling possibly in excess of $1 billion , it is not unfair that shareholders receive nothing.

e. The Public Interest

[171] In this case, the court cannot limit its assessment of fairness to how the Plan affects the direct participants. The business of the Petitioners as a national and international airline employing over 16,000 people must be taken into account.

[172] In his often cited article, ***Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*** (1947), 25 Can.Bar R.ev. 587 at 593 Stanley Edwards stated:

> Another reason which is usually operative in favour of reorganization is the interest of the public in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if it employs large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions of the creditors and shareholders of the company and is undoubtedly a factor which a court would wish to consider in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C.C.A.A.

[173] In ***Re Repap British Columbia Inc.*** (1998), 1 C.B.R. 449 (B.C.S.C.) the court noted that the fairness of the plan must be measured against the overall economic and business environment and against the interests of the citizens of British Columbia who are affected as "shareholders" of the company, and creditors, of suppliers, employees and competitors of the company. The court approved the plan even though it was unable to conclude that it was necessarily fair and reasonable. In ***Re Quintette Coal Ltd.,*** *supra*, Thackray J. acknowledged the significance of the coal mine to the British Columbia economy, its importance to the people who lived and worked in the region and to the employees of the company and their families. Other cases in which the court considered the public interest in determining whether to sanction a plan under the CCAA include ***Canadian Red Cross Society (Re)***, (1998),5

C.B.R.(4th) (Ont. Gen. Div.) and ***Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada (Trustee of)***, [1992] O.J. No. 795 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

[174] The economic and social impacts of a plan are important and legitimate considerations. Even in insolvency, companies are more than just assets and liabilities. The fate of a company is inextricably tied to those who depend on it in various ways. It is difficult to imagine a case where the economic and social impacts of a liquidation could be more catastrophic. It would undoubtedly be felt by Canadian air travellers across the country. The effect would not be a mere ripple, but more akin to a tidal wave from coast to coast that would result in chaos to the Canadian transportation system.

[175] More than sixteen thousand unionized employees of CAIL and CRAL appeared through counsel. The unions and their membership strongly support the Plan. The unions represented included the Airline Pilots Association International, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Transportation District 104, Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union. They represent pilots, ground workers and cabin personnel. The unions submit that it is essential that the employee protections arising from the current restructuring of Canadian not be jeopardized by a bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation. Liquidation would be devastating to the employees and also to the local and national economies. The unions emphasize that the Plan safeguards the employment and job dignity protection negotiated by the unions for their members. Further, the court was reminded that the unions and their members have played a key role over the last fifteen years or more in working with Canadian and responsible governments to ensure that Canadian survived and jobs were maintained.

[176] The Calgary and Edmonton Airport authorities, which are not for profit corporations, also supported the Plan. CAIL's obligations to the airport authorities are not being compromised under the Plan. However, in a liquidation scenario, the airport authorities submitted that a liquidation would have severe financial consequences to them and have potential for severe disruption in the operation of the airports.

[177] The representations of the Government of Canada are also compelling. Approximately one year ago, CAIL approached the Transport Department to inquire as to what solution could be found to salvage their ailing company. The Government saw fit to issue an order in council, pursuant to section 47 of the ***Transportation Act***, which allowed an opportunity for CAIL to approach other entities to see if a permanent solution could be found. A standing committee in the House of Commons reviewed a framework for the restructuring of the airline industry, recommendations were made and undertakings were given by Air Canada. The Government was driven by a mandate to protect consumers and promote competition. It submitted that the Plan is a major component of the industry restructuring. Bill C-26, which addresses the restructuring of the industry, has passed through the House of Commons and is presently before the Senate. The Competition Bureau has accepted that Air Canada has the only offer on the table and has worked very closely with the parties to ensure that the interests of consumers, employees, small carriers, and smaller communities will be protected.

[178] In summary, in assessing whether a plan is fair and reasonable, courts have emphasized that perfection is not required: see for example ***Wandlyn Inns Ltd. (Re)*** (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d)

316 (N.BQ.B), ***Quintette Coal***, *supra* and ***Repap***, *supra*. Rather, various rights and remedies must be sacrificed to varying degrees to result in a reasonable, viable compromise for all concerned. The court is required to view the "big picture" of the plan and assess its impact as a whole. I return to ***Algoma Steel v. Royal Bank of Canada***., *supra* at 9 in which Farley J. endorsed this approach:

> What might appear on the surface to be unfair to one party when viewed in relation to all other parties may be considered to be quite appropriate.

[179] Fairness and reasonableness are not abstract notions, but must be measured against the available commercial alternatives. The triggering of the statute, namely insolvency, recognizes a fundamental flaw within the company. In these imperfect circumstances there can never be a perfect plan, but rather only one that is supportable. As stated in ***Re Sammi Atlas Inc.***, (1998), 3C.B.R. (4^{th}) 171 at 173 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at 173:

> A plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment.

[180] I find that in all the circumstances, the Plan is fair and reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

[181] The Plan has obtained the support of many affected creditors, including virtually all aircraft financiers, holders of executory contracts, AMR, Loyalty Group and the Senior Secured Noteholders.

[182] Use of these proceedings has avoided triggering more than $1.2 billion of incremental claims. These include claims of passengers with pre-paid tickets, employees, landlords and other parties with ongoing executory contracts, trade creditors and suppliers.

[183] This Plan represents a solid chance for the continued existence of Canadian. It preserves CAIL as a business entity. It maintains over 16,000 jobs. Suppliers and trade creditors are kept whole. It protects consumers and preserves the integrity of our national transportation system while we move towards a new regulatory framework. The extensive efforts by Canadian and Air Canada, the compromises made by stakeholders both within and without the proceedings and the commitment of the Government of Canada inspire confidence in a positive result.

[184] I agree with the opposing parties that the Plan is not perfect, but it is neither illegal nor oppressive. Beyond its fair and reasonable balancing of interests, the Plan is a result of bona fide efforts by all concerned and indeed is the only alternative to bankruptcy as ten years of struggle and creative attempts at restructuring by Canadian clearly demonstrate. This Plan is one step toward a new era of airline profitability that hopefully will protect consumers by promoting affordable and accessible air travel to all Canadians.

[185] The Plan deserves the sanction of this court and it is hereby granted. The application pursuant to section 185 of the ABCA is granted. The application for declarations sought by Resurgence are dismissed. The application of the Minority Shareholders is dismissed.

HEARD on the 5th day of June to the 19th day of June, 2000.
DATED at Calgary, Alberta this 27th day of June, 2000.

J.C.Q.B.A.

APPEARANCES:

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For the Calgary and Edmonton Airport Authority

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

And in the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with Respect to Stelco Inc. and the Other Applicants Listed Under Schedule "A"

Application Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

[Indexed as: Stelco Inc. (Re) (No.2)]

78 O.R. (3d) 254
[2005] O.J. No. 4733
Docket: M33099 (C44332)

Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Laskin, Rosenberg and LaForme JJ.A.
November 4, 2005

Debtor and creditor -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Jurisdiction -- Jurisdiction of supervising judge not limited to preserving status quo -- Supervising judge having power to vary stay and allow company to enter into agreements to facilitate restructuring, provided that creditors have final decision whether or not to approve Plan -- Supervising judge entitled to use his own judgment and conclude that plan was not doomed to fail despite creditors' opposition -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

The debtor company negotiated agreements with two of its stakeholders and a finance provider which were intrinsic to the success of the Plan of Arrangement that the company proposed. While the stakeholders did not have a right to vote to approve any plan of arrangement and reorganization, they had a functional veto in the sense that no restructuring could be completed without their support. The company sought court authorization to enter into the agreements. Authorization was granted by the supervising judge. Creditors of the company appealed the orders, arguing that the supervising judge did not have jurisdiction generally to make the orders and that he did not have jurisdiction to approve orders that would facilitate a Plan that was doomed to fail, considering the creditors' opposition to the Plan.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

The motions judge had jurisdiction to make the orders authorizing the company to enter into the agreements. Section 11 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act provides a broad jurisdiction to impose terms and conditions on the granting of the stay. Section 11(4) includes the power to vary the stay and allow the company to enter into agreements to facilitate the restructuring, provided that the creditors have the final decision under s. 6 whether or not to approve the Plan. The court's jurisdiction is not limited to preserving the status quo. The orders in this case did not usurp the s. 6 rights of the creditors and did not unduly interfere with the business judgment of the creditors. The orders moved the process along to the point where the creditors were free to exercise their rights at the creditors' meeting. It must be a matter of judgment for the supervising judge to determine whether a Plan is doomed to fail. It was apparent in this case that the motions judge brought his judgme nt to bear and decided that the Plan was not doomed to fail. There was no basis for second guessing him on that issue.

