

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
PCAS PATIENT CARE AUTOMATION SERVICES INC.
AND 2163279 ONTARIO INC. (the "Applicants")**

**APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS

March 23, 2012

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1. *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List])
2. *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Comm. List])
3. *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List])
4. *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List])

TAB 1

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Stelco Inc., Re

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IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO
STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004
Judgment: March 22, 2004
Docket: 04-CL-5306

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Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Rob Centa for United Steelworkers of America

Bob Thornton, Kyla Mahar for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants

Kevin J. Zych for Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders

David R. Byers for CIT

Kevin McElcheran for GE

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Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act

Steel company S Inc. applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") on January 29, 2004 — Union locals moved to rescind initial order and dismiss initial application of S Inc. and its subsidiaries on ground S Inc. was not "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of CCAA because S Inc. was not insolvent — Motion dismissed — Given time and steps involved in reorganization, condition of insolvency perforce required expanded meaning under CCAA — Union affiant stated that S Inc. will run out of funding by November 2004 — Given that November was ten months away from date of filing, S Inc. had liquidity problem — S Inc. realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access to further outside funding — S Inc. had negative equity of \$647 million — On balance of probabilities, S Inc. was insolvent and therefore was "debtor company" as at date of filing and entitled to apply for CCAA protection.

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), *Re* (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., *Re* (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd. (1996), [1997] 1 W.W.R. 209, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 148 Sask. R. 135, 134 W.A.C. 135, 6 C.P.C. (4th) 90, 1996 CarswellSask 581 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Barsi v. Farcas (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered

Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Clarkson v. Sterling (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) — considered

Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 273, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156, 1986 CarswellBC 481 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Cumberland Trading Inc., Re (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Davidson v. Douglas (1868), 15 Gr. 347, 1868 CarswellOnt 167 (Ont. Ch.) — considered

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Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of) (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133, 1991 CarswellOnt 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 2213, 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74, 1950 CarswellOnt 101 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Gardner v. Newton (1916), 10 W.W.R. 51, 26 Man. R. 251, 29 D.L.R. 276, 1916 CarswellMan 83 (Man. K.B.) — considered

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306, 1991 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44, 1995 CarswellOnt 38 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

King Petroleum Ltd., Re (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1978 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 283, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317, 45 B.L.R. 14, 237 A.P.R. 283, 1989 CarswellINS 27 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 101 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 321 A.P.R. 73, 1992 CarswellPEI 13 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

MTM Electric Co., Re (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29, 1982 CarswellOnt 170 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1993 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5210, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 313, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*) 180 O.A.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 64, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 42 O.A.C. 321, (sub nom. *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp.*) 1 O.R. (3d) 131, 1990 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209, 1979 CarswellQue 76 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

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PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 49 C.P.R. (3d) 456, 64 O.A.C. 274, 15 O.R. (3d) 730, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 109, 1993 CarswellOnt 149 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (note), 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 68 O.A.C. 21 (note), 164 N.R. 78 (note), 16 O.R. (3d) xvi (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Proulx (2000), [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 2000 SCC 5, 2000 CarswellMan 32, 2000 CarswellMan 33, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 212 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7, 21 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 1993 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

TDM Software Systems Inc., Re (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92, 1986 CarswellOnt 203 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157, 1986 CarswellBC 499 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Webb v. Stenton (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72, 73 O.R. (2d) 774, 1990 CarswellOnt 181 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (a) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (b) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (c) — considered

s. 43(7) — referred to

s. 121(1) — referred to

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s. 121(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" (a) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (b) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (c) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (d) — considered

s. 12 — referred to

s. 12(1) "claim" — referred to

Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11

Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

debtor company

It seems to me that the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency . . . which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

MOTION by union that steel company was not "debtor company" as defined in *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

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- (c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or
- (d) is in the course of being wound-up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bkcy.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bkcy.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing

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sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last gasp* of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throes.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throes" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

15 I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where

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the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

19 I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the *Bankruptcy Act* was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

21 The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . .

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its appli-

cation, admit its insolvency.

22 It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1) . . .

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

- (a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,
- (b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or
- (c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

24 I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former *Bankruptcy Act* unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor *prior* to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

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25 It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

26 Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

27 On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

28 The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

29 In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past.* I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and

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coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

33 I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (Que. S.C.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.

37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

35 But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

36 I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to

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determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *supra* at p. 162.

37 The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

38 As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "sometime in the long run . . . eventually" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

39 I have not given any benefit to the \$313 - \$363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

40 It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the stay and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

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41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33 . . . They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.

25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge erred in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

45 The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or

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may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and its text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 *Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated* *supra* at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

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The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

53 In *Gardner v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re*, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Gagnier, Re* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

54 It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

55 I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

56 All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd., supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie, Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of)*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital*

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Management Inc., *supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re*, 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

58 There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variably made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

59 It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.*, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. . . .

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

60 The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

61 I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."

71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, underestimate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

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63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

64 As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

65 From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the capitalized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

66 On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1080 million.

67 Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of (\$433 million minus \$1080 million) or *negative* \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

68 In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

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69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

70 I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

Motion dismissed.

Appendix

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TAB 2

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1993 CarswellOnt 183, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992

Judgment: January 6, 1993

Docket: Doc. B366/92

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Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy*, for applicants.

L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada.

R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal.

J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.

Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada.

Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne[FN*] Inc., proposed monitor.

John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada.

Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings.