Cases referred to

Bargain Harold's Discount Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of Canada (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 362, [1992] O.J. No. 374, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 306, 10 C.B.R. (3d) 23 (Gen. Div.); [page255] Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.) (sub nom. Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods); Inducon Development Corp. (Re), [1992] O.J. No. 8, 8 C.B.R.

(3d) 306, 31 A.C.W.S. (3d) 94 (Gen. Div.)

Statutes referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 6 [as am.], 11 [as am.], 13 [as am.]

APPEAL from the orders of Farley J., [2005] O.J. No. 4309 (S.C.J.) authorizing the company to enter into agreements.

Robert W. Staley and Alan P. Gardner, for Informal Committee of Senior Debentureholders, appellants.

Michael E. Barrack and Geoff R. Hall, for Stelco Inc., respondent.

Robert I. Thornton and Kyla E.M. Mahar, for Monitor, respondent.

John R. Varley, for Salaried Active Employees, respondents.

Michael C.P. McCreary and David P. Jacobs, for USW Locals 8782 and 5328, respondents.

George Karayannides, for EDS Canada Inc., respondent.

Aubrey E. Kauffman, for Tricap Management Ltd., respondents.

Ben Zarnett and Gale Rubenstein, for the Province of Ontario, respondents.

Murray Gold, for Salaried Retirees, respondents.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg, for USW International, respondents.

Robert A. Centa, for USWA, respondents.

George Glezos, for AGF Management Ltd., respondents.

The judgment of the court was delivered by

[1] ROSENBERG J.A.:-- This appeal is another chapter in the continuing attempt by Stelco Inc. and four of its wholly-owned subsidiaries to emerge from protection from their creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ["CCAA"]. The appellant, an Informal Committee of Senior Debenture Holders who are Stelco's largest creditor, applies for leave to appeal under s. 13 of the CCAA and if leave be granted appeals three orders made by Farley J. on October 4, 2005 in the CCAA proceedings. These orders authorize Stelco to enter into agreements with two of its stakeholders and a finance provider. The appellant submits that the motions judge had no jurisdiction to make these orders and that the effect of these orders is to distort or skew the CCAA process. A group of Stelco's equity holders support the submissions of the appellant. The various other players with a stake in the restructuring and the court-appointed Monitor support the orders made by the motions judge. [page256]

[2] Given the urgency of the matter it is only possible to give relatively brief reasons for my conclusion that while leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal should be dismissed.

The Facts

[3] Stelco Inc. and the four wholly-owned subsidiaries obtained protection from their creditors under the CCAA on January 29, 1994. Thus, the CCAA process has been going on for over 20 months, longer than anyone expected. Farley J. has been managing the process throughout. The initial order made under s. 11 of the CCAA gives Stelco sole and exclusive authority to propose and file a plan of arrangement with its creditors. To date, attempts to restructure have been unsuccessful. In particular, a plan put forward by the Senior Debt Holders failed.

[4] While there have no doubt been many obstacles to a successful restructuring, the paramount problem appears to be

that stakeholders, the Ontario government and Stelco's unions, who do not have a formal veto (i.e., they do not have a right to vote to approve any plan of arrangement and reorganization) have what the parties have referred to as a functional veto. It is unnecessary to set out the reasons for these functional vetoes. Suffice it to say, as did the Monitor in its Thirty-Eighth Report, that each of these stakeholders is "capable of exercising sufficient leverage against Stelco and other stakeholders such that no restructuring could be completed without that stakeholder's support".

[5] In an attempt to successfully emerge from CCAA protection with a plan of arrangement, the Stelco board of directors has negotiated with two of these stakeholders and with a finance provider and has reached three agreements: an agreement with the provincial government (the "Ontario Agreement"), an agreement with The United Steelworkers International and Local 8782 (the "USW Agreement"), and an agreement with Tricap Management Limited (the "Tricap Agreement"). Those agreements are intrinsic to the success of the Plan of Arrangement that Stelco proposes. However, the debt holders including this appellant have the ultimate veto. They alone will vote on whether to approve Stelco's Plan. The vote of the affected debt holders is scheduled for November 15, 2005.

[6] The three agreements have terms to which the appellant objects. For example, the Tricap Agreement contemplates a break fee of up to $10.75 million depending on the circumstances. Tricap will be entitled to a break fee if the Plan fails to obtain the requisite approvals or if Tricap terminates its obligations to provide financing as a result of the Plan being amended without Tricap's approval. Half of the break fee becomes payable if the Plan [page257] is voted down by the creditors. Another example is found in the Ontario Agreement, which provides that the order sanctioning the Final Plan shall name the members of Stelco's board of directors and such members must be acceptable to the province. Consistent with the Order of March 30, 2005 and as required by the terms of the agreements themselves, Stelco sought court authorization to enter into the three agreements. We were told that, in any event, it is common practice to seek court approval of

agreements of this importance. The appellant submits that the motions judge had no jurisdiction to make these orders.

[7] There are a number of other facts that form part of the context for understanding the issues raised by this appeal. First, on July 18, 2005, the motions judge extended the stay of proceedings until September 9, 2005 and warned the stakeholders that this was a "real and functional deadline". While that date has been extended because Stelco was making progress in its talks with the stakeholders, the urgency of the situation cannot be underestimated. Something will have to happen to either break the impasse or terminate the CCAA process.

[8] Second, on October 4, 2005, the motions judge made several orders, not just the orders to authorize Stelco to enter into the three agreements to which the appellant objects. In particular, the motions judge extended the stay to December and made an order convening the creditors' meeting on November 15 to approve the Stelco Plan. The appellant does not object to the orders extending the stay or convening the meeting to vote on the Plan.

[9] Third, the appellant has not sought permission to prepare and file its own plan of arrangement. At present, the Stelco Board's Plan is the only plan on the table and as the motions judge observed, "one must also realistically appreciate that a rival financing arrangement at this stage, starting from essentially a standing start, would take considerable time for due diligence and there is no assurance that the conditions will be any less onerous than those extracted by Tricap" [at para. 5].

[10] Fourth, in his orders authorizing Stelco to enter into these agreements, the motions judge made it clear that these authorizations, "are not a sanction of the terms of the plan ... and do not prohibit Stelco from continuing discussions in respect of the Plan with the Affected Creditors".

[11] Fifth, the independent Monitor has reviewed the Agreements and the Plan and supports Stelco's position.

[12] Finally, and importantly, the Senior Debenture Holders that make up the appellant have said unequivocally that they will not approve the Plan. The motions judge recognized this in his reasons [at para. 7]: [page258]

> The Bondholder group has indicated that it is firmly opposed to the plan as presently constituted. That group also notes that more than half of the creditors by $ value have advised the Monitor that they are opposed to the plan as presently constituted. ... The present plan may be adjusted (with the blessing of others concerned) to the extent that it, in a revised form, is palatable to the creditors (assuming that they do not have a massive change of heart as to the presently proposed plan).

Leave to Appeal

[13] The parties agree on the test for granting leave to appeal under s. 13 of the CCAA. The moving party must show the following:

(a) the point on appeal is of significance to the practice;

(b) the point is of significance to the action;

(c) the appeal is prima facie meritorious; and

(d) the appeal will not unduly hinder the progress of the action.

[14] In my view, the appellant has met this test. The point raised is a novel and important one. It concerns the jurisdiction of the supervising judge to make orders that do not merely preserve the status quo but authorize key elements of the proposed plan of arrangement. The point is of obvious significance in this action. If the motions judge's approvals were to be set aside, it is doubtful that the Plan could proceed. On the other hand, the appellant submits that the orders have created a coercive and unfair environment and that the Plan is doomed to fail. It was therefore wrong to authorize Stelco to enter into agreements, especially the Tricap

Agreement, that could further deplete the estate. The appeal is prima facie meritorious. The matter appears to be one of first impression. It certainly cannot be said that the appeal is frivolous. Finally, the appeal will not unduly hinder the progress of the action. Because of the speed with which this court is able to deal with the case, t he appeal will not unduly interfere with the continuing negotiations prior to the November 15th meeting.

[15] For these reasons, I would grant leave to appeal.

Analysis

Jurisdiction generally

[16] The thrust of the appellant's submissions is that while the judge supervising a CCAA process has jurisdiction to make orders that preserve the status quo, the judge has no jurisdiction to make an order that, in effect, entrenches elements of the proposed Plan. Rather, the approval of the Plan is a matter solely for [page259] the business judgment of the creditors. The appellant submits that the orders made by the motions-judge are not authorized by the statute or under the court's inherent jurisdiction and are in fact inconsistent with the scheme and objects of the CCAA. They submit that the orders made in this case have the effect of substituting the court's judgment for that of the debt holders who, under s. 6, have exclusive jurisdiction to approve the plan. Under s. 6, it is only after a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors vote to approve the plan that the court has a role in deciding whether to sanction the plan.

[17] Underlying this argument is a concern on the part of the creditors that the orders are coercive, designed to force the creditors to approve a plan, a plan in which they have had no input and of which they disapprove.

[18] In my view, the motions judge had jurisdiction to make the orders he did authorizing Stelco to enter into the agreements. Section 11 of the CCAA provides a broad jurisdiction to impose terms and conditions on the granting of

the stay. In my view, s. 11(4) includes the power to vary the stay and allow the company to enter into agreements to facilitate the restructuring, provided that the creditors have the final decision under s. 6 whether or not to approve the Plan. The court's jurisdiction is not limited to preserving the status quo. The point of the CCAA process is not simply to preserve the status quo but to facilitate restructuring so that the company can successfully emerge from the process. This point was made by Gibbs J.A. in Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.), at para. 10:

> The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. It is available to any company incorporated in Canada with assets or business activities in Canada that is not a bank, a railway company, a telegraph company, an insurance company, a trust company, or a loan company. When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

(Emphasis added)

[19] In my view, provided the orders do not usurp the right of the creditors to decide whether to approve the Plan the motions judge had the necessary jurisdiction to make them. The orders made in this case do not usurp the s. 6 rights of the creditors and [page260] do not unduly interfere with the business judgment of the creditors. The orders move the process along to the point where the creditors are free to exercise their rights at the creditors' meeting.

[20] The argument that the orders are coercive and therefore

unreasonably interfere with the rights of the creditors turns largely on the potential $10.75 million break fee that may become payable to Tricap. However, the motions judge has found as a fact that the break fee is reasonable. As counsel for Ontario points out, this necessarily entails a finding that the break fee is not coercive even if it could to some extent deplete Stelco's assets.

[21] Further, the motions judge [at para. 9] both in his reasons and in his orders made it clear that he was not purporting to sanction the Plan. As he said in his reasons, "I wish to be absolutely clear that I am not ruling on or considering in any way the fairness of the plan as presented". The creditors will have the ultimate say on November 15 whether this plan will be approved.

Doomed to fail

[22] The appellant submits that the motions judge had no jurisdiction to approve orders that would facilitate a Plan that is doomed to fail. The authorities indicate that a court should not approve a process that will lead to a plan that is doomed to fail. The appellant says that it has made it as clear as possible that it does not accept the proposed Plan and will vote against it. In Inducon Development Corp. (Re), [1992] O.J. No. 8, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Gen. Div.), at p. 310 C.B.R., Farley J. said that, "It is of course, ... fruitless to proceed with a plan that is doomed to failure at a further stage."

[23] However, it is important to take into account the dynamics of the situation. In fact, it is the appellant's position that nothing will happen until a vote on a Plan is imminent or a proposal from Stelco is voted down; only then will Stelco enter into realistic negotiations with its creditors. It is apparent that the motions judge is of the view that the Plan is not doomed to fail; he would not have approved steps to continue the process if he thought it was. As Austin J. said in Bargain Harold's Discount Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of Canada (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 362, [1992] O.J. No. 374 (Gen. Div.), at p. 369 O.R.:

> The jurisprudence is clear that if it is obvious that no plan will be found acceptable to the required percentages of creditors, then the application should be refused. The fact that Paribas, the Royal Bank and K Mart now say there is no plan that they would approve, does not put an end to the inquiry. All affected constituencies must be considered, including secured, preferred and unsecured creditors, employees, landlords, shareholders, and the public generally ...

(Emphasis added) [page261]

[24] It must be a matter of judgment for the supervising judge to determine whether the Plan is doomed to fail. This Plan is supported by the other stakeholders and the independent Monitor. It is a product of the business judgment of the Stelco board as a way out of the CCAA process. It was open to the motions judge to conclude that the plan was not doomed to fail and that the process should continue. Despite its opposition to the Plan, the appellant's position inherently concedes the possibility of success, otherwise these creditors would have opposed the extension of the stay, opposed the order setting a date for approval of the plan and sought to terminate the CCAA proceedings.

[25] The motions judge said this in his reasons [at para. 2]:

> It seems to me that Stelco as an ongoing enterprise is getting a little shop worn/shopped worn. It would not be helpful to once again start a new general process to find the ideal situation [sic solution?]; rather the urgency of the situation requires that a reasonable solution be found.

He went on to state [at para. 7] that in the month before the vote there "will be considerable discussion and negotiation as to the plan which will in fact be put to the vote" and that the present Plan may be adjusted. He urged the stakeholders and Stelco to "deal with this question in a positive way" and that "it is better to move forward than backwards, especially where progress is required". It is obvious that the motions judge has brought his judgment to bear and decided that the Plan or some version of it is not doomed to fail. I can see no basis for second-guessing the motions judge on that issue.

[26] I should comment on a submission made by the appellant that no deference should be paid to the business judgment of the Stelco board. The appellant submits that the board is entitled to deference for most of the decisions made in the day-to-day operations during the CCAA process except whether a restructuring should proceed or a plan of arrangement should proceed. The appellant submits that those latter decisions are solely the prerogative of the creditors by reason of s. 6. While there is no question that the ultimate decision is for the creditors, the board of directors plays an important role in the restructuring process. Blair J.A. made this clear in an earlier appeal to this court concerning Stelco reported at (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5, [2005] O.J. No. 1171 (C.A.), at para. 44:

> What the court does under s. 11 is to establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply [page262] to such activities. In the course of acting as referee, the court has great leeway, as Farley J. observed in Lehndorff, supra, at para. 5, "to make order[s] so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors". But the s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise must be guided by the schem e and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. Moreover, the court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructuring efforts.

(Emphasis added)

[27] The approvals given by the motions judge in this case are consistent with these principles. Those orders allow the company's restructuring efforts to move forward.

[28] The position of the appellant also fails to give any weight to the broad range of interests in play in a CCAA process. Again to quote Blair J.A. in the earlier Stelco case at para. 36:

> In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme, and that for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction.