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Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.*) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — referred to

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

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Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — referred to

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — referred to

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — referred to

Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — referred to

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — referred to

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — considered

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — referred to

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — referred to

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — referred to

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen.

1993 CarswellOnt 183, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847

Div.) — *referred to*

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*) 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

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s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

- (a) short service of the notice of application;
- (b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;
- (c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;
- (d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

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(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act*, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lender also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

- (a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.
- (b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.
- (c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.
- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.

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- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.); *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.). The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.), at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.), reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.), at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel*

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Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) ; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , *supra*, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , *supra* at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , *supra*, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , *supra*, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , *supra*, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , *supra*, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) , at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , *supra*, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , *supra*, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.) . It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* , *supra*, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.* , 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act* , whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

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(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, *supra*, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, *supra*, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, *supra*, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, *supra*, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, *supra*, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (Que. C.A.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, *supra*, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions

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of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik*, unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.*, unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these.* (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

The Power to Stay

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discretionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

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The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period*.

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, *supra* (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems*, *supra*, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at

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71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach*) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.).

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In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122, appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.*) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:

(1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships*, (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the

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business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership*, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test*, (1992), *supra*, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business

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operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

FN* As amended by the court.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 3

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS
CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION,
NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009
Written reasons: July 23, 2009
Docket: 09-CL-7950

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Counsel: Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al

Lyndon Barnes, Adam Hirsh for Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited

J. Carfagnini, J. Pasquariello for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

M. Starnino for Superintendent of Financial Services, Administrator of PBGF

S. Philpott for Former Employees

K. Zych for Noteholders

Pamela Huff, Craig Thorburn for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities
Partners III L.P., Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.

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Alex MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill, Matthew P. Gottlieb for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit for IBM

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Miscellaneous issues

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") --- Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units --- Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets --- Company was pursuing sale of its other business units --- Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement --- Motion granted --- Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote --- Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act --- Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate --- Sale of assets --- Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") --- Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units --- Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets --- Company was pursuing sale of its other business units --- Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement --- Motion granted --- Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote --- Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act --- Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) --- followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) --- considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) --- referred to

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Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 236, 2006 CarswellAlta 383, (sub nom. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 393 A.R. 340, 62 Alta. L.R. (4th) 168, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

s. 363 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.:

Introduction

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with ap-

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proximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will

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ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the

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CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows

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the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, at paras. 5, 9.

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("Cliffs Over Maple Bay"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured

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creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

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47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 4

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

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Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants

Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors

David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

Edmond Lamek for Asper Family

Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada

Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia

Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Debtor companies experienced financial problems due to deteriorating economic environment in Canada — Debtor companies took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets — Economic conditions did not improve nor did financial circumstances of debtor companies — They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees — Appli-

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cation was brought for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Proposed monitor was appointed — Companies qualified as debtor companies under Act — Debtor companies were in default of their obligations — Required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under s. 11(2) were filed — Stay of proceedings was granted to create stability and allow debtor companies to pursue their restructuring — Partnerships in application carried on operations that were integral and closely interrelated to business of debtor companies — It was just and convenient to grant relief requested with respect to partnerships — Debtor-in-possession financing was approved — Administration charge was granted — Debtor companies' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers was granted — Directors' and officers' charge was granted — Key employee retention plans were approved — Extension of time for calling of annual general meeting was granted.

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

General Publishing Co., Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216, 2003 CarswellOnt 275 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 71, 2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

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Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 15 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

s. 106(6) — referred to

s. 133(1) — referred to

s. 133(1)(b) — referred to

s. 133(3) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(2) — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 23 — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137(2) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

R. 38.09 — referred to

APPLICATION for relief pursuant to *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Pepall J.:

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.^[FN1] The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Background Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*^[FN2]. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members

hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

10 In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US\$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US\$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to \$75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of \$5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling \$2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately \$954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by \$272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by \$253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of \$1.578 billion compared to \$22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by \$8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was \$21 million compared to \$39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US\$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

14 On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US\$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% se-

cured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of \$75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to \$23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of \$100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately \$634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of \$10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US\$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of \$187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of \$430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than \$2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

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21 The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of \$13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of \$32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

Proposed Order

23 I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

24 This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshold Issues

25 Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US\$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[FN3] definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc., Re*[FN4]. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay

is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re*[FN5]; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re*[FN6]; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*[FN7]. In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*[FN8] and *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re*[FN9]

(C) DIP Financing

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.
- (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
- (3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.
- (4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

32 In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to \$100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately \$10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

34 Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is \$10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

35 Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and

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implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

39 As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to \$15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.
- (2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.
- (3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.
- (4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court ap-

proval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

44 The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D & O") charge in the amount of \$20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first \$85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company
- (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
- (3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
- (4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

46 I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of \$20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for \$30 million in coverage and \$10 million in excess coverage for a total of \$40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re*[FN10] Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case

scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of \$5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them.

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*[FN11] have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*[FN12] provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the

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holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from \$1000 to \$5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

Application granted.

FN1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended

FN2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.

FN3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.

FN4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).

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FN5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

FN6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

FN7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).

FN8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

FN9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).

FN10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).

FN11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.

FN12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

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IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
PCAS PATIENT CARE AUTOMATION SERVICES INC. AND 2163279 ONTARIO INC.
(the "Applicants")

Court File No. CV-12-9656-00CL

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

Proceedings commenced at Toronto

**BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES
OF THE APPLICANTS**

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