(Emphasis added)

[29] For these reasons, I would not give effect to the submissions of the appellant.

Submissions of the equity holders

[30] The equity holders support the position of the appellant. They point out that the Stelco CCAA situation is somewhat unique. While Stelco entered the process in dire straits, since then almost unprecedented worldwide prices for steel have boosted Stelco's fortunes. In an endorsement of February 28, 2005, [2005] O.J. No. 730, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 310 (S.C.J.), the motions judge recognized this unusual state of affairs [at para. 5]:

> In most restructurings, on emergence the original shareholder equity, if it has not been legally "evaporated" because the insolvent corporation was so far under water, is very substantially diminished. For example, the old shares

may be converted into new emergent shares at a rate of 100 to 1; 1,000 to 1; or even 12,000 to 1. ... Stelco is one of those rare situations in which a change of external circumstances ... may result in the original equity having a more substantial "recovery" on emergence than outline above.

[31] The equity holders point out that while an earlier plan would have allowed the shareholders to benefit from the continued [page263] and anticipated growth in the Stelco equity, the present plan does not include any provision for the existing shareholders. I agree with counsel for Stelco that these arguments are premature. They raise issues for the supervising judge if and when he is called upon to exercise his discretion under s. 6 to sanction the Plan of arrangement.

Disposition

[32] Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal. On behalf of the court, I wish to thank all counsel for their very helpful written and oral submissions that made it possible to deal with this appeal expeditiously.

Appeal dismissed.

AMENDED this 24 day of September, 2014 Pursuant to Rule 3.62 dated the 24 day of Sept '14

CLERK OF THE COURT

FORM 10
[RULE 3.25]

CLERK OF THE COURT
FILED STAMP
SEP 24 2014
JUDICIAL CENTRE OF CALGARY

ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF CLAIM FILED ON OCTOBER 31, 2013

COURT FILE NUMBER	1301-12927
COURT	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
PLAINTIFF	**Poseidon Concepts Corp.**
DEFENDANTS	**A. Scott Dawson, Matt Mackenzie, Lyle D. Michaluk, Harley L. Winger, Clifford L. Wiebe, Dean R. Jensen, Joe Kostelecky, David Belcher, Kenneth J. Faircloth, Wazir (Mike) Seth, Neil W. Richardson, John Doe 1-5, Jane Doe 1-5, ▲ Peyto Exploration & Development Corp., and KPMG LLP**
DOCUMENT	**AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM**
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	**BENNETT JONES LLP** Barristers and Solicitors #4500, 855 – 2nd Street S.W. Calgary, Alberta T2P 4K7 Attention: Ken Lenz Telephone No.: 403-298-3317 Fax No.: 403-265-7219 Client File No.: 11866-66

NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS

You are being sued. You are a defendant.

Go to the end of this document to see what you can do and when you must do it.

Note: State below only facts and not evidence (Rule 13.6)

Statement of facts relied on:

THE PARTIES

The Plaintiff

1. The Plaintiff, Poseidon Concepts Corp. ("PSN") is a corporation incorporated pursuant to the laws of Alberta.

The PSN Directors

2. The Defendant, Lyle Michaluk, as far as is known to the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta. At all material times, he was the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and a director of PSN. From inception until November 1, 2011, he was the Vice-President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of Open Range Energy Corp. ("Old Open Range"). On or about December 27, 2012, Michaluk resigned as PSN's CEO and director and was appointed PSN's interim CFO.

3. The Defendant, A. Scott Dawson, as far as is known to the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta. At all material times, he was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of PSN, a member of PSN's Board of Directors Audit Committee, and was appointed the Executive Chairman of PSN. He was also the CEO and a director of Old Open Range from inception until November 1, 2011, when he became the CEO and a director of New Open Range (as later defined). On or about December 27, 2012, Dawson assumed the position of PSN's interim President and CEO.

4. The Defendant, Harley L. Winger, is an individual resident in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta. At all material times, he was a director of PSN. He was also a director of Old Open Range from inception until November 1, 2011, and as of November 1, 2011, a director of New Open Range.

5. The Defendant, Clifford L. Wiebe, as far as is known by the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the United States of America. He was the President and COO of PSN and a

director. Prior to November 1, 2011, he was the Completions Manager of Old Open Range. Wiebe resigned as the President and COO and a director of PSN on or about December 27, 2012.

6. The Defendant, Dean R. Jensen, as far as is known by the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the City of Calgary. He was at all material times a director of PSN. He was also a director of Old Open Range from its inception and a director of New Open Range beginning November 1, 2011, and was Chair of its Audit Committee.

7. The Defendant, Neil W. Richardson, as far as is known by the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the state of Utah, in the United States of America. He was a director of PSN and a number of its Audit Committee during the relevant period.

The PSN Officers

8. The Defendant, Matt MacKenzie, is an individual resident in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta. At all material times, he was the CFO of PSN. MacKenzie resigned as PSN's CFO on or about December 27, 2012.

9. The Defendant, Joe Kostelecky, as far as is known to the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the United States of America. He was the Senior Vice-President, U.S. Division of PSN until he was appointed Executive Vice-President on or around May 9, 2012. Kostelecky was responsible for PSN's U.S. sales. He resigned as Executive Vice-President of PSN on or about January 10, 2013.

10. The Defendant, David Belcher, as far as is known by the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the Province of Alberta. He was the Vice-President, Finance of PSN and the Controller and Treasurer of Old Open Range. He resigned in January 2013.

The PSN Employees

11. Jane Doe 1-5 and John Doe 1-5 were at all material times employees of Old Open Range, PSN, and/or New Open Range who were involved in the recording of revenue from the tank business.

The Old Open Range Directors

12. The Defendant, Kenneth J. Faircloth, as far as is known by the Plaintiff, is an individual resident in the Province of Alberta. He was a director of Old Open Range from its inception until November 1, 2011, at which time he became a director of New Open Range. He was also Old Open Range Audit Committee Chair.

13. The Defendant, W.C. (Mike) Seth, as far as is known to the Plaintiff, is an individual resident Alberta. He was a director of Old Open Range from its inception until November 1, 2011, at which time he became a director of New Open Range. He was also a member of the Old Open Range Audit Committee.

The New Open Range Directors and Officers

14. The Defendants, Michaluk, Dawson, Winger, Jensen, Faircloth and Seth were at all material times directors and/or officers of New Open Range.

Peyto Exploration & Development Corp.

15. The Defendant, Peyto Exploration & Development Corp. ("Peyto") is a corporation incorporated pursuant to the laws of Alberta with an office in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta. It is the successor of New Open Range by way of an amalgamation effective December 31, 2012.

16. At all material times:

   (a) The individual Defendants were de jure or de facto directors and/or officers of Old Open Range, PSN, New Open Range, or a number of them; and

   (b) PSN and New Open Range had substantially the same management and directing minds, and were under common control and direction. Information known by the directors and officers of PSN was known or ought to have been known by the directors and officers of New Open Range.

KPMG LLP

17. KPMG LLP ("KPMG") is a limited liability partnership with an office in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta.

18. From at least November 1, 2011 to April 9, 2013, KPMG provided independent audit and other services to PSN. Prior to November 1, 2011, KPMG provided independent audit and other services to Old Open Range, and to New Open Range after November 1, 2011.

19. KPMG issued audited financial statements for the fiscal year 2011. KPMG also reviewed PSN's quarterly financial statements for the fiscal quarters Q3 2011, and Q1, Q2 and Q3 2012.

20. As a result of its longstanding role as auditor of Old Open Range and then of PSN and New Open Range, KPMG had a detailed working understanding of the financial and accounting systems used by Old Open Range and PSN and the financial results experienced by those entities from time to time. KPMG was also well aware of, and heavily involved in, the Plan of Arrangement (as described below) and of the negotiations that took place between Old Open Range and PSN following the Plan of Arrangement, in which the companies determined what assets and liabilities would be borne by each.

THE PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

21. On or about November 28, 2005, Old Open Range was formed by way of amalgamation. Since approximately 2010, Old Open Range carried on two areas of business: 1) the oil and gas exploration and production ("E&P") business (the "E&P Business"); and 2) the fluids handling (tank) business (the "Tank Rental Business"). The Tank Rental Business began in about 2010.

22. On November 1, 2011, Old Open Range completed a Plan of Arrangement (the "Arrangement") pursuant to which it divided its business into two separate public companies. The new corporation, New Open Range, assumed the E&P Business of Old Open Range. Old Open Range changed its name to PSN and retained the Tank Rental Business.

23. After the implementation of the Arrangement, certain officers and directors of Old Open Range were appointed directors and/or officers of New Open Range and/or PSN. In particular:

(a) The Defendant Dawson, formerly President and CEO of Old Open Range, was appointed New Open Range's President and CEO and a director. He was also a director of PSN;

(b) The Defendant Winger, formerly a director of Old Open Range, was appointed a director of New Open Range and PSN;

(c) The Defendant Jensen, formerly a director of Old Open Range, was appointed a director of New Open Range and PSN;

(d) The Defendant Michaluk, formerly the Vice-President, Finance and CFO of Old Open Range, was appointed the ▲ CEO and a director of PSN;

(e) The Defendant Faircloth, formerly a director of Old Open Range, was appointed a director of New Open Range; and

(f) Wazir (Mike) Seth, formerly a director of Old Open Range, was appointed a director of New Open Range.

24. Thus, at the time of the Arrangement and thereafter, PSN and New Open Range had substantially the same management and directing minds, and were under common control and direction.

25. Pursuant to the Arrangement, the E&P assets of Old Open Range were conveyed to New Open Range pursuant to a Separation and Transition Agreement effective November 1, 2011 in exchange for the issuance of New Open Range common shares to PSN. The Separation and Transition Agreement also provided for the assumption of certain PSN liabilities by New Open Range.

26. Also pursuant to the Separation and Transition Agreement, New Open Range acquired the E&P Business, including all of the assets, but did not assume any of the outstanding bank indebtedness (approximately $15.5 million) relating to the E&P Business.

27. New Open Range and PSN also entered into the following financing arrangements:

    (a) the assumption by New Open Range of PSN's bank indebtedness net of $25 million, as a result of which PSN assumed net debt to New Open Range in the amount of $36.5 million (the "OR Debt"); and

    (b) the issuance by PSN of a $15 million promissory note payable to New Open Range, due November 1, 2012, on which PSN drew $10 million immediately (the "PSN Note").

28. PSN repaid the OR debt fully in or about March, 2012, after it undertook a public offering for gross proceeds of $82.5 million, and repaid the PSN Note in or about June 2012, in connection with the closing of its credit facilities with a syndicate of banks established on November 1, 2011, and the establishment of new credit facilities with a syndicate of banks on June 29, 2012.

WRONGFUL ACTS, OMISSIONS, AND BREACHES WITH RESPECT TO THE ARRANGEMENT

29. The Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers were, at all material times, fiduciaries of Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, and owed to Old Open Range and PSN, along with the Defendant PSN directors and officers, fiduciary duties, duties of utmost good faith and duties of care. PSN had a reasonable expectation that its affairs would be managed in good faith and in its best interests, as well as those of its stakeholders.

30. At the time of the Arrangement, Old Open Range owed approximately $60 million under its credit facilities, of which $51.5 million pertained to the E&P Business, which was acquired by New Open Range pursuant to the Arrangement. However, New Open Range did not assume any portion of the bank indebtedness relevant to the E&P Business or the Tank Rental Business.

31. Despite not assuming any portion of the bank indebtedness relating to the E&P Business, the Defendant directors and officers of Old Open Range and PSN represented to the public that the bank indebtedness associated with the E&P business would be paid to PSN by New Open Range.

32. However, PSN did not receive money from New Open Range in respect of the bank indebtedness attributed to the E&P Business. Rather, pursuant to the Separation and Transition Agreement and subsequent transactions, New Open Range assumed a portion of PSN's bank indebtedness and advanced $10 million to PSN pursuant to the PSN Note.

33. As result, PSN became indebted to New Open Range in the amount of $46.5 million, which amounts were in fact related to the E&P Business, including the assets, which were acquired by New Open Range.

34. The effect of the above was to bestow upon New Open Range the benefit of the E&P assets without the corresponding debt, which placed it in a far better financial and operating position than PSN. This suggests that the predominant purpose of the Arrangement was not to advance the legitimate business interests of PSN and its stakeholders. Rather, the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers chose to use their position and power to secure benefits for New Open Range and themselves.

35. Based on the above and other facts as may be discovered, the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties, duties of utmost good faith and duties of care, and were negligent in the performance of their duties and breached their contractual obligations. The Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers breached their duties to Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, by using their positions and power to secure a corporate opportunity for New Open Range to the detriment of PSN, as well as secure personal benefits for themselves. They also failed to ensure that PSN was not left in a financially vulnerable position after the Arrangement, and that New Open Range's business interests were not favoured over PSN's.

36. Further, and in the alternative, the failure to ensure that PSN's business interests were not sacrificed in favour of those of New Open Range, and that PSN was not left in a

financially vulnerable position, amounted to a breach of the duty of care. As a result of these breaches, PSN acquired a disproportionate amount of indebtedness after the Arrangement, which required it to seek further bank financing, among other things, and left it vulnerable to insolvency.

37. Further, and in the alternative, the Defendant Open Range directors carried on the business or affairs of Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded the interests of PSN and its stakeholders. PSN and its stakeholders had a reasonable expectation that the Open Range directors would carry out the affairs of PSN in a manner that was lawful and that would not have preferred the interests of New Open Range or insiders. PSN claims relief under s. 242 of the *Alberta Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c. B-9 ("*ABCA*").

38. Further and in the alternative, the Defendant New Open Range directors and officers and New Open Range (now Peyto) were knowing and willing participants in the Arrangement, and have benefited from the breaches of the Defendant Old Open Range and PSN directors and officers described above. As such, they are in knowingly receipt the benefits of these breaches of duty, and a constructive trust should be imposed over all of the E&P assets (now in the hands of Peyto), the monies paid with respect to the OR Debt and the PSN Note, as well as any proceeds from the sale of shares in PSN by the Defendant New Open Range directors and officers and any other benefits or compensation as will be proven at the trial of this action.

THE ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES AND THE DEMISE OF PSN

39. All of the facts and information described below were at all material times known to all of the Defendants, including New Open Range and its directing minds.

40. By means of the disclosure documents and other materials, PSN's directors and officers created the false image of PSN as a prosperous, highly profitable company.

41. At all material times, PSN's directors and officers disregarded the policies, procedures and controls that are required from a reporting issuer. They reported tens of millions of

dollars in phantom revenues and accounts receivable ("AR") that were not recognized in accordance with applicable accounting principles.

42. PSN manufactured and leased tank systems and generated revenue by providing fluid handling solutions to oil and gas E&P companies. PSN provided services to customers principally under "day-to-day" and "long-term" contracts. Under the day-to-day contracts, PSN purported to invoice the customers at the completion of the service for the number of days during which the tanks were located at the customer's lease location. Under the "long-term" contracts, PSN purported to invoice customers at a daily rate for the duration of the purported contract, regardless of whether or not the tank systems were actually delivered to the customer's location.

43. On November 14, 2012, PSN released the results from its Q3 2012 operations, which disclosed, among other things:

(a) a charge of $9.5 million for uncollectable debt would be taken, reducing its AR position;

(b) a significantly increasing AR portfolio of $125.5 million, including $36 million past due;

(c) PSN's internal controls over financial reporting were not "completely effective";

(d) PSN's new credit policy was put in place to mitigate any problems with doubtful receivables; and

(e) that only 38% of PSN's AR portfolio was purportedly due from investment grade parties.

44. This disclosure caused PSN's share price to decline from $13.22 as at the close of trading on November 14, 2012, to $5.00 as at the close of trading on November 15, 2012. On November 15, 2012, approximately 40% of PSN's shares were traded.

45. Further disclosure was made on December 27, 2012 by PSN which revealed, among other things, that:

(a) a Special Committee ("SC") of the Board of Directors had been struck to investigate, in part, issues relating to the write-off of certain AR. The SC's mandate included the review and assessment of PSN's business processes and controls;

(b) PSN had been addressing its AR and actively pursuing collections; and

(c) PSN may have to make additional write downs of AR in the future, which write downs may be significant.

46. As a result of this disclosure, PSN's share price decreased from $3.31 as at the close of trading on December 24, 2012 to $1.48 as at the close of trading on December 27, 2012.

47. On February 14, 2013, PSN disclosed further that:

(a) based on the recommendations of the SC, PSN's Board of Directors had determined that $95 to $106 million of its purported $148 million revenue recorded during the first nine months of 2012 should not have been recognized;

(b) as a result, $94 to $102 million of PSN's $125.5 million AR should not have been recorded;

(c) PSN's Q1, Q2, and Q3 2012 interim financial statements and Management's Discussion &Analysis required restatements;

(d) PSN's Q1, Q2, and Q3 2012 Interim Financial Statements did not comply with recognized accounting principles or with PSN's own accounting policies;

(e) PSN's 2012 EBITDA forecast could no longer be relied upon; and

(f) all of these events were primarily related to PSN's long-term contracts.

48. As a result of this disclosure, PSN's shares decreased from $0.89 as at February 13, 2013, to $0.27 on February 14, 2013, when PSN's shares were ceased traded by the Alberta Securities Commission.

49. As a result of the overstatement of revenue, PSN was in default under the terms of its credit facilities, and on or about April 9, 2013, applied for creditor protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "*CCAA*").

50. It was also disclosed in April 2013 that a review and assessment of PSN's financials had given rise to questions with respect to the recorded revenues in its 2011 Annual Financials.

51. Effective May 17, 2013, PSN was delisted by the TSX.

52. In connection with the CCAA proceedings, PSN entered into an asset purchase agreement with a buyer on May 24, 2013, which, among other things, valued PSN's AR at approximately $3.4 million.

ACTS, OMISSIONS AND BREACHES OF THE DEFENDANT PSN DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

53. As an audited public company, and in accordance with recognized accounting principles and its own policies, PSN's directors, officers and employees were required to:

(a) accurately disclose the quantum of revenue earned in the quarter in which it was actually earned. For the leasing of the tank systems, revenue is recognized where there is persuasive evidence of a contract in the quarter in which tank rentals and related services are provided and only when collectability is reasonably assured;

(b) monitor its AR on an ongoing basis, to evaluate the quality of its ▲ AR position, and to record allowances for doubtful receivables in order to not report inflated AR; and

(c) review its AR quality on an ongoing basis to determine if any debt had become uncollectible.

54. At all material times, the Defendant PSN directors and officers and employees, or any one of them, failed to ensure that PSN implemented and followed recognized accounting principles and its own accounting policies, with the result that PSN's financial reporting

and disclosure documents were at all relevant times materially defective, false and misleading with respect to PSN's operational and financial results, especially PSN's financial position, financial performance, and cash flows, the particulars of which include, among other things:

(a) PSN recorded tens of millions of dollars of revenues and AR even though there was no reliable documentation of an arrangement, services were not provided, the rates were not fixed or determinable and/or collectability was not reasonably assured;

(b) PSN recorded revenue from customers who had not entered into a valid and legally enforceable contract with PSN, or in respect of whom valid evidence of revenue did not exist;

(c) PSN recorded revenue in respect of provision of services to clients while collectability was not reasonably assured;

(d) PSN did not have sufficient credit policies in place to ensure that customers would pay the amounts they purportedly owed to PSN;

(e) PSN recorded revenue from clients who indicated they would not pay and in respect of whom collectability was not reasonably assured;

(f) PSN failed to record sufficient allowances for doubtful receivables; and

(g) PSN did not have effective policies and controls in place to address AR issues.

55. As a result of the foregoing, the Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees, or any one of them, followed revenue recognition and accounting practices that were at all material times contrary to applicable accounting principles and PSN's own revenue recognition policy. PSN was caused to record revenue and AR when one or more of the revenue recognition requirements had not been met, which resulted in gross misstatements of the company's revenue, AR, cash flow and assets.

56. These improper revenue recognition practices were known to the Defendant PSN directors and officers, and those Defendant PSN employees responsible for PSN's accounting.

57. The Defendant PSN directors and officers and employees were, at all material times, fiduciaries of PSN and owed to PSN fiduciary duties, duties of trust, duties of utmost good faith and duties of care. Those duties and obligations were also implied terms of the employment contracts between PSN and its officers and employees. Among other things, the Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees were required to conduct themselves and the operations of PSN in a manner that was lawful.

58. The Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees breached their duties to PSN by failing to ensure that PSN implemented and followed proper accounting policies and procedures, which resulted in the overstatement of PSN's revenue and its ultimate demise. The Defendant PSN directors, officers, and employees, or any one of them, breached their duties by:

(a) causing PSN to materially overstate the value of its revenues;

(b) preparing, approving, certifying, and/or publishing false or misleading financial statements (including interim financial statements) and public disclosure documents;

(c) failing to maintain PSN's records in a manner that would be expected of a publicly traded company, including by carrying out a practice of improperly recognizing revenue for long-term contracts;

(d) failing to implement and follow proper accounting procedures and policies, including the implementation and maintenance of internal controls and revenue recognition policies;

(e) failing to adequately supervise finance and accounting employees;

(f) preparing and/or publishing false information in connection with obtaining financing through share offerings or credit facilities;

(g) authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in the misstatement of revenues and the failure to take allowances against AR;

(h) failing to ensure PSN's business was being carried out properly;

(i) failing to ensure PSN's financial statements accurately reflected the substance of the transactions being carried out by PSN; and

(j) failing to take steps to correct PSN's financial reporting with respect to revenue recognition, even after having learned it was materially misstated in June 2012.

ACTS, OMISSIONS AND BREACHES OF THE DEFENDANT OLD OPEN RANGE AND NEW OPEN RANGE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

59. Further, as stated above, the Defendant directors and officers of Old Open Range are also fiduciaries of PSN and owed to PSN fiduciary duties, duties of trust, duties of utmost good faith and duties of care.

60. Further, by virtue of their possession of information regarding the business operations and finances of Old Open Range and PSN, and the vulnerability of PSN, the Defendant New Open Range directors and officers were also fiduciaries of PSN and owed it fiduciary duties, duties of trust, duties of utmost good faith and duties of care.

61. The improper revenue recognition practices of PSN were known to the Defendant Old Open Range and New Open Range directors and officers due to the fact that the three companies were under common control and direction at all material times. In particular, Michaluk, as CFO of Old Open Range, designed, implemented and oversaw its accounting procedures and policies, which procedures and policies were continued at PSN.

62. The Defendant Old Open Range and New Open Range directors and officers breached their duties to PSN by failing to ensure that Old Open Range, and later PSN, implemented and followed proper accounting policies and procedures and had the necessary controls in place to ensure PSN did not misstate its financials. The Defendant

Old Open Range and New Open Range directors and officers, or any one of them, breached their duties by:

(a) causing Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, to materially overstate the value of its revenues;

(b) preparing, approving, certifying, and/or publishing false or misleading financial statements (including interim financial statements) and public disclosure documents;

(c) failing to maintain Old Open Range's, and thus, PSN's, records in a manner that would be expected of a publicly traded company, including by carrying out a practice of improperly recognizing revenue for long-term contracts;

(d) failing to implement and follow proper accounting procedures and policies, including the implementation and maintenance of internal controls and revenue recognition policies;

(e) failing to adequately supervise finance and accounting employees; and

(f) authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in the misstatement of revenues and the failure to take allowances against AR.

63. Moreover, the Directors of Old Open Range and New Open Range personally benefitted from these actions, by the receipt of shares in PSN, and the subsequent sale of these shares at a substantial premium.

64. The behavior of these Defendants amounts to a breach of their contractual, fiduciary and other duties to PSN. As a result of the breaches, PSN has suffered losses, which losses are not yet fixed and will be provided prior to trial.

NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF CONTRACT

65. Further, and in the alternative, the Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees were negligent in the performance of their duties to PSN and breached their contractual obligations. The Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees owed a duty of care to

ensure that PSN adopted, maintained, and followed adequate internal controls and accounting policies and procedures to ensure PSN's financial reporting was accurate.

66. Similarly, the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers were negligent in the performance of their duties to Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, and breached their contractual obligations. They owed a duty of care to ensure that Old Open Range, and thus, PSN, adopted, maintained, and followed adequate internal controls to ensure Old Open Range's, and thus, PSN's, financial reporting was accurate.

67. The failure to ensure that Old Open Range and PSN adopted, maintained, and followed adequate internal financial controls caused PSN's financial reporting to be inaccurate, and thus, amounted to a breach of the duty of care. As a result of the breaches, PSN was required to restate its financials for 2011 and 2012, causing PSN to suffer losses due to the decrease in its share price, its delisting from the TSX, and eventual sale through *CCAA* proceedings, among other losses.

68. In addition, by reason of the facts set out above, the Defendant PSN officers and employees have conducted themselves in a manner that disentitles them to retain the compensation that they received directly and indirectly from PSN, whether in the form of salary, bonuses, options, or otherwise. In light of all of the circumstances, PSN received no value for services provided by the PSN officers and employees in connection with their employment contracts, and such compensation should be returned to PSN.

OPPRESSION

69. In the circumstances, the Defendant PSN directors carried on the business or affairs of PSN in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded the interests of all of PSN's shareholders and creditors. Such shareholders and creditors had a reasonable expectation that the Defendants would carry out the affairs of PSN in a manner that was lawful and that would not have preferred the interests of insiders. PSN claims relief under s. 242 of the *ABCA*.

MISREPRESENTATIONS

70. The Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees made a number of false and misleading representations prior to November 14, 2012, including that:

(a) PSN's management had established and maintained a system of internal controls designed to ensure that financial information was relevant, reliable and accurate;

(b) PSN's internal controls over routine and non-complex accounting transactions were functioning adequately;

(c) PSN had a policy for evaluating its AR;

(d) the Audit Committee reviewed PSN's financial statements and its key risks and queried management about significant transactions;

(e) Senior Management of PSN performed daily oversight of the accounting records;

(f) PSN had a credit policy for evaluating the creditworthiness of its customers;

(g) PSN's financial statements were prepared in accordance with recognized accounting principles; and

(h) PSN had not taken an allowance for doubtful AR.

71. The above representations made and/or authorized by the Defendant PSN directors, officers, and employees, or any one of them, were untruthful and inaccurate. They knew that such representations were untrue and inaccurate or, alternatively, they were willfully blind as to their truth or accuracy.

72. Alternatively, the Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees, or any one of them, were negligent as to the truth or accuracy of the representations they made or authorized to be made to PSN, the public, and lenders regarding the financial situation of PSN.

73. PSN relied on the said representations to its detriment and has suffered losses as a result, which losses are not yet fixed and will be provided prior to trial.

THE IMPROPER DIVIDENDS

74. Since its inception, the Defendant PSN directors declared, and the Defendant PSN officers paid, monthly dividends to its shareholders.

75. Monthly dividends were declared and paid for the months of December 2011 to November 2012, and a dividend was declared for December 2012. These dividends were declared and/or paid at a time when there were reasonable grounds for believing that:

(a) PSN is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due, or

(b) the realizable value of the PSN's assets would thereby be less than the aggregate of its liabilities and stated capital of all classes.

76. The directors of PSN consented to the declaration and payment of dividends to shareholders beginning for the months of December 2011 to November 2012 after it was known or ought to have been known that there were problems with PSN's accounting reporting, and particularly, that its revenues had been overstated, and thus, the realizable value of its assets would be less that the aggregate of its liabilities and stated capital. As a result, PSN's directors contravened s. 43 of the *ABCA* and breached their fiduciary and other duties to PSN. PSN is entitled to recover the dividends paid out from the directors pursuant to s. 118 of the *ABCA*.

NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF CONTRACT OF KPMG

77. KPMG, as the auditor of PSN, Old Open Range and New Open Range, owed duties of care, including duties in contract and/or tort, to PSN to meet the standard of care of professional accountants and auditors and to comply with the rules of professional conduct of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta in performing an audit and review. In particular, in accepting the appointment as PSN's auditor, KPMG undertook to, among other things:

(a) audit PSN's financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") and Canadian Auditing Standards ("CAS");

(b) ensure PSN's financial statements presented fairly the financial position of PSN in accordance with GAAS; and

(c) review PSN's quarterly financial statements in accordance with CAS.

78. Further, KPMG's engagement letter of November 8, 2011 provided that KPMG would:

(a) plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements were free from material misstatement;

(b) identify and assess risks of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, based on an understanding, in part, of PSN's internal controls;

(c) obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about whether material misstatements exist;

(d) form an opinion on PSN's financial statements based on conclusions drawn from the audit evidence; and

(e) communicate matters required by professional standards, including but not limited to: fraud and non-compliance with laws and regulations, control deficiencies, misstatements, significant difficulties and matters arising from the audit.

79. In its capacity as auditor, KPMG failed to assess the adequacy of PSN's internal controls and take any steps to adequately test or audit AR and revenue recognition in the audit for fiscal 2011 (the "2011 Audit"). Those same errors were reflected in KPMG's ongoing reviews, which it knew or ought to have known would be relied upon by PSN and its stakeholders. Where the 2011 Audit failed to uncover serious accounting flaws within PSN, those errors were perpetuated in the quarterly reviews, which served to mask PSN's ongoing issues.

80. KPMG's 2011 Audit Report provided that the audited financial statements fairly represented PSN's financial position, financial performance and cash flows, and stated that:

(a) the audited 2011 financial statements were conducted in accordance with GAAS;

(b) GAAS required KPMG to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement; and

(c) the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial position of PSN as at December 31, 2011, December 31, 2010, and January 1, 2010, and its consolidated financial performance and its consolidated cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2011 and December 31, 2010 in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS").

81. With respect to PSN's quarterly financial statements for 2012, KPMG allowed PSN to rely on it as one of the control mechanisms used by PSN to overcome its own accounting weaknesses. In all of those reviews of the 2012 quarterly financial statements (the "2012 Reviews"), KPMG raised no concerns with PSN and represented that it had no reason to believe that the quarterly financial statements did not fairly represent PSN's financial performance.

82. However, the audited financial statements prepared by KPMG for fiscal 2011 and the 2012 quarterly financial statements were materially misstated and did not accurately or fairly represent, in all material respects, the financial position of PSN as at the relevant date in accordance with IFRS. PSN's financial statements for 2011 and 2012 quarterly financial statements were materially misstated at the time they were issued due to the failure of KPMG, in breach of the duties they owed to PSN, to uncover and reveal the irregularities and errors therein.

83. In particular, in performing the 2011 Audit and 2012 Reviews, KPMG was negligent and in breach of contract in failing to, among other things

(a) perform the 2011 Audit so as to provide reasonable assurance that the 2011 financial statements were free from material misstatement and adequately ;

(b) perform the 2011 Audit in compliance with GAAS;

(c) evaluate and assess PSN's internal controls, and ensure PSN adopted, maintained and followed adequate internal controls;

(d) uncover and disclose the reasonably discoverable material overstatements of PSN's revenue and receivables;

(e) ensure PSN's financial statements complied with recognized accounting principles and/or PSN's own accounting policies;

(f) reserve or qualify the audit report;

(g) to apply appropriate consideration of materiality and professional skepticism, and ensure PSN's financial reporting was IFRS compliant;

(h) require a reversal of revenue by PSN where revenue recognition tests were not satisfied;

(i) investigate, under CAS and IFRS, the increases in overall accounts receivable;

(j) undertake a proper risk assessment and investigate the risks it had identified;

(k) apply the appropriate professional standards in the review of quarterly financial statements issued in 2012, and ensure they adequately and fairly represented the business and affairs of PSN; and

(l) undertake the necessary inquiries and confirm the plausibility of PSN's financing reporting, especially in light of the non-existent internal controls at PSN.

84. KPMG's breaches resulted in the overstatement of PSN's revenues, AR and financial performance of PSN. Had KPMG performed the 2011 Audit and 2012 Reviews in accordance with the applicable accounting standards, it would have discovered PSN recorded false revenue and AR and that the financial statements materially misrepresented PSN's financial position, financial performance and cash flows.

85. As a result of KPMG's breaches, PSN was required to restate its financial statements for 2011 and 2012, causing it to suffer losses due to a decrease in share price, delisting from the TSX and eventual sale through the CCAA proceedings, among other losses.

86. In addition, KPMG has conducted itself in a manner that disentitles it to retain the compensation it received from PSN. Based on the above, PSN received no value for the services KPMG provided and the compensation received should be returned.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

87. All of the Defendants have been unjustly enriched by the wrongful acts and omissions described herein. PSN suffered a corresponding deprivation, for which there is no juristic reason. As a result, PSN is entitled to a constructive trust and disgorgement with respect to such enrichment, which includes:

(a) the amounts received by the Defendant Old Open Range, PSN and New Open Range directors and officers who sold PSN shares at artificially inflated prices;

(b) the bonuses and other performance based compensation received by the Defendant directors, officers and employees of PSN and the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers;

(c) the compensation received by KPMG for the audit and review services; and

(d) such other amounts as shall be proven at the trial of this action.

88. PSN also claims a constructive trust over the E&P assets and monies paid pursuant to the OR Debt and the PSN Note pursuant to s. 242 of the *ABCA*, and alternatively, by way of unjust enrichment, as New Open Range was unjustly enriched as a result of the Arrangement, for which no juristic reason exists and caused PSN loss.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

89. New Open Range (Peyto) is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts, omissions and breaches of its directors, officers and employees.

DAMAGES

90. As a result of the wrongful acts, omissions and breaches of the Defendant PSN directors, officers and employees, or any one of them, and of the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers, or any one of them, and of the Defendant New Open Range directors and officers, or any one of them, PSN suffered losses and damages for which these Defendants and Peyto, as successor to New Open Range, are jointly and severally liable.

91. Further, KPMG's negligence and breach of contract caused damages to PSN, which damages were a reasonable foreseeable consequence of those breaches. Due to KPMG's breaches and negligence, PSN's financial position was overstated, which overstatement was relied upon by PSN to obtain credit facilities, enter into contracts with third parties, and induce shareholders to buy its shares. In addition, the overstatement of PSN's financial position ultimately resulted in PSN having to apply for *CCAA* protection and cease operating its business, causing PSN to suffer a loss of expectation or loss of opportunity

92. The particulars of such losses and damages are not yet fixed and will be provided prior to trial.

93. By virtue of the conduct described above, an award of punitive or exemplary damages is appropriate. The ▲ conduct of the Defendant PSN directors, officers, and employees, and of the Defendant Old Open Range directors and officers, and of the Defendant New Open Range directors and officers was high handed and demonstrated reckless and wonton disregard for PSN and its stakeholders.

STATUTES

94. PSN pleads and relies upon the provisions of the *ABCA* and the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c. J-2.

ALBERTA THE APPROPRIATE VENUE

95. There exists a real and substantial connection between the facts on which the claims herein are based and Alberta and in particular:

(a) the claim relates to Alberta corporations and the majority of Defendants are Alberta residents;

(b) the claim is governed by Alberta law;

(c) the claim relates to breaches of fiduciary duty and a breach of the standard of care in Alberta;

(d) the Defendants who are resident outside Alberta are necessary and proper parties; and

(e) such further grounds as may be necessary to demonstrate in the course of this action.

TRIAL OF THE ACTION

96. PSN proposes that the trial of the action be held at the Calgary Courts Centre in Calgary, Alberta. In the opinion of PSN, this action will likely take less than 25 days to try.

Remedy sought:

97. The Plaintiff claims as against the Defendant PSN directors only, jointly and severally:

(a) judgment or damages in the amount of the dividends wrongfully declared and paid for the months of December 2011 to November 2012 pursuant to s. 118 of the *ABCA*;

(b) interest calculated pursuant to the *Judgment Interest Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-1; and

(c) Such further and other relief as this Honourable deems just.

98. The Plaintiff claims as against KPMG:

(a) judgment or damages for losses suffered as a result of breach of contract, and/or negligence in the amount of $100,000,000.00, or such other amount as may be proven at trial;

(b) an order for disgorgement and an accounting of all benefits received as a result of the wrongful conduct;

(c) interest calculated pursuant to the *Judgment Interest Act*, RSA 2000, c. J-1;

(d) solicitor-and-his-own-client costs; and

(e) such further and other relief as this Honourable Court deems just.

99. The Plaintiff claims as against the Defendants, jointly and severally:

(a) judgment or damages for losses suffered as a result of breach of contract, breach of duty (contractual, tortuous, equitable, fiduciary, statutory, and/or other duties), misrepresentation, breach of trust, and/or duty of care and skill by, negligence by, and/or unjust enrichment, in the amount of ▲ $100,000,000.00, or such other amount as may be proven at trial;

(b) an order for restitution and/or such other equitable remedy for the breach of duties and other tortuous conduct referred to in paragraph 75(a);

(c) an order that the E&P assets, and the monies received by New Open Range from the OR Debt and the PSN Note from PSN are held in constructive trust for PSN;

(d) a declaration that any benefits received by the Defendants as a result of their wrongful conduct are held in trust for PSN, including the proceeds of the sale of shares, bonuses, and other compensation;

(e) an order for disgorgement and an accounting of all of the benefits received by the Defendants as a result of their wrongful conduct, including the proceeds of the sale of shares, bonuses, and other compensation;

(f) indemnity from any amounts directed to be paid by Poseidon as a result of the wrongful conduct set out herein;

(g) punitive and/or exemplary damages in the amount of $1,000,000;

(h) interest calculated pursuant to the *Judgment Interest Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-1;

(i) solicitor-and-his own-client costs; and

(j) such further and other relief as this Honourable Court deems just.

NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT(S)

You only have a short time to do something to defend yourself against this claim:

20 days if you are served in Alberta

1 month if you are served outside Alberta but in Canada

2 months if you are served outside Canada.

You can respond by filing a statement of defence or a demand for notice in the office of the clerk of the Court of Queen's Bench at Calgary, Alberta, AND serving your statement of defence or a demand for notice on the plaintiff's(s') address for service.

WARNING

If you do not file and serve a statement of defence or a demand for notice within your time period, you risk losing the law suit automatically. If you do not file, or do not serve, or are late in doing either of these things, a court may give a judgment to the plaintiff(s) against you